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ABSTRACT 
 
The dissertation critically examines and compares the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court and the High Courts in cases dealing with the right to life, as 
contained in section 11 of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. The 
dissertation analysis the issues of adjudication and the concept of justice in 
perspective. The main question is as follows: Are the Constitutional Court 
decisions objective, based on the interpretation of the constitutional text, or do they 
rather reflect the individual judge(s) personal perspective(s) or preference(s). 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to undertake a comparative study and analysis 
of the Constitutional Court decisions on the right to life, same aspect from different         
perspectives, and show that the right to life is not given proper effect to on account 
of the subjective approach to its interpretation undertaken by the judges. 
 
The Dissertation examines and scrutinises the Constitutional Court’s adjudication 
process. It found that the law is indeterminable, because the court’s decisions are 
not based on the interpretation of the law, but on the individual judges’ background 
and personal preferences. This is so because the court uses the majority rule 
principle in its decisions: The perception of the majority of the judges becomes the 
decision of the court. It is argued that when taking a decision a judge does not 
apply the law but instead uses the law to justify his predetermined decision on the 
matter. The conclusion supports the critical legal scholars’ theory relating to the 
indeterminacy of the law. It tests the objectivity of the judges using their own 
previous decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Human behaviour by nature requires regulation and sanction so that human society 
can survive and avoid chaos. Human beings normally live in a community, in a 
society where various social mechanisms exist to help them to live together in an 
acceptable orderly fashion.1 For this to happen there must be a legal system in 
place, and an impartial judiciary, whose function is to interpret the law. In both these 
applications, horizontal or vertical, an impartial judge adjudicates the dispute 
objectively without favour, fear or prejudice.2 Ideally the end results of the 
adjudication process should yield justice, thus the courts administer justice in the 
democratic countries.3 Democracy is a system of government based on regular 
elections where the electorate elects the public representatives; the political party 
that wins the majority votes establishes government in the state. The government of 
the state must then uphold the rule of law. In undemocratic countries governments 
disregard the rule of law so that it can hold on to power for as long as possible but in 
democratic countries the popular government will respect law and advance the 
                                                 
1 Bekker PM, Geldenheyns T, Joubert  JJ, Swanepoel JP, Terblanche SS, Van der Merwe SE, Van 
Rooyen  JH (2001) Criminal Procedure Hand Book at 5; Ashworth A (2006) Principles of Criminal 
Law 5th ed Oxford University Press, New York at 1-4; Smith JC (2002) Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 
10th ed Butterworths, Edinburg at 3 and 4; Molan M, Laser D, Bloy D (2000) Principles of Criminal 
Law 4th ed Cavendish Publishing Ltd, London at 7&8; Vorster WS (1988) The Right To Life in 
Bioethics at 70; see also Seleoane M (1996) Death Penalty: Let the People Decide   Vivlia at 14; Hart 
HLA (1961) The Concept of Law Oxford University Press at 97-120, Berns S (1983) Concise 
Jurisprudence The Federation Press at 3; Meyerson D (2011) Jurisprudence Oxford Univ Press at 13; 
Kavanagh A, Oberdiek J (eds) (2009) Arguing about Law Routledge London New York at 1-9; Samar 
VJ (1998) Justifying Judgement: Practising Law and Philosophy Univ Press of Kansas at 137, Carney 
T, (1991) Law at the Margin: Towards Social Participation, Oxford University Press at 1, Campbell EL 
(1996) The Science of Law, Gaunt Inc, Chapter 1.   
2 Section 165(2) of the 1996 Constitution; see also section 10(1) (a) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 
1959, section 2(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944.   
3 In South Africa the Constitution provides for universal adult suffrage, a common voter’s roll, regular 
elections and multi-party system of democratic government see section 1(d) of the Constitution of 
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, for connection between law and justice see Hutton C (2009) 
Language, Meaning and the Law Edinburgh Univ Press at 29; Samar supra n (1) at 62-64; for 
adjudication see Stone M Focusing on the Law in Marmor A (ed) (1995) Law and Interpretation 
Clarendon Press Oxford at 33; Frank J “Legal Realism” in Feinberg J, Coleman J (eds) (2004) 
Philosophy of Law  7th ed Thomson Wadsworth at 172; Meyerson  supra n (1) at 194-197.  
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interests of the electorate.4    
 
In South Africa the administration of justice is provided for in the Constitution.5 
Section 165 of the Constitution provides that the judicial authority of the Republic is 
vested in the courts, that the courts are independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour 
or prejudice. The Constitution sets out the hierarchy of courts.6 The Constitutional 
Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters, it may decide only 
constitutional matters and issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters 
and make the final decision on whether a matter is a constitutional matter or whether 
an issue is connected with a decision on a constitutional matter.7 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal is the highest court of appeal except in constitutional matters and 
may decide only appeals, issues connected with appeals and any other matter that 
may be referred to it in circumstances defined by an Act of Parliament.8  
 
The High Courts and Magistrates Courts also play a role in the administration of 
justice. The High Courts may decide any constitutional matter except a matter that 
only the Constitutional Court may decide or is assigned by an Act of Parliament to 
another Court of a status similar to a High Court and, court may decide any other 
matter not assigned to another court by an Act of Parliament.9 The Magistrates 
                                                 
4 Robert Mugabe has been in power since 1980 and his government has ignored several court orders 
resulting  in the rule of law not been respected, further reading on democracy see  Feinberg J, 
Coleman J (eds) (2004) Philosophy of Law 7th ed Thomson Wadsworth at 182-185; Hattersley AF 
(1930) A Short History of Democracy, Cambridge Univ Press at 1-14; Stourzh G & Lerner R (1959) 
Readings in American Democracy Oxford Univ Press at 436-446 and Holland D, Nonini DM, Lutz C, 
Bartlett L, Frederick-McGlathery M, Guldbransen TC and Murillo EG Jr (2007) Local Democracy 
Under Siege New York University Press at 3-4 and Roederer C and Moelendorf D (2006) 
Jurisprudence, Juta at pp 406-407, Friedrich CJ and Chapman JW (eds) (1963) Nomes VI Justice, 
Atherton Press at pp 5, 7-8, Mhlaba MW “The Operation of Democracy and the Rule of the Judiciary 
in a Constitutional State”, 2010(1) Speculum Juris 43; Botha H “Democracy and Rights: Constitutional 
Interpretation in a Post Realists World” (2000) 63 THRHR 561; Lenta P “Democracy, Rights, 
Disagreement and Judicial Review” (2004) 20 SAJHR 1 at 1, Engel Verlag NP (1990) Democracy and 
Human Rights Engel Publisher at 1-2, Davis DM (1999) Democracy and Deliberation Juta, Kenwyn at 
23-24; King J (2012) Judging Social Rights Cambridge Univ Press, New York at 152-153; White J 
“Open Democracy: Has the Window of Opportunity Closed” (1998) 14 SAJHR 65 at 65; Davis DM 
“The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Rights Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as 
Directive Principles” (1992) 8 SAJHR 475 at 488-490.  
5 1996 Constitution ss 165-180. 
6 1996 Constitution s 166. 
7 1996 Constitution s 167(3), the Right to Life is the most important Constitutional matter in the Bill of 
Rights. 
8 1996 Constitution s 168. 
9 1996 Constitution s 169, see also High Court Act 59 of 1959. 
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Court, on the other hand may not inquire into or rule on the constitutionality of any 
legislation or any conduct of the President.10      
 
The dispute that starts in the lowest court may end up at the Constitutional Court. 
Once the dispute is adjudicated by the Constitutional Court, there is no other 
opportunity for appeal or review, the Constitutional Court settles the legal disputes 
once and for all as it is the Court of final instance in all matters. 
 
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court must declare that any 
law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its 
inconsistency.11 The court may make any order that is just and equitable including 
an order suspending the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity for any 
period and on any conditions to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.12 
The President as the head of national executive does the appointment of judges, 
after consulting the Judicial Services Commission and the leaders of parties 
represented in the National Assembly.13 Of course, the person so appointed must be 
appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper person. 
 
The judiciary adjudicates disputes between parties and between state and parties in 
criminal matters in an open court without fear, prejudice or favour. The courts 
interpret the law and determine which behaviour warrants sanction, and they also 
determine the sanction itself, as prescribed by law. However, as the statutory law is 
created by elected representatives through Parliament, so is the adjudication 
process. Magistrates and judges, who are human, with all the strengths and 
weaknesses which this concept may entail, preside over the court proceedings and 
determine the outcome of the case before them. This is adjudication.14 The presiding 
                                                 
10 1996 Constitution s 170, see also Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944. 
11 1996 Constitution s 172(1) (a). 
12 1996 Constitution s 172(1)(b). 
13 1996 Constitution s 174(3), see also Sarkin K “The Political Role of the South African Constitutional 
Court” (1997) 114 SALJ 134 at 136-137, Currie I, De Waal J (2001) The New Constitutional and 
Administrative Law: Vol 1. Constitutional Law, Juta at 301-302, Van Blerk AE “Judicial Appointment: 
Some Reflections” (1992) 55 THRHR 559 at 563-574, Cameroon E “Legal Chauvinism, Executive 
Mindness and Justice-LC Steyn’s Impact on South African Law” (1982) 99 SALJ 38 at 40, Sarkin J 
“Problems and Challenges Facing South African Constitutional Court: An Evaluation of Its Decisions 
on Capital and Corporal Punishment” (1996) 113 SALJ 71 at 79. 
14 Adjudication is defined and dealt with extensively in chapter two below. See Davis DM “Duncan 
Kennedy’s Critique of Adjudication” (2000) SALJ 697 at 697; Hutchinson AC (2000) It is All in the 
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officer interprets the relevant statute, common law principles and/ or customary law 
rules applicable in order to arrive at his decision, the verdict.  
 
1.2.   Problem Statement 
 
As mentioned above, human beings, the magistrates and judges preside over the 
proceedings in their respective courts. The decision of the court in fact refers to the 
decision of the presiding officer. The presiding officer personifies the court. The 
presiding officer is supposed to be objective in adjudicating issues before him or her. 
If he or she has any vested interests in the matter before him or her, he or she must, 
in order to avoid prejudice to the parties before him or her, recuse himself or 
herself.15 The decisions of the courts affect our lives profoundly from various angles, 
an innocent  man may be sent to jail or guilty one acquitted due to the decision of 
the court, or in litigation matters involving the enforcement of the right to life, 
someone may lose his or her life as a result of the court’s decision. Therefore the 
decision of the court can mean life or death in most instances: Soobramoney,16 
Treatment Action Campaign17 and Makwanyane18  are some of the examples of 
such cases. In the first case, a terminally ill patient who needed dialysis to keep him 
alive lost the case in both the High Court and the Constitutional Court, and 
subsequently lost his life due to the court decision ruling against his prayers; in the 
second case pregnant mothers required ARV’s to prevent transmission of HI Virus to 
their unborn children – they  won the case against the government and forced 
                                                                                                                                                       
Game at 3.  
 15Tarrant J (2012) Disqualification For Bias Federation Press at 1-8 and 11; see also Thomas PHJ, 
van der Merwe CG, Stoop BC (2000) Historical Foundations of SA Law 2nd  ed at 196; also Pretoria 
News and Citizen of 28 October 2009 wherein former SA Police Commissioner applied for the recusal 
of Judge Joffe on ground of bias, the judge has since ruled against the Commissioner and he 
continues to preside over the matter in Gauteng South High Court; see also Bernert v Absa bank Ltd 
2011 (3) SA 92 (CC) and Hlope v Premier of the Western cape Province, Hlope v Freedom Under 
Law [2012] ZACC 4, Juma L, International Dimension of Rules of Impartiality and Judicial 
Independence: Exploring the Structural Impartiality Paradigm’ 2011 (2) Speculum Juris 17, Makiwane 
PN “Balancing Victims’ Rights Against those of Accused Persons: Challenges Posed by the 
Adversarial Criminal Justice System” (2011) 2 Speculum Juris 66 at 75, President of Republic of 
South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 (7) BCLR 725 on recusal of a judge. 
 16Soobramoney v Minister of Health Kwazulu Natal 1998 (1) SA 430 (CC); see also Dworkin RM 
(1986) Laws Empire Havard University Press at 1-3; Pennock JR, Chapman JW (eds) (1974) The 
Limits of Law New York at 39, Campbell T (2010) The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical 
Essays Oxford University Press at 297-311 and Kaarthikeyan DR (2005) Human Rights: Problems 
and Solutions Gyan Publishing House at 177-182.  
17Treatment Action Campaign v Minister of Health 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).  
18 Makwanyane and Others v State 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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government to make available lifesaving tablets, this resulted in the saving of 
thousands of lives of innocent unborn children; in contrast, in the last case, prisoners 
who were on death row had their lives saved by the court. 
 
This brings us back to the main theme of the dissertation, the adjudication of the 
right to life as enshrined in the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions. The problem emanates 
from the fact the decision of the court is based on majority rule, the decision of 
majority of judges becoming the decision of the court. This means that the decision 
of the court is constituted by what the majority of judges say, meaning the law is 
what the court says rather than what the law actually is. This is so because majority 
of the judges in any particular case may be wrong, the minority may be right. The 
judges do not beforehand agree on the rule of interpretation to be used in any 
matter, every judge may decide to use the other rule of interpretation while another 
judge may use a different rule of interpretation and therefore may result in the two 
judges arriving at different conclusions due to the method used to interpret the law. 
In any matter where the decision of the court is not unanimous, the court agreed with 
both the winning and losing litigant to a certain extent.  
 
The majority judgment agrees with the winning litigant and the minority says to the 
losing party you had a case just that more of our colleagues did not agree with you. 
In other words the losing party failed to garner more votes in his or her favour. 
Adjudication then is a game of numbers more than anything else. At the end the 
judges hearing the matter do not agree on correct interpretation of the law and arrive 
at conflicting decisions called majority and minority judgments, or to put it in clear 
perspective, dissenting judgment.  
 
This dissenting judgment and judgment of the court may result in inconsistency in 
judicial decisions over a period of time. Different judges at different times in the life 
of the court may hand down different judgments on the same subject matter and 
result in what is called ‘‘overturning” of the previous judgments. This is so because 
judges understand and interpret law differently resulting in different decisions on the 
same subject matter. 
 
 The Constitutional Court and the High Courts have so far not been consistent in 
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adjudicating the sacred fundamental human right, the right to life. The challenge is 
the consistency of courts judgments on the same or similar legal question. The 
courts have not been consistent in handing down judgments on the same subjects 
matter in different times and places. The judges hand down different or conflicting 
decision due to their different understanding and interpretation of the law. The High 
Court judge who heard the matter and finalized it grants the leave to appeal only 
when he or she believes that another judge may come to a different conclusion. This 
may be so because law in itself is indeterminable.  
 
Judges are human beings with characters and different understandings of law and 
adjudication. With this in mind, the question is whether the law is indeterminate, or 
whether the judges are not being objective. The answer to these questions is 
unfortunately not in affirmative and this dissertation will show that the High Courts 
and Constitutional Court have not been consistent when adjudicating the right to 
life.19  
 
The Constitutional Court and the High Courts adjudicated on the right life issues 
such as death penalty, euthanasia, the right to medical treatment and abortion and 
handed down conflicting decisions. These institutions affect the right to life 
negatively and positively as will become clear when they are discussed in the body 
of this dissertation. 
 
The indeterminacy of legal rules and regulations allow the judges to use their 
discretion resulting in different interpretation methods being used, this is evident in 
most Constitutional Court cases where the eleven judges had different 
understandings of what the relevant provisions of Constitution meant, and reached 
different conclusions on the matter before them. This is one of the reasons why 
                                                 
19 The Constitutional Court issued conflicting decisions on the right to life: in Soobramoney supra n 
(16) the Court allowed the Department’s budgetary constraints as good reason for excluding critically 
ill patients from treatment at the state’s expense. The Court reasoned that it would be better to spend 
the scarce resources on more patients than on one chronic patient and for this reason the Court 
concluded that the admission policy was reasonable, par [25] 775C-D. In contrast, in Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign the same Court interpreted section 27(1)(a) widely - to protect 
and preserve the life of the unborn babies of HIV positive mothers. In this case the Court was not 
concerned about the chronic nature of HIV; for different predictions based on same facts see also 
D’Amato A (1984) Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis of Law at 33-35; MacAdam A 
& Pyke J (1998) Judicial Reasoning and the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia Butterworths at 314-
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there are minority and majority judgments.20 The rules of the Constitutional Court 
allow for concurring judgments and dissenting judgments. The concurring and 
dissenting judgments indicate that the Judges interpreted the law differently and 
hence there are different judgments emanating from the same set of facts before the 
court. Therefore, the question of determinacy is discussed in this dissertation. This is 
the point of the dissertation, the inconsistency of judicial decisions. In some cases 
involving the right to life, the Constitutional Court affirmed the right to life21 and in 
other cases it did not.22 In all these cases life was at stake. The research is focused 
on the High Court and the Constitutional Court’s decisions, especially on the 
decisions on the right to life, contained in section 11 of the Constitution. The right to 
life is used to indicate or expose the indeterminacy and inconsistency of judicial 
decisions. The right to life is chosen as it is considered the most fundamental and 
important right of all the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
 
1.3. Purpose of this Dissertation  
 
The purpose of this research is to undertake a comparative study and to critically 
analyse the Constitutional Court and High Court’s decisions on the right to life from 
two perspectives: namely, the protection and preservation of life, using the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. The adjudication process is explored in this 
dissertation, and previous decisions of both the Constitutional Court and High Court 
on the right to life from medical, social and legal perspective are critically analysed. 
Their judgments are analysed and their interpretation of the provisions of the 
Constitution is criticised, amongst others.  
 
Adjudication and justice are explored to show the inconsistency in judicial decisions 
on the right to life in that different courts and different judges interpret the right to life 
differently. This is so because in split decisions cases, there are concurring and 
                                                                                                                                                       
316. 
20 Some judgements are handed down unanimously and others not, see S v Mhlungu and Others 
1995 (3) SA 867(CC) where the judgment was taken on 5-4, four judges dissenting. However in S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391(CC) the judgement was taken unanimously; on minority and majority 
judgments see also MacAdam  supra n (19) at 314-316.  
21 Government of RSA v Grootboom and Another 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); S v Makwanyane and 
Another 1995 (3) SA 642 (CC) and Treatment Action Campaign supra n (17).  
22 Soobramoney supra n (16). 
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dissenting judgments which means that some of the judges agreed with the losing 
litigant and while others agreed with the winning litigant. I conclude that the 
perspectives of the various courts and judges differ on the right to life – therefore, 
they give the right to life different measures especially if the right is inferred from 
associated rights or protected indirectly by other rights in the Bill of Rights. The 
Constitutional Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal have over a 
period of time interpreted the right to life differently and used different interpretation 
methods to arrive at their decisions.  
 
In this dissertation the courts’ adjudication process is scrutinised. It would be shown 
that since law is partially indeterminable, the Court’s decisions are not really based 
on the correct interpretation of the law but on the individual judge’s perception and 
understanding of the law. 23 This is so because these courts use the majority rule 
principle in taking a decision on issues before the court, where each judge indicates 
whether he or she agrees with the plaintiff or the defendant. The perception or the 
understanding of the law of the majority of the judges becomes a decision of the 
court. What if the majority of the judges were wrong on the issue before them at that 
time? The majority interprets the same legal rules differently from the minority, and 
thus   the critical legal scholar’s theory that law is indeterminable as it allows judges 
a room for discretion may be the case and therefore it would appear that in some 
cases the legal rules do not decide the outcome of a case as they (rules of 
interpretation) are applied and understood differently by different judges. 
 
1.4.   Hypothesis 
 
The right to life is the most fundamental of human rights and should be respected 
and protected. 
 
The correct and objective interpretation of the constitutional text on the same aspect 
- the right to life - should yield the same results. The judges must not arrive at different 
                                                 
23 Dworkin (1986) Laws Empire at 2 argues that law becomes what judges say it is. See also Hart 
HLA (1961) The Concept of Law at 1-6; see also Weinred CC “Law as Order” (1978) 91 Harvard Law 
Review 909; Burton SJ (1992) Judging in Good Faith Cambridge University Press at 35-37;  
Meyerson D (2011) Jurisprudence Oxford University Press at 188 where he argues that the law found 
in books has little influence on judicial decisions. 
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decisions when adjudicating the same subject matter, interpreting same text and the 
legal dispute arises from the same set of facts. If they arrive at different decisions this 
means that the outcome is not determined by the law, but rather by the judges’ 
different personal interpretation thereof. While a lower court decision may be 
overturned by a higher court, and the reversing of a very old judgment may be 
justified by the passing of time and the change in societal needs and circumstances, it 
is still troubling to contemplate the implications of a situation where the different 
interpretations of the law are postulated by judges sitting on the same bench: the 
possibility that the majority may have reached the wrong decision, which will stand as 
the judgment of the court, is disconcerting. 
 
1.5.  Summary of Chapters 
 
Chapter One is the present chapter, which aims to introduce this dissertation. 
  
Chapter Two: Concepts and Theoretical Framework 
 
Chapter Two focuses on definitions of concepts and theoretical framework. The 
concept adjudication is discussed and explored with reference to various theories of 
well-known philosophers in this Chapter. The concepts law, justice, and public interest 
are also briefly defined and interrelated.  
 
Chapter Three: The Right to Life Defined 
 
The right to life as enshrined in the Constitution and other international documents is 
defined and discussed extensively in this chapter. The right to life as reflected in 
International and Regional Instruments is discussed with reference to case laws 
decided by the Regional Courts. The concept justiciability is discussed in relation to 
the socio-economic rights.  
 
Chapter Four: The Right to Life: Medical Treatment 
 
The right to medical treatment and the right to life in Chapter Three are linked in this 
Chapter. It is argue that the right to life should not be qualified by any other condition 
10 
 
such as whether there are available resources or not, but it is still subject to the 
limitation clause as enshrined in the Constitution. The availability of resources for the 
realisation of the socio-economic rights is inevitably a budgetary matter and should 
therefore be left to policy makers as it would be difficult for the courts to assess 
whether the resources have been allocated appropriately or not. If such a condition 
should be taken into consideration then the state should be forced to make resources 
available for the progressive realisation of all the fundamental rights in the Bill of 
Rights. Extensive reference is made to socio-economic rights as rights supporting the 
right to life, without which the right to life becomes meaningless and unenforceable as 
far as the preservation of life and survival are concerned. All of the above shall be 
preceded by an extensive discussion of landmark case law such as Soobramoney 24 
and Van Biljon,25  as well as other cases involving the right to life. 
 
The discussion of the right to medical treatment in another context continues in 
Chapter Four. The right to life of an unborn child where the mother is HIV positive is 
discussed. This discussion will be set against the argument that, though not legally 
protected until birth, life starts at conception – an issue, which I delve into in the 
following chapter. The case Treatment Action Campaign26 will also discussed 
extensively in this chapter. I contrast this decision with that of Soobramoney on the 
preservation and protection of the right life, thus the enforcement of the right to life.  
 
Chapter Five: Right To Life: Death Penalty, Euthanasia and   Abortion 
 
The right to life is explored in the context of abortion, euthanasia and the death 
penalty in Chapter Five. The analysis the right to life of people who have reached 
different and often contrasting stages of their lives is conducted. In the first case the 
person is not born yet but killed during the developmental phase of life. In the 
second case, the patient is in a medically vegetative state and another decides to 
end his suffering by ending his life. Finally, in the death penalty matter, the question 
as to whether a convicted person who has taken the life of another, should have his 
protected by the outlawing of the death penalty, will be discussed. Reference is 
                                                 
24 TAC supra n (17). 
25 Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) SA 441 (C).  
26 TAC supra n (17). 
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made to various case laws on these aspects. The issue to be considered is whether, 
in each case, it is logical to preserve and protect this life in the prevailing 
circumstances. 
 
Chapter 6: Inconsistency in Judicial Decisions: The Right to Life in 
Perspective  
 
This is the epilogue chapter. Here all the decisions are compared and contrasted to 
show that law is indeterminable and that the Constitutional Court and the High 
Court’s decisions are not consistent because they are not based on the correct 
interpretation of the law, rather those decisions are based on the different 
understanding of the law shown by the individual judges. The recommendation is 
that the majority principle of adjudication should be abolished. It is suggested further 
that, if that principle cannot be done away with, then the rehearing of the same 
matter be mandatory when two-thirds of the Judges who heard the matter have 
retired or are no longer serving. Alternatively, section 11 of the Constitution should 
be redrafted so as to clarify the extent to which life is protected. The section may 
also have to make exceptions such as in the case of the death penalty, following the 
example of the European Convention of Human Rights27 (for instance), as well as 
the constitutions of other jurisdictions such as Namibia. 
 
                                                 
27 Article 1 of The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms provides for an exception to the general rule: for example a person’s right to life may be 
waived in cases where the Court decision provides otherwise (imprinted in Clayton R  & Tomlison T 
The Law of Human Rights at 55). See also Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
Article 4 of African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the last two documents are imprinted in 
Patel EM and Watters C (2004) Human Rights Fundamental Instruments and Documents 
Butterworths at 94 and 141 respectively. See also section 2 of the Lesotho Constitution, section 4 of 
Botswana Constitution, section 4 of Swaziland Constitution and section 12 of Zimbabwean 
Constitution, these constitutions made the exceptions clear and they qualify the right to life. See also 
the Namibian Constitution, section 6 thereof is very clear on the death penalty, it stipulates that the 
right to life shall be respected and protected and that no law may prescribe death as a competent 
sentence. This provision articulates its intention clearly. 
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CHAPTER 2 
   CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1. General Introduction 
 
The most important question when dealing with the administration of justice is 
always: What is law? It is also common cause that law has a special or certain 
relationship with adjudication and interpretation. Is there any kind of relationship 
between law and other concepts such as adjudication, justice and public interests? 
Can any of these concepts exist independently of the law? These are pertinent 
questions, which will be discussed in this chapter.  
 
Most importantly the concept “law” is discussed and defined in this Chapter. The 
relationship between law and adjudication is explored followed by discussion of the 
concept “adjudication” with reference to theories of some jurists and philosophers.1 I 
will also define and interrelate the concepts “law”, “justice” and “public interests”. The 
main focus is on two aspects of the right to life, namely the preservation and 
protection of life. Are the various courts’ decisions on the right to life consistent? Do 
they accord the right to life the full protection it deserves? The dissertation tries to 
answer these questions. Finally, this chapter would end with a discussion of the 
theories of the Critical Legal Scholars and my conclusion on the matter. I will first 
discuss the concepts of law, justice and public interests.  
 
2.2. Law, Justice and Public Interests 
 
2.2.1. Introduction: Law 
 
The purpose of this research is to show the prevalence of inconsistency in judicial 
decisions, that of the Constitutional Court and the High Courts using the right to life 
                                                 
1 Hutchinson AC (2000) It’s All in the Game Irwin Law at 3; Roederer C and Moellendorf D (2006) 
Jurisprudence Butterworths at 215; see also Davis DM “Kennedy’s Critique of Adjudication: A 
Challenge to the Business as Usual Approach of South African Lawyers (2000) SALJ 701, 
Hutchinson AC “The  Reasoning Game: Some  Pragmatic Suggestions”(1998) 61(2) The Modern  
Law Review 263; Thomas Ph.J, van Der Merwe CG, Stoop BC  (2000) Historical Foundations of SA 
Law Butterworths at 1, Smith JC, Weisstub DN (1983) The Western Idea of  Law vii; MacAdam, A & 
Pyke J (1998) Judicial Reasoning and the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia at 3-4, Gruberg M, 
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cases. There is no better way of doing that than by defining what is law first and 
explore the adjudication process thereafter. In ancient human societies, there were 
unwritten laws followed and obeyed for generations.2 As the law was unwritten, the 
source of law was custom only. The law developed from the repeated practice by 
members of the society. Today, the law has sources, namely, legislation, common 
law, court decisions, custom and African indigenous law. Today we can proudly add 
the supreme law of the Republic, the Constitution. Generally, it may be said that the 
law is a set of rules governing society in a just and fair manner. It controls and 
regulates human beings and their behaviour to the benefit of society as a whole. 
However, this view may not always be pertinent, the law might not be just and fair: 
apartheid legislation advocating the policy of social reconstruction is a classical 
example.  
 
Apartheid laws did not keep order in society, nor did they benefit the whole 
community; they were applied against African communities and to the benefit of the 
white communities. Therefore, the concept of ‘law’ needs to be explored further. Few 
questions concerning anything in society have been asked from different angles and 
in so many ways as the question of what the law is. Hart argues that even if we 
confine our attention to legal theory of at least 150 years and neglect classical and 
medieval speculations about the “nature of law” we shall find a situation not 
paralleled in any other subject systematically studied as a separate academic 
discipline.3  There are other academic disciplines that are studied and 
comprehended much better than law as a science, disciplines such physics, 
mathematics, accounting, medicines, agricultural science, chemistry, astrology and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Introduction to Law, University Press of America at 1-54.  
2 Hahlo HR and Kahn E (1968) The SA Legal System and its Background Juta at 302 and 303; 
Edwards AB (1996) The History of SA Law at 73; Willie G (1961) The Principles of SA Law 5th ed Juta 
17-21; Zimmermann R & Visser D (1996) Civil Law and Common Law in  SA Juta 12-15; Emanuel SL 
(2011) Civil Procedure 20th ed  Wolters Kluwer at 1-6; Geldenhuys T (1991) Introduction to Security 
Law Juta at 2. 
3 Hart (1961) The Concept of Law at 1. The concept has been widely written about in literature, see 
also Geldenhuys T (1991)  Introduction to Security Law Juta at 2; Hahlo HR and Kahn E (1968) The 
SA Legal System and Its Background Juta 3-6; Wille G (1961) Principles of SA Law 5th ed Juta at 1; 
Vorster WS (ed) The Right to Life in Bioethics at 70; D’  Amato (1984) Jurisprudence: A Descriptive 
and Normative Analysis of Law Martinus Nijhoff at 224; Feibleman JK (1985) Law, Justice  and 
Culture Martinus Nijhoff at 39, Wells WAN (1991) Law, Judges and Justice Butterworths at 1-6; 
Douzinas C & Gearey A (2005) Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice Hart 
Portland  Oregan at 76, Read W (1986) Legal Thinking Univ of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia at 
10-12. 
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many more similar disciplines. The literature with regard to these disciplines deals 
with the content of the disciplines more than defining the discipline itself. Law, on the 
other hand, has so much literature focusing on defining the concept “law”.   
   
It is true that no vast literature is dedicated to answering the question what is 
chemistry? The reason is that chemistry, unlike law, is a science that can be 
determined with absolute certainty using various experimental methods. It would not 
be hard to determine, for an example, that two hydrogen molecules plus oxygen 
molecule equals to water. You rarely find that one scientist’s chemical equations 
result in different by-products than the other using the same chemicals. The same 
cannot be said about what is right in law; different judges reached different decisions 
interpreting the same text on several occasions, the Constitutional Court with the 
concurrent and dissenting judgments.  
 
Chemistry is a science dealing with tangible things while law is an abstract theory of 
social science. Chemistry is determinable, whilst law is not. Law is somehow an 
abstract theory of human mental discipline, law may be our inner policeman; it sets 
limits to our behaviour. Law punishes bad behaviour and sometimes does not 
reward good one. In criminal cases the perpetrator of crime may be sent to jail or 
fined certain amount of money on conviction, but the victim of crime comes out of 
the court with just the mental satisfaction that the perpetrator has been jailed or 
fined. However, the sad thing about the law is that the perpetrator, once incarcerated 
will enjoy more rights than his victim. An example, which may be mentioned at this 
point, although it will be analysed in detail at a later stage, is Van Biljon v Minister of 
Correctional Services, where – for all practical purposes - the Court delineated the 
rights of prisoners as reaching further than those of people outside prison, because 
of the wording of the relevant Constitutional provisions, namely section 35(2) (e).4 
Section 35(2) (e) of the Constitution is dedicated exclusively to the arrested, 
detained and accused persons.  
 
                                                 
4 In Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) SA 441 (C) Cape High Court said that the 
state owed higher duty to prisoners than to the general citizens and that the Constitution itself provide 
for the differentiation (par 50), on treatment of prisoners, see Kaarthikeyan DR (2005) Human Rights: 
Problems and Solutions at 231-273, Rudulph HG “Man’s Inhumanity to Man Makes Countless 
Thousands Mourn! Do Prisoners Have Rights? (1979) 96 SALJ 640. 
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The rights in section 35 of the Constitution are not qualified the way in which the 
rights contained in sections 26 and 27 are (the latter provisions being applicable to 
the general public). On the other hand, there is no section or provision in the 
Constitution dedicated exclusively to the rights of the victims of crime (or victims of 
section 35 persons). The socio-economic rights of people outside prison are 
qualified by the provision of available resources in subsections (2) of both sections 
26 and 27 of the Constitution. Hence the argument that the law does not always 
benefit everyone in society, in some cases it benefits the people who contravene it.  
 
Law should be a combination of both rules and conscience. Conscience is the inner 
policeman of every human being which constantly guides human behaviour without 
external enforcement.  However, some people have different understanding of the 
nature of the law, thus their definitions of law differ from mine.  Below I consider the 
theories of Schlag, White, Austin, Hart, Dworkin, the Realists and Critical Legal 
Scholars. 
 
2.2.2 Schlag 
 
Schlag differentiates between the normative law, and the law in practice. He 
explains that the law is not as it is in the statute books or university textbooks, but it 
is rather a network of bureaucratic power arrangements that can be manipulated by 
the practicing lawyer.5 He refers to these two scenarios of law, respectively, as the 
“ideal’’ of legal academy and the “realities” of practice. For Schlag, therefore, law is 
nothing more than a power game. Schlag creates hypothetical theatre of law to show 
how the bureaucratic power arrangements work in practice. 
 
In “The Normative and Politics of Form” Schlag presents a bureaucratic power 
arrangements by using the incident involving the practicing attorney, Stuart.6  In this 
play he indicates that a person can be arrested for contravening the law7  and enlist 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
5 Schlag P “The Normative and Politics of Form” (1991) 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
at 801-804. 
6 Id at 852. 
7 California’s DWI statute imprinted in Schlag P “The Normative and Politics of Form” supra n (5) at 
853 states that it is unlawful for any person who has 0,08% or more, by weight of alcohol in his or her 
blood to drive the vehicle. 
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the best witness for himself at the hearing and have the best attorney to represent 
him in court.8 The attorney will adduce only evidence he wants to present to court in 
the best interests of his client.9 The evidence so presented in court will determine the 
outcome of the case.10 The outcome is determined by the performance of the 
attorney and the witnesses.11 
 
In the end, the favour bank, the shadow law and the attorney’s performance have 
done their work: the charges would be dropped even though the accused was in fact 
guilty.12 
 
Schlag presents a manipulative formation of facts, which define exactly what the law 
is all about in the real sense. From the case of Stuart, one can deduce that law is not 
exactly the one written in the statute books or textbooks but it depends on the quality 
of the performances by various actors within the legal community. The lawyers elicit 
the precise testimony they would like the witnesses to give in court. The image of 
law presented here is “the performance of the impressive moves within scripted, 
stylized roles that can be used by various actors to invoke or suppress institutional 
power”.13 The professional friendship between actors is called shadow law, the 
network of law within law.14 There is also a favour bank, hierarchical in structure and 
operated on principles of loyalty and honour, and on ties of professional friendship.15 
Schlag says that the real law is like playing the power ratios and manipulating the 
performance to get the right results. Thus law is a game of power and manipulation. 
According to Schlag, “law is a stabilized proposition, rational arrangements of ideas 
and theories”.  
 
Lawyers tend to see their professional powers as resting not on rules but on local 
knowledge, insider access, connections and reputation, the favour bank and shadow 
law, more than the reason of the better argument is the stuff of law.16 There is no 
                                                 
8 Schlag supra n (5) at 853. 
9 Ibid at 854. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 857. 
13 Id at 855. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Id at 856. 
16 Ibid at 859. 
17 
 
better way of describing law than Schlag’s way. It is true that law taught at law 
schools, found in statute books, and the law in practice, are not the same.  
 
The facts of the case do not necessarily indicate which way the case may go, but the 
legal practitioner representing the litigant may play an important role in the outcome 
of the case. The real law is the one in practice where the skills and diligence of the 
lawyer may determine the outcome of the case. The performance of the lawyer and 
to a certain degree his connections in the legal profession may swing most cases in 
his favour. 
 
2.2.3.   White 
 
Roederer and Moellendorf argue that law is in a full sense a language, for it is a way 
of reading and writing and speaking, it is way of maintaining a culture, largely a 
culture of argument, which has a character of its own.17 For White, law can more 
properly be seen not as a set of commands or rules or even with a set of restateable 
principles or values behind them, but as the culture of arguments and interpretation 
through the operation of which the rules acquire their life and ultimate meaning. If 
law is about culture of argument, then I would find it difficult to determine which one 
develops first, the rules or the arguments? If the arguments precede the rules then 
what would you be arguing about? White says that rules acquire their meaning and 
life from the culture of arguments, which would mean the culture of arguments, 
exists before the rules.18 
 
It is true that language forms part of law, but many disciplines, such as Sociology, 
and Economics rely on language in order to be understood. Yet, different 
conclusions or theories within these disciplines are rarer than the dissents or 
concurrences in judgments of law.  
 
                                                 
17 Roederer C, Moellendorf supra n (1) at 217, see also Levi JN and Walker AG (eds) (1990) 
Language in Judicial Process, Plenium Press London, at 4 and 5, Burger AJ (2001) A Guide To 
Legislative Drafting in South Africa, Juta at 1-3 on language and law see, Hlope JM “Official 
Languages and Courts” (2000) 117 SALJ 690, Hoffmann L “The Intolerable Wrestling with Words and 
Meanings” (1997) 114 SALJ 656 at 656-657. 
18 Ibid at 217. 
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2.2.4.   Austin 
 
Austin, like other philosophers of his time, tried to define the term “law”. He 
developed a theory known as the “Command Theory of Law” or (the imperative 
theory of law).19 For Austin, law is a command given by a determinate common 
superior to whom the bulk of society is in the habit of obedience and who is not in 
the habit of obedience to a determinate human superior, enforced by a sanction.20 
Austin distinguishes commands of two kinds. Austin avers that where a command 
obliges generally to a specific act or forbearances, a command is occasional or 
particular.21 Thus commands are neither general nor particular. A command of 
general kind is a law; a command of occasional kind is an order, according to Austin. 
 
Austin distinguished two kinds of laws, laws “properly so called’’ and laws “not 
properly so called”.22 Every law “properly so called” consists of a rule laid down for 
guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power. Laws “not 
properly so called’’ are of two kinds: laws by analogy and laws by metaphor. Under 
laws by analogy Austin places such matter as the dictates of fashion, of honour, the 
laws or rules imposed upon gentlemen by opinions current amongst gentlemen and 
also international law. Laws “not properly so called” are also of two kinds: laws set 
by God to human creatures and laws set by men to men. Human laws are of two 
kinds, laws “strictly so called” and laws “not strictly so called’’. Laws “not strictly so 
called’’ comprised laws set by men not as political superior: “These are the 
commands of the sovereign not supported by legal sanctions and administered by 
the state”. Laws “strictly so called” comprise law set by men as political superiors to 
political inferiors and laws set by men as private individuals in pursuance of legal 
rights”.  
 
By laws by metaphor Austin refers to “laws regulating the growth or decay of 
vegetables….laws determining the movements of inanimate bodies or masses”.23 To 
                                                 
19 Austin (1970) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 2nd ed (Preface at v). 
20 Id at 15. 
21 Id at 27. 
22 Ibid at 15. 
23 Riddal (1991) Jurisprudence  2nd  ed at 19. 
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amplify his definition of law Austin goes on to examine the nature of sovereignty.24 
Sovereignty exists, Austin explains, where the bulk of given political society are in 
habit of obeying a determinable common superior and that the command is backed 
by threats. Although Austin’s analysis of the nature of law is sufficient, it is not 
inescapably applicable in all circumstances. Obeisance to an Act of Parliament 
which has a set date of operation will not necessarily have been driven by force of 
habit. The command element must also fail in some circumstances, since there are 
legislative provisions which are not peremptory and could not be commands, if 
elements of discretion are present. The 1996 Constitution requires that the Court 
‘must’ consider international law and 39(1) (c) requires that the Court ‘may’ consider 
foreign law.25 The former provision is peremptory and the latter not. 
 
Law is not a command. Commandment, according to the English concise dictionary 
refers to giving an authoritative order or peremptory order. Law is not always 
peremptory and it is not always given by superior but in most by the elected body 
such as the Provincial Legislatures or the Parliament.26 The Provincial Legislature 
and Parliament are also subject to the Constitution.27 So Austin’s theory of 
obedience must fail. It must also be noted that not every law is followed by sanction. 
The Appropriation Act by the Minister of Finance appropriates funds only in that 
financial year.28 The Acts appropriate funds for that particular financial year and it 
would not be applicable in the next financial year, it is difficult to see how this kind of 
legislation would have a chance to be applied and enforced through sanctions 
considering its short spell. 
 
2.2.5. Hart 
 
Professor HLA Hart launched a scathing attack on Austin’s command theory of law. 
                                                 
24 Hart supra n (3) at 16. 
25 Section 39(1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution; see also s15 of Military Ombud Act 4 of 2012. 
26 The use of the word “may” in the provision of the legislation indicates it is not peremptory provision 
and the person applying the law has a measure of discretion, unlike the provision of the Statute that 
uses the word “shall” or “must”. The latter gives the administrator no discretionary at all; he must 
comply with the provisions of the Act. 
27 Section 8 of the Constitution. 
28 Appropriation Act 2 of 2006; See also the Division of Revenue Act 2 of 2006: this Act provides for 
the equitable division of revenue anticipated to be raised nationally among the National, Provincial 
and Local spheres of Government for the 2006/07 financial year.  
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Hart says that laws as we know them are not command backed by threats.29 Some 
laws, Hart concedes, do resemble orders backed by threats, for example – in the 
case of criminal law.  But there are many types of laws that do not resemble orders 
backed by threats, for example laws that prescribe the way in which valid contracts, 
wills or marriages are made do not compel people to behave in a certain way, Hart 
contends.30 Hart refers to the laws not backed by threat or sanction as the power 
conferring rules, for these are like orders of courts and enactments of law-making 
bodies, just consist in valid exercise of legal powers.31 Hart contends that the range 
of application of law is not the same as the range of application of order backed by 
threats.32   
 
In Austin’s scheme the lawmaker is not himself bound by the command he gives, the 
order is directed to others, not to himself. It is true, Hart concedes, that in some 
systems of government this is what may occur. But in many systems of law 
legislation has a force that is binding on the body that makes it. So as the lawmaker 
can be bound by the law he has enacted, the Austinian concept of sovereign-
command-obedience-sanction theory cannot be of universal application.33 
 
Hart, on the command and threat aspects, argues that the mode of origin of law is 
different from the mode of origin of an order backed by threats.34 Hart says that an 
order backed by threats originates from a deliberate act performed at a specific time. 
But not all laws can be said to have their origin in a deliberate datable act. Hart cites 
custom. Customs that are recognised as law within a particular society do not stem 
from any deliberate acts, but have gained status of law by continuous and common 
usage in those communities over a period of time. Command may have to be 
obeyed immediately not over a period of time.  
 
Hart says that the notion of habit of obedience is deficient where sovereignty 
succession is involved.35 Hart argues that where a leader succeeds another, there 
                                                 
29 Hart supra n (3) at 27. 
30 Ibid at 32. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid at 25. 
34 Ibid at 44. 
35 Ibid at 53-54. 
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would be no habit of obedience to his orders immediately, and as such the habit 
would have to be established over a period of time. The last reason why, according 
to Hart, the Austinian theory of command should fail, is that Austin’s notion of 
sovereignty is also deficient.36 In Austin’s theory of law, while there may be political 
limits on sovereign’s power, there can be no legal power on sovereign’s power, 
since, if he is sovereign, he does not obey any other legislator. Thus according to 
Austin, if law exists within a state, there must exist a sovereign with unlimited power. 
The competence of a legislature may be limited by written constitutions under which 
certain matters are excluded from the scope of its competence to legislate upon.37 
 
After these descriptions on Hart’s scathing attack on Austin’s theory of law, let us 
now consider Hart’s own theory of law. In his book The Concept of Law 38 Hart 
avoids to define “law”. Hart says, definition, as the word suggests, is primarily a 
matter of drawing lines or distinguishing between one kind of thing and another, 
which marks off by a separate word. 39 The need for such a drawing of lines is often 
felt by those who are perfectly at home with the day-to-day use of the word in 
question, but cannot state or explain the distinctions which, they sense, divide one 
kind of a thing from another.40 Hart wanted to analyse the concept of law and not 
define or deal with the question of what law is. Hart’s main concern was what 
constitutes a legal system. 
 
For Hart, a legal system is a complex union of primary and secondary rules.41 Hart 
distinguishes between primary and secondary rules. The former being rules 
imposing duties and concern actions involving physical movement or changes, and 
the latter rules confer powers and provide for operations, which create, or variate 
obligations.42  For Hart law is all about a matter of rules. 
 
In conclusion, law is not only about rules, but about rules, customs and traditions 
and morals as well. Furthermore, Hart’s theory of law seems to fit very well in 
                                                 
36 Ibid at 69. 
37 Ibid at 67. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid at 13. 
41 Ibid at 111. 
42 Ibid at 79. 
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modern legal systems: today we have the Constitution that prescribes how to amend 
it. The Constitution provides for a national legislative process. Section 73 provides 
that any Bill may be introduced in the National Assembly. Section 74 provides for the 
procedure of amending the Constitution. This section provides that section 1 and this 
subsection may be amended by a bill passed by the National Assembly with a 
supporting vote of at least 75% of its members; and the National Council of 
Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces. 
 
2.2.6.   Dworkin 
 
In direct contrast with Hart, Dworkin argues that law is all about principles and not 
rules. Dworkin says that when lawyers reason or dispute about rights and 
obligations, particularly in those hard cases when our problems with these concepts 
seem most acute, they make use of standards that do not function as rules but 
operate differently as principles, policies and other sorts of standards.43 Dworkin 
differentiates between the principles and the rules. He defines “principle” as the 
standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, 
political or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of 
justice and fairness or some other dimension of morality.44 On the other hand 
Dworkin says that rules are applicable in an “all-or-nothing” fashion.45 
 
According to Dworkin, the difference between legal principles and legal rules is a 
logical distinction. Both set standards point to particular decisions about legal 
obligation in particular circumstances, but they differ in character of the direction 
they give.46 The principle, unlike the rule, does not have an exception. It is all or 
nothing. Dworkin argues that the rule does not exist before the case is determined: 
the court cites principles as its justification for adopting and applying a new rule.47 
Dworkin is of the opinion that law is not a system of rules but of principles. Dworkin 
linked law and politics as well. 
 
                                                 
43 Dworkin RM (1977) The Philosophy of Law at 43. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid at 45. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid at 49. 
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Dworkin concedes that lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the broad sense 
of political theory.48 But law is not a matter of personal or partisan politics, and a 
critique of law that does not understand this difference will provide poor 
understanding and even poorer guidance.49 
 
Dworkin continues in this article and poses a question: what sense should be given 
to propositions of law?50 Dworkin refers to various statements lawyers make 
reporting what law is on some questions or another.51 Dworkin thinks that 
propositions of law can be very abstract and general. What are propositions of law 
all about?  What in the world could make them true or false, Dworkin questions?52 
Dworkin seems to argue that the puzzle arises because propositions of law seem to 
be descriptive, they are how things are in law, not about how they should be - and 
yet it has proved extremely difficult to say exactly what it is they describe.53 
 
In conclusion, Dworkin’s theory of law that law is not a system of rules but of 
principles does not fit the modern flexible and liberal Constitutions. Dworkin’s 
principle of “all or nothing” would not stand the test of most Constitutions, legislations 
and International Conventions. Most legal systems or legislations provide for 
exceptions to almost every rule. The exception is in the form of limitation of particular 
right in those legislations. The limitation clause found in the 1996 Constitution limits 
the extent of the rights in the Bill of Rights.54 Some of the sections in the Bill of 
Rights have limitation immediately after conferring a right, namely sections 26 and 
27 thereof. Section 16(2) also contains an internal qualifier: Section 16 of the 
Constitution confers a right to individuals to freely express themselves but still 
prohibits them from doing or saying anything clearly mentioned in subsection (2). 
Subsection (2) is the exception to rule that very individual has the right to freedom of 
expression. I therefore do not agree with Dworkin’s theory that law is a system of 
                                                 
48 Dworkin RM (1982) “The Interpretation of Politics: Law as Interpretation” The University of Chicago 
Press LWE407 at 249, see also Sachs A, (2009) The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law, Oxford 
University Press at 9, Mnyongani FD “The Judiciary as a Site of the Struggle for Political Power: A 
South African Perspective” (2011) 2 Speculus Juris 1.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
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principles. Law is a system of rules interpreted by the courts of law, and so doing 
they develop legal principles.  
 
2.3. Adjudication 
 
2.3.1. Adjudication: General 
 
Adjudication in simple terms refers to the formalistic process in terms of which the 
presiding officer, in the court of law, interprets the relevant statute, common law 
principles and/or applicable customary law rules in arriving at his decision, the 
verdict. This verdict may have an adverse effect on one’s exercises of his or her 
rights.  
 
It is through this process that judges and magistrates make their decision known. 
The focus will be on various approaches or theories of interpretation used by the 
courts in adjudicating matters before them and on how the same theories of 
interpretation are used to interpret the law. I am in fact not dealing with theories of 
interpretation per se, but with adjudication using these theories.  
 
 
The resultant usage of the theories of interpretation is adjudication; the result of 
adjudication process is the court decisions or judgments which has profound effect 
on the lives of the people concerned.55 Five methods or theories of constitutional 
interpretation are recognized in South Africa, the first one being the literal or 
grammatical method which requires that words used in the statute must be given 
their ordinary grammatical meaning, and if the meaning is clear then it should be put 
into effect. This approach focuses on the literal meaning of the words to be 
interpreted.56 The deviation is allowed from the literal method where the plain 
meaning of the words used are ambiguous to avoid absurdity.57 
                                                 
55 Axam T (Jr) “A Model for Learning and Teaching-Rights and Responsibilities in the New Legal 
Order” (2001) 17 SAJHR 404 at 405; Campbell T, Ewing KD, Tomkins A (eds) (2010) The Legal 
Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays Oxford University Press at 297-311; Kaarthikeyan DR 
(2005) Human Rights: Problems and Solutions Gyan Publishing at 177-182. 
56 Corcoran S, Bottomley S (eds) (2005) Interpreting Statutes The Federation Press, Sydney at 16 
and 29. 
57 Ibid at 27. 
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The second method of interpretation recognized is systematic interpretation, this 
methods sought to clarify the meaning of particular constitutional provision in 
conjunction with the constitution as a whole; the constitutional provisions are 
therefore interpreted collectively, not in isolation.58  
 
Teleological or purposive method aims to ascertain the objects or intention and 
purpose of the provision taking into account the constitutional values.59 The court 
must find out what was the intention of the legislature when enacting the provision 
and therefore the object the provision intends to achieve, nothing else. The fourth 
theory of interpretation is historical interpretation. This method of interpretation uses 
the historical context; that is looking into the history of the text by situating a 
provision within the tradition from which it emerged.60 
 
The last and fifth method of constitutional interpretation is comparative method. This 
method allows the court to look at foreign court decisions and international human 
rights law to assist it to arrive at a decision on cases similar in facts.61 The court look 
at the decided cases of foreign jurisdiction as a yardstick to guide it to arrive at a 
decision, this is in fact sanctioned by the constitution.62 The utilization of the 
interpretative methods yields in court judgments which affects the persons involved 
differently.  
 
D’Amato refers to the effect of law by saying that “law affects our lives profoundly, it 
channels our behaviour, it gives us incentives, and it provides for our punishment if 
we violate its prescribed norms”.63 Dworkin discusses the effects of law more clearly 
when he concludes that the civil suits, in which one person asks compensation or 
protection from another for some past or threatened harm, are sometimes more than 
                                                 
58 Corcoran supra n (56) at 16. 
59 Corcoran supra n (56) at 16; see also Burger AJ (2001) A Guide to Legislative Drafting in South 
Africa, Juta at 25-26, Cockram GM (1983) The Interpretation of Statutes, 2nd ed Juta at 60-68, Du 
Plessis L, “The (re)Systematisation of the Cannons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretation” (2005) 122 
SALJ 591 at 607; see also S v Makwanyane and Others 1995(3) SA 391 (CC) 404H. 
60 Du Plessis supra n (59) at 609-610, Corcoran supra n (56) at 116. 
61 Du Plessis supra n (59) at 142. 
62 Section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution, see also Makwanyane 405E-F. 
63 D’Amato A supra n (3) at 2; see also Feibleman JK (1985) Justice, Law and Culture at 39; 
Cameroon E “When Judges Fail Justice” (2004) 121 SALJ 580 at 587. 
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all the most momentous criminal trials.64 Dworking asserts rightfully that the 
argument by one’s council in court may seal or determine whether he or she loses 
the case for as long the argument can influence the judge in one direction or 
another.65  The decisions of the Courts have, in some instances such as the death 
penalty, the right of access to health care services and abortion, tremendous effect 
on the lives of the people.66 The Constitutional Court’s decisions have momentous 
effects on our lives; life may be saved or even lost due the Constitutional Court’s 
decision.67 
 
The effect of the decision of the courts in civil or criminal matters may not be 
measurable as the rights lost may, in some cases, not be humanly quantified or 
measured.68 There is inevitably a moral dimension to an action at law, and so a 
standing risk of a distinct form of public injustice.69 There are different effects of law 
on parties and their families. Law effectively controls and regulates our lives in our 
societies. The courts as manned by human beings are the interpreters and enforcers 
of law in the state; the judiciary adjudicates legal disputes and hands down 
judgments. Can we really trust that judges will be objective and consistent? The 
constant scrutiny of the adjudication process by the academics, lawyers, legal 
philosophers, the media and the society at large may stand guard against the wrong 
decision, but we do not have any remedy against the wrong decisions by the 
Constitutional Court as its decisions are final and not subject to any other review or 
appeal. Then the question would still be: How does the court decide or reach a 
decision, how do they adjudicate matters before them, and what is adjudication? 
 
According to the Oxford Concise English Dictionary, “adjudication” is defined as a 
                                                 
64 Dworkin RM (1962) Laws Empire at 39. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 In S v Makwanayane and Others 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) the Constitutional Court ruled that death 
penalty was unconstitutional  thereby effectively doing away with this type of punishment, and the 
lives of all people who were on death  row were saved. However in Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
KZN the Constitutional Court ruled against the patient who wanted government to provide him with 
renal dialysis to save his life. The patient died later after the Court’s momentous decision on life, see 
also Mohamed and Another v President of the Republic of SA and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) 
where the Court held that a person may not be surrendered to a country where he or she may face 
death penalty, on surrender to foreign country that may impose death penalty see also Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others v Tsebe and Others, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
and Another v Tsebe and Others 2012 (2) SA 467 (CC); Axam supra n (55) at  405-406. 
68 Dworkin Supra n (64) at 1. 
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formal judgment made by a judge on a disputed matter after considering all the facts 
and evidence before the court.70 One may say that adjudication refers to the whole 
process of using the various interpretation theories and methods by the courts of law 
in determining or reaching their decisions on disputed matters.  
 
Hutchinson likens adjudication with the game of soccer.71 Hutchinson insists that 
adjudication, like much of life itself, is best understood as a game-as playful, yet 
serious attempt by the Judges to engage in law’s language of politics, which helps to 
constitute and regulate social life. Hutchinson continues in his hypothetical analogy 
of law and the game of life by saying that: 
 
law is not a site that is located aside or away from ordinary life and that adjudication 
is not an activity that can be appreciated as separate from ordinary living: law and 
adjudication are part of, not apart from life and represent one site and one way of 
playing the game of life72   
 
The jurisprudential account Hutchinson offers here is a theory about the relation 
between law and life.73  
 
Hutchinson’s theory is correct. Adjudication itself is like a stage play, the one who 
knows the stage very well will play very well and consequently win the match. He 
must at least know the rules to be able to play within their ambit on the stage. One 
cannot really escape the fact that interpretation and adjudication and sanction are 
inherent part of law or the courts. The inevitable result of interpreting the law is the 
verdict: someone is found guilty or not guilty, or the court finds in favour of one party 
                                                                                                                                                       
69 Ibid 
70 Oxford Concise English Dictionary 10th Ed at 16. Fiss argues that adjudication is simply 
interpretation in Fiss OM “Objectivity and interpretation” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 739; see 
also Brest P “Interpretation and Interests” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 765; Fish S “Fish v Fiss” 
(1984) 34 Stanford Law Review 1325; see also Carter LH (1998) Reason in Law Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers, 5th ed at 21 and 119; Bix B (1993) Law, Language and Legal Determinacy, 
Oxford at 4; Hutchinson  supra n (1)  at 2, 9 and 84, see also McCormic P and Greene I, (1990) 
Inside the Canadian Judicial System: Judges and Judging, James Lorimer and Co at 4, Wacks R 
“Judges and Injustice” (1984) 101 SALJ 266 at 270-272. 
71 Hutchinson supra n (1) at 2; see also Hlope J “The Role of Judges In A Transformed South Africa - 
Problems, Challenges and Prospects” (1995) 112 SALJ 22 at 31; Corder H (1984) Judges at Work: 
The Role and Attitude of South African Appellate Division Judges 1910-1950 Juta at 23, see also 
Mahesh K & Bhattacharyya B (eds) (1999) Judging the Judges, Gyan Publishing House at 183. 
72 Hutchinson supra n (1) at 2. 
73 Ibid. 
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over the other. The verdict may result in punishment or freedom in the case of a 
criminal matter; in the case of a civil matter the plaintiff may secure his prayers and 
the defendant may lose some rights or even money, if the judgment involves credit. 
 
Hutchinson completes his analogy of adjudication and sports game by saying that 
adjudication is a language game in that it is played both through and with language: 
“judges shape and are shaped by the discursive regimes that comprise law and the 
reality that it helps to make possible”.74 The second feature Hutchinson explores is 
the fact that the language game of adjudication is:  
 
played within a social and historical context that is never static, but is always 
moving, while judges are never not in the game, there is no one game of games”. 
The true nature of adjudication is its interpretive element, thereby making the 
language the tool to be used in this game. The judges cannot leave out the 
historical and social aspects of life in interpreting the law. “The law itself is in most 
cases reactive to the society’s historic events and social ills, these social and 
historical events are reflected in the court judgments disguised somehow by the 
language of the court.75 
 
Language is a human science that is dynamic, constantly evolving differently across 
different societies and communities, even for those who reside in the same territory 
speaking similar language.76 Adjudication can be thought of as a particular language 
game that takes place within the larger language games of law and society.77 
Hutchinson argues further that because convention and context are never 
historically stable and always socially contestable, the meaning and application of 
legal rules cannot be put beyond the possibility of disputation or need for defense; 
as such the practice of adjudication becomes incorrigibly indeterminate and political 
                                                 
74 Id at 52. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Id at 54. 
77 Ibid, on law and language see also Sarkin J “The Political Role of the South African Constitutional 
Court” (1997) 114 SALJ 134 at 137, Hlope JM “ Official Languages and the Courts” (2000) 117 SALJ 
690 at 690, De Villiers J “Meaning and Statutory Interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 387, 
Devenish G “Interpretation From The Bowels Of The Act- An Essential Methodology For Unqualified 
Contextual Interpretation” (1989) 106 SALJ 68 at 81, Kerr AJ “The Interpretation of Contracts: Some 
Persistent Problems” (1994) 57 THRHR 87 at 88, Viljoen F “Look Who’s Talking, In the Courtroom, 
Too!” (1992)109 SALJ 64; Cameroon E “Lawyers, Languages and Politics-In Memory of JC De Wet 
and WA Joubert” (1993) 110 SALJ 51 and Posner RA (1990) The Problems of Jurisprudence, 
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exercise.78 
 
Language is part of human society’s existence; there would be no communication 
without language. Because law is interpretive naturally, language plays a crucial role 
in adjudication. As it is said above, adjudication is a language game in that is played 
through and with language. The language of law is different from the languages of 
the other social sciences. Law differentiates between murder and culpable homicide, 
between robbery and theft. It is possible in law, for the defence attorney, where one 
human being has killed another, to contextualise the act of killing to mean self-
defence, and the act will be considered no longer murder depending on how the 
defense attorney present the argument or case in law’s language of adjudication. 
This is where the elements of ambiguity and indeterminacy in law emerge.  
 
Because language is the tool used to communicate by both human beings in their 
society, the historical and social events find their way to court judgments through an 
interpretation process. Language is a tool used in interpreting the law. Crimes in 
South Africa have become contextualised or titled according to the nation’s recent 
past, by political and social practices. We have seen the emergence of the so-called 
domestic violence cases, racially motivated crimes and the apartheid cases.79 In 
South Africa there is a tendency of labeling cases one way or another, being 
sensitive to sex and gender inequalities80 or race.81   
 
Different people from the same ethnic group may understand the same language 
                                                                                                                                                       
Harvard University Press at 101-105. 
78 Hutchinson supra n (1) at 54, on law and politics see also Van Marle K “Jurisprudence, Friendship 
and the University as Heterogeneous Public Space” (2010) 127 SALJ 628 at 638-639, Du Plessis M 
“Between Apology and Utopia-The Constitutional Court and Public Opinion” (2002) 18 SAJHR 1 at 7-
11, Hayson N “Constitutionalism, Majoritarian, Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights” (1992) 8 
SAJHR 451 at 453, Van Wyk D, Dugard J, de Villiers B, Davis D (eds) (1994) Rights and 
Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order, Juta at 599-601 and 622-623 and Classen 
CJ” The Functioning and Structure of the Constitutional Court” (1994) 57 THRHR 412 at 414-417. 
79 S v Basson 2005 (1) SA 171 (CC): Dr Basson was charged with crimes ranging from murder to 
kidnapping during the reign of apartheid. He is known to be the apartheid chemical warfare spin-
doctor where liberation movement or anti-apartheid activists would be killed using chemicals. 
80 In Hugo v President of the Republic of South Africa 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) single women parents with   
children 12 years and younger were granted Presidential pardon but Mr. Hugo, who was also a single   
parent was not pardoned and he could not convince the Constitutional Court that he had been  
unfairly discriminated against. It may be argued that this case testifies as to the extent to which law is 
influenced by history – in this instance – the inequality which women have been subjected to in the 
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81 See S v Scott-Crossly 2004 (3) SA 436 (T). 
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differently. This inevitably brings in the element of ambiguity, and uncertainty. Do 
judges, when using the language as tool of interpretation, understand the law 
differently? Judges are part of our community, but they are also individuals with 
unique characteristics and different backgrounds and therefore – different 
understandings of the law.  Thus, they may reach different conclusions while 
interpreting the same legal text; their perspective on the subject matter before them 
may differ. 
 
The perspective of a judge is determined by his understanding of the text before 
him. This in turn results in certain attitude towards the issue in question. According 
to Gadamar,82 the individual (judge) approaches a text with a set of prejudices, from 
a perspective one cannot escape coming to a text with prejudices and that there is 
no neutral, non-prejudiced place from which to approach everything. If this is the 
case, then the court’s decisions will not be consistent. Different judges would come 
with different prejudices and the result would be different conclusions even where 
the judges interpret the same text with the same facts before them. This was shown 
by the Constitutional Court decisions where some judges concurred and others 
differed with the majority.83 The Constitutional Court Justices reached different 
conclusions in the matter before them: In practical terms this means that there has 
been an acknowledgement that both litigants’ arguments have merits, but only one 
will benefit by the judgment of the court – the one whose argument is favoured by 
the majority.    
 
Judge Davis examines Kennedy’s Critique of Adjudication critically. In this 
subsection Judge Davis’ opinion on adjudication is discussed, which has been 
underlined by first-hand practical experience. The perspective of a judge on 
adjudication is vitally important in defining the concept adjudication. The most 
important concession Judge Davis makes in his analysis of Kennedy’s critique of 
                                                 
82 Roederer & Moellendorf supra n (1) at 215; see also Swart M “The Carfininan Curse: The Attitude 
of South African Judges Towards Women Between 1900 and 1920” (2003) 120 SALJ 540. 
83 In Hugo v President of the Republic of South Africa 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) Judge Kriegler wrote the 
dissenting judgment. The question is: why did Judge Kriegler differ with other judges - was it because 
he understood the text differently, or was it because he wanted to protect men and remove the 
societal stereotype that women can take better care of the children than men? See also Du Plessis 
and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (4) 331 (CC), Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC), 
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adjudication is that law is a highly political activity:  
 
Adjudication is thus highly political activity, for judges, whether acting in good faith or 
not, are, involved in a political practice as they engage with the legal materials and 
make different choices from the available range of materials, and the application 
thereof, in the particular context within which the judge is operating at that time. Not 
only does she work within and with the materials but also within a community of 
which she is the member and for whom, in addition to the litigating parties and their 
lawyers, she is writing to persuade.84 
 
Adjudication is a highly political activity because it is inevitably part and parcel of law 
and law is shaped by political ideologies of the political party in power in the territory 
of the state. The enactments of legislation reflect the policies and practices, the 
culture of political party in power in any government. The South African legal system 
has undergone tremendous changes with the change of political masters in Cape 
Town and Pretoria. We have witnessed the transition from apartheid to democracy 
and the change in government after the 1994 general election in which the African 
National Congress led by Dr Nelson Mandela emerged victorious. The African 
National Congress government enacted the people’s Constitution that replaced the 
National Party’s parliamentary sovereignty with the Supreme Constitution.85 
Although the 1996 Constitution was drafted by the Constitutional Assembly formed 
by members of various political parties represented in Parliament, the Assembly 
itself was a political institution headed by a politician who would be assumed to have 
advanced the interests and political ideologies of his party. The interests of the 
African National Congress would be to reverse the terrible effects of apartheid 
quickly through legislative and other measures. The ruling African National 
Congress’ Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action policies are aimed 
                                                 
84 Davis DM “Duncan Kennedy’s Crititique of Adjudication: A Challenge To The Business As Usual 
Approach Of The South African Lawyers” (2000) 117 SALJ 697 at 701; see also Dlamini M “The 
Political Nature Of Judicial Function” (1992) 55 THRHR 411 at 411; Davis DM “Integrity And Ideology 
Towards A Critical Theory Of Judicial Function” (1995) 112 SALJ 104; see also Plaatjes D “We Need 
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85 The 1996 Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, Courts now can test the validity of the  
Parliamentary legislation and can declare the legislation invalid on account of its unconstitutionality; 
see s 2 of the 1996 Constitution. 
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at reversing the legacy created by National Party’s policy of social reconstruction.86 
Lastly the contents of the 1996 Constitution reflect the African National Congress 
Freedom Charter of 1955.87 
 
Adjudication is a political activity; the judges interpret statutes, which are political 
documents; the judges are performers in the political arena, whether or not they are 
aware of that fact, and ultimately we have to accept that we are political beings and 
we live in a political village.88 The ideas contained in Kennedy’s Critique of 
Adjudication are described below. 
 
Kennedy examines and discusses in detail the account of adjudication that employs 
a variety of methodologies.89 Kennedy rightfully contents that law making activity 
takes place in the context of a structure of legal rules, in the face of a particular gap, 
conflict, or ambiguity in the structure.90 Kennedy thinks that judges resolve 
interpretive questions through a form of work that consists in restating some part of 
this structure and then use their legal arguments to justify the decision they have 
taken.91 The most important mode of influence of ideology in adjudication comes 
from the interpenetration of this specific, technical rhetoric of legal justification and 
the general rhetoric of the time.92  
 
Kennedy’s introduction to our subject theme, adjudication tells us that he associates 
adjudication with ideologies. Kennedy argues that adjudication functions both “to 
                                                 
86 See s 9(2) of the 1996 Constitution, it provides for the implementation of affirmative action to 
redress the imbalances created by apartheid. 
87 See the section titled ‘All National Groups Shall have Equal Rights’ of the ANC Freedom Charter, 
the aspects of culture and language are covered here, and the same aspects are covered in similar 
tone in s 30 of the1996 Constitution. Protection of law is also covered in the ANC Charter and the 
same is found in section 9 of the 1996 Constitution. The ANC Freedom Charter is available at 
www.anc.org.za (site last visited on 15 January 2014). 
88 The electorate vote for political representative to represent them in Parliament which makes the 
laws for the whole country based on certain policies of the ruling party. Plaatjies supra n ( 77) argues 
that Courts are political agencies and judges are their political actors, and winning elections grants 
the winner the right to control only two branches of government, the legislature and the executive, see 
also Hutchinson  supra n (62)at 109-114; Dworkin RM (1986) A Matter of Principle at 1 argues that 
the judiciary exercises a veto over political decisions; see also Berns S (1998) Concise Jurisprudence 
The Federation Press at 2; Carter LH (1998) Reason in Law 5th ed Addison-Wesley at 3 and 22; 
Botha H “Democracy and Rights: Constitutional Interpretation In A Post Realist World” (2000) 63 
THRHR 561 at 561; Fieldman D (ed) (2013) Law in Politics, Politics in Law Hart, Oxford at 1-3;  
89 Kennedy D (1997) A Critique of Adjudication at 1. 
90 Ibid at 1. 
91 Ibid at 2. 
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secure particular ideological and general class interests of the intelligentsia in the 
social and economic status quo”.93 Kennedy continues his ideological path of 
adjudication, and says that adjudication functions in a politics through its relationship 
to the general idea of rights, the belief that rights exists is both sustained and 
threatened by their role in legal discourse.94 Kennedy’s take here is that without 
rights to enforce, they would be no need for adjudication. He links adjudication with 
the idea of rights. 
 
Adjudication itself emanates from the discourse of law making: the 1996 Constitution 
stipulates how it (and other statutes) should be interpreted.95 Law making, being 
political in nature, has political ideologies from the outset. The legislation enacted by 
governments all over the world reflects their political ideologies reflected in Acts of 
Parliament. The National Party government adopted the policy of social 
reconstruction, the philosophy of apartheid to implement their discriminatory 
ideologies in legislation such as the Group Areas Act and the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act, to name few.96 The African National Congress government came to 
power with different political ideologies, the ideology of an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The African National 
Congress’ ideologies are reflected in the 1996 Constitution, the supreme law of the 
Republic.97  
 
Kennedy is right when he argues that ideologies influence the adjudication by 
structuring the “legal discourse and through strategic choice in interpretation”.98 I 
also concur with Kennedy that the denial of presence of ideologies in adjudication 
leads to political results different from those that would occur in a situation of 
transparency.99 Judges come with individual ideologies; the decision of two or more 
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95 Sections 39 and 233 of the 1996 Constitution. 
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judges would differ even when interpreting the same text. As I have pointed out, this 
is evidenced by the existence of minority and majority judgments in some of our 
Constitutional Court cases.100 The inherent personal and political ideologies in 
adjudication make the law indeterminate. Kennedy argues that we must get rid of the 
idea that there is an objective boundary line we can draw between questions of law 
that have correct determinate answers and questions that can be resolved only 
through ideological choice.101  Be that as it may, the courts must decide cases in 
terms of the law of the land and the Constitution.  
 
The Constitutional Court decides cases before it by majority vote. The Constitution 
requires that a matter be heard by quorum of at least eight judges.102 In ordinary 
practice all eleven judges hear every case. Each judge sitting in a case must 
indicate his or her decision; the ruling is then determined by majority vote.103 The 
reasons are published in a written judgment. If there are disagreements about the 
decision or the route taken in reaching it, the judge who disagrees with the main 
writer will prepare to write a concurrence or dissent.  
 
To conclude my discussion on adjudication, it is conceded that people, who are both 
individual and social beings, will understand things differently, because human 
beings are unique as individual human beings. Unfortunately, law as a social 
science is not an exception and the consequent varying conclusions lead to 
inconsistency in judicial decisions. There are various factors, such as cultural, 
political and educational backgrounds which influence both societal interaction and 
understanding. In the context of adjudication this difference in perception and 
perspective, leads to differences of opinion on the same issue before the court.  
 
Adjudication therefore is an ideological process carried out through the individual’s 
interpretation of the law. The socialist or communist judge would be sympathetic to 
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the poor in the socio-economic cases. The female judge is more likely to look at 
feminist theories in interpreting the law especially where the victim is a woman. They 
are therefore influenced by what they used to interpret the law and they look at the 
particular prescripts because of who they are.  
 
The Constitutional Court and the High Court judges are appointed by the Head of 
State, who is a politician, in consultation with the Judicial Services Commission.104 
This is where the political element inherent in the law is nurtured and grows into the 
courtrooms when the judges interpret the law. This brings me to Judge Davis’ 
concession that adjudication is a highly political activity; 105 it is true that adjudication, 
being an interpretation of law, is a political activity in a real sense. Hutchinson 
endorsed the idea of adjudication being a political activity  when he said that 
adjudication, like much of life itself, is best understood as a game-as playful, but yet 
serious attempt by judges to engage in law’s language of politics, which helps to 
constitute and regulate social life.106 
 
Although Hutchinson and judge Davis’ theories on adjudication are correct, it can 
also be argued that adjudication is just the way the judges interpret the political 
documents called statutes in such a way that the end results reflect the judge’s 
preference embodied in the court’s decision. Adjudication is the process of legal 
interpretation and application of the law, which has been undertaken with the aim of 
resolving a dispute. The law is enacted by Parliament, elected by the people and 
therefore mandated by them to pass that same law on their behalf. The law is 
therefore – ideally – the people’s own. People do understand the concept law 
differently and amongst people emerged different schools of thought to which a 
particular group of thinkers may belong. Amongst the many who belong to different 
schools of thought are the realists. 
 
2.4. The Realists: General 
 
The term “realist” refers to the movement of writers who first assembled in the 
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United States in the earlier part of the twentieth century.107 This group of scholars 
came to be known as the realist and their theory realism.108 Realism means relating 
to the real world, the world as it actually operates, in this sense it carries the idea of 
being practical, down to earth and pragmatic.109 
 
The realists are skeptical of the law. They say that since the rules allow judges 
considerable free play, the judge can in fact decide the case in a variety of ways, 
and the way that is in fact adopted will be more of a function of such factors as the 
judge’s psychological temperament, social class and values than anything written 
down called “rules’’110 The realists took aim at dominant mechanical jurisprudence or 
formalism of the day, which held that judges decide cases on the basis of 
distinctively legal rules and reason that justify a unique result of each case. The 
realists argue that judgments are not primarily based on the law but rather on the 
judges’ sense of what would be “fair” on the facts of the case.111 Realists wanted the 
law in the books to be applied and seen in practice, in observable way. They could 
not find the link between the law on paper and the law in real life, which is legal 
practice.  
 
2.4.1. Holmes 
 
One of the prominent realists was Holmes. Holmes said that the prophecies of what 
the court will in fact do were what he called law.112 Holmes was therefore skeptical of 
the ability of general rules to provide the solutions to particular cases, “and readily 
gave credence to the role of extra-legal factors in judicial decision making”.113 
Holmes thinks that the real nature of law cannot be explained by formal deductive 
logic. Judges make their decision based on their own sense of what is right, and in 
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particular, on what they think is best for the interest of the community.114 For Holmes 
law is nothing more than how the courts would react to particular behaviour. As long 
as one could predict what the court would do about a particular behaviour that would 
be law. 
  
Holmes’ theory of what the law is not correct. Why do we have to wait for a particular 
behaviour to manifest before law can exist, in fact the very conduct of identifying a 
particular act to be unlawful is law itself. Why do we have statutes if people can 
simply predict the outcome of the case, and that prediction simply becomes the law?  
The predictive exercise has nothing to do with the nature of law but something to do 
with dearth of knowledge at that time. However, Holmes is right when he says that 
the life of law has not been logic, it has been an experience. The South African legal 
history is testimony to the life of law being an experience, and not logic. 
 
 Prior to 1994 and the democratic dispensation, the judges applied and enforced law 
that was immoral and unjust. They applied and enforced the unjust laws consciously. 
They were fully aware of the detrimental repercussions of their judicial decisions on 
the majority African people in the country. In the new dispensation, some of the 
apartheid judges are enforcing the new law that outlawed the apartheid laws and 
policies.115 What an experience on the bench.  
 
2.4.2. Frank 
 
Like Holmes, Frank was skeptical of legal rules providing solutions to legal disputes. 
While Holmes thought that the prophecies of what the court will do was in fact law, 
Frank thought that what the court has done is law, thus he said: 
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As Copernicus caused men to drop a geocentric notion of the universe and take up a 
heliocentric notion, so Holmes’ bad man will, sooner or later compel all intelligent 
persons to acknowledge that the center of the legal world is not in the rules but in a 
specific court decisions in a specific law suit.116 
 
It is difficult to digest Frank’s theory. Do we have to wait for a court to decide on a 
dispute before the law on any matter can exist? The courts can develop the existing 
law. 117 In the modern society people are proactive; they can legislate on a matter 
that was never heard in the court of law before. The statute can deal with a potential 
legal dispute and therefore law would exist on the dispute before the dispute 
materialises. The law relating to that dispute may precede the legal dispute. Frank 
wrongfully thought that the courts created law through their decisions. 
 
Frank stated that the rules of law are not the basis of a judge’s decision. Instead, the 
decisions are influenced by emotions, intuitive hunches, prejudices and other 
irrational factors. 118 The knowledge of legal rules therefore is of little assistance in 
predicting the decision of a particular judge, Frank contends; hence the law is in 
essence uncertain. Frank thinks that until a court decided on a particular issue, there 
would be no law on that subject in existence. Essentially judges would be law-
makers and presiding officer at the same time, if we were to embrace Frank’s theory. 
 
2.5. Critical Legal Scholars 
 
The Critical Legal Scholars succeeded the Realists. The Critical Legal Movement 
was built on the insight of the Realists. The main impulse of the movement is to 
challenge liberal theory by debunking its claims to determinacy, coherence and 
objectivity.119 Critical Legal Studies Scholars see liberal legalism as an ideology 
whose underserved air of legitimacy falsely persuades society that the prevailing 
social arrangements are necessary and natural, in their First Annual Conference on 
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critical legal studies, the crits stated: 
 
 If there is a single theme, it is that law is an instrument of social, economic and    
  political domination, both in the sense of furthering the concrete interests of the  
  dominators and in that of legitimating the existing order.120 
 
Crits continue on the critical path and say that if law is ideologically based; all 
scholarship premised on the law blends into political and ideological debate. The 
Critical Legal Studies averments that law is an instrument of social, economic and 
political domination are valid. South Africa is a good example of the law as an 
instrument of domination. The National Party government used the policies of social 
reconstruction to oppress the poor Africans through legislations such as Group 
Areas Act 77 of 1957, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 and many more 
regulations to systematically exclude Blacks from the mainstream economic 
participation. The National Party government used the law, in the form of 
discriminatory legislation, to enhance their political ideology of apartheid for nearly 
five decades. The Courts, including the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein found 
nothing wrong in applying and enforcing the discriminatory apartheid laws. Various 
cases heard in the 1960’s bear testimony to the courts turning a blind eye on 
justice.121 
 
The more vigorous Critical Legal Studies’ claim is that “every case reveals mirror-
image contradictory norms-principles and counter principles, which permit and 
support competing possible decisions”.122 The Crits argue that the choice reflects 
the political or ideological preference.123 On this aspect Van Blerk gives an example 
of the plural society like South Africa, and says that the interpretation of the notion of 
reasonableness according to the Western standards of behaviour is a political 
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choice, which favours the status quo.124 
 
In conclusion, the theories of the abovementioned authors and philosophers are 
neither wrong nor right. These different understandings of the nature of the law, or 
what exactly the word “law” means exist because law is indeterminate. It depends on 
the way in which law is interpreted. It is the same in the courtroom: the individual 
judges’ personal interpretations of the law result in indifferent verdicts. Because the 
law regulates our lives, so our lives are indirectly determined by the judges’ 
perception of the law rather than the law itself.  The law may be a political instrument 
that allows the ruling party in the country to impose their political ideologies and 
policies. The elusive concept of law must at least serve public interests and justice. 
 
2.6. Public Interests 
 
The term “public interest” features in almost all statutes passed by legislatures 
worldwide.125 “Public interest” may simply refer to that which is in the interest of the 
public. It is that which is understood or perceived by the people within a society as 
being good for them, as convenient for them. Public interests represent the collective 
good of the community or the country. The Constitution of 1996 also contains a 
provision that can be linked to public interests, the oath of office of the President.126 
The President takes an oath that he will advance the interests of the Republic– 
“Republic” in this context representing the people of South Africa.127 Thus it is 
possible that the law may serve the public interests. 
 
2.7. Justice 
 
This is the last discussion of three concepts, the other two being “Law” and “Public 
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Interests” discussed above. Justice has two elements, namely, equality and fairness. 
It is about equality in the context of law treating subjects equally. It is about fairness 
in the context of balancing the scale between two competing interests. We often 
hear people say that is only fair and just that criminals are sent to jail for their crimes. 
Here justice would be seen to be done if criminals are punished for what they have 
done. The victim of crime would be happy that the perpetrator is sent to jail.  Justice 
has an element of balancing the scale of fairness in law, although the victim would 
not receive any material benefit from the offender’s punishment, but he would be 
mentally satisfied that law has served justice to him therefore justice is an abstract 
theory of psychological satisfaction. Different people attach different meaning to 
justice, for example White people would, during the apartheid period in South Africa, 
have thought that they had the right to enjoy the benefit of apartheid because their 
forefathers fought for it; the Africans would think that law was not just as it treated 
them unfairly on their ancestral land. Whatever the case might be, justice is a purely 
subjective theory. I discuss Rawls and Perelman’s theories of justice briefly in the 
paragraphs below. 
 
2.8.   Rawls 
 
According to Rawls “justice” is that which prevails in a just society. A just society is 
the one that people would agree to be members if they had a choice.128 Rawls thinks 
that justice is fairness. Justice as fairness is intended as a political concept on 
justice.129 Rawls says that justice, as fairness is a political conception in part 
because it starts from within a certain political tradition.130 
 
 Rawls creates a hypothetical situation where people have entered into a contract. 
Rawls’ theory is concerned with what people would agree to if they had a choice, the 
choice of what laws are to prevail, what system of government must be made 
“behind the veil of ignorance” since only if people make the choice with no 
knowledge of where they would stand can they be counted on to decide on system 
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that is just for all. Rawls termed people behind the veil of ignorance as being “people 
in the original position”.131 
 
With respect to justice as fairness, it is explained that: 
 People in the original position understand the factors that influence the rationale 
choice and the laws and principles that regulate human affairs, but they do not know 
where they would find themselves in the society when the veil of ignorance is lifted, 
The person in the original position would choose the body of principles that would be 
fair however he finds himself when the veil of ignorance is lifted.132 
 
These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kind of 
social cooperation that can be entered into and forms of government that can be 
established.133 In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to 
the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contracts.134 Justice as 
fairness conveys an idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial 
situation that is fair.135 
 
Rawls formulated two fundamental principles of justice argues that people in the 
original position could not fail to adopt, principles that are inescapable sine qua non 
if justice as fairness is to exist.  The first of these principles is that each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive total system equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.136  The basic liberties are to include 
the right to vote and to be eligible for public office, freedom of speech, freedom of 
assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of person, the right to 
hold property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, as defined by the rule of 
law.137 
 
The second fundamental principle of justice is that social and economic inequality 
are to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected to be to everyone’s 
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advantage and attached to offices and positions open to all.138 As a result the 
distribution of wealth does not have to be equal, provided that the unequal 
distribution is for everyone’s advantage.139 
 
Rawls’ fundamental principles of justice are applicable to the modern South African 
democracy. The first principle is satisfied entirely in the context of South Africa in 
that we live in a constitutional democracy. Our Constitution is one of the best in the 
world. Chapter Two of the Constitution entrenched the fundamental human rights, 
thus the political and civil rights enunciated in Rawls’ first principle of justice are 
covered in our Bill of Rights. 
 
The second principle is also relevant to South Africa. Although we have one of the 
finest Constitutions in the world, the policies such as Affirmative Action and Black 
Economic Empowerment favour one race group over the other, the favoured races 
are the ones who were disadvantaged by apartheid policies for almost four decades 
of National Party rule. Today we see white youths, not benefiting from the existing 
social and economic arrangements due to the previous government’s system. Is this 
justice? Is the prevailing system justifiable? This is justified injustice. It is justified in 
the eyes of the law, by the constitutional provisions and the substantiation therein.  
 
Section 9(2) of the Constitution provides that: 
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote 
the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or 
advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
may be taken. 
 
It is prima facie injustice because someone is adversely affected by the application 
of such measures as affirmative action; however, on the other hand the same 
measures are put in place to redress the imbalances of the past. The 1996 
Constitution allows affirmative action to be implemented (although it does not set a 
target date). Some may argue that this justified injustice is presumptuous as it is 
presumed that White people benefited from apartheid and Black people suffered 
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injustice at the hand of the discriminatory laws, while it is possible that not all Whites 
benefited from apartheid and not all Black people suffered injustice under apartheid.  
However, the measures of unequal distribution are necessary and reasonably 
expected, aimed to obliterate the societal and economic legacy of previous apartheid 
discrimination. 
 
2.9. Perelman 
 
Perelman enumerates six possible meanings of the idea of justice. Perelman   
enumerated six; he termed them the conceptions of justice,140 namely: 
 
 From stand point justice is done if what people receive is determined 
according to what contribution they make, whether in the local sphere as at 
the work place or in the wider social sphere, to each according to his work; 
 
 To each according to his needs, for some people justice is served if what 
people receive is determined according to their needs. The needs measured 
according to varying degrees of financial or social need; 
 
 For some justice means that the benefits and burdens are distributed 
according to personal merit ascertained according to some ethical code, the 
good receiving the benefits and the bad the burdens of life, to each according 
to his merit; 
 
 To each according to his rank, the higher the rank the greater the benefits; 
this  formula divides men into various categories which will treated differently;  
 
 To each according to his legal entitlements; this refers to the notion that to be 
just means to accord each person what the law entitled them to; 
 
 To each the same thing; according to this conception, all people taken into 
account must be treated in the same way, without regard to any of their 
distinguishing particulars. Young or old, well or sick, rich or poor, virtuous or 
criminal, aristocrat or boor, white or black, guilty or innocent, is just that all 
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should be treated in the same way, without any discrimination or 
differentiation. 
 
Among all the evocative ideas, that of justice appears to be one of the most eminent 
and most hopelessly confused.141 Many people consider “justice” to be the principal 
virtue, the source of all others.142 Perelman admits that defining the concept “justice” 
does not come easily and that it is defined subjectively rather than objectively. 
Different people attach different meaning to the word “justice”. There will always be 
contradictory affirmation, each of the antagonists can be sincere and believe that his 
cause alone is just.143 Perelman says that no one would be wrong, for each is 
speaking of a different justice.144 Each would defend a conception of justice that puts 
him in the right and his opponents in the wrong.145 
 
Perelman states: 
 
one has only to remind oneself that for the thousands of years protagonists, in public 
and private conflicts, in wars, in revolutions, in lawsuits, in clashes of interests, have 
always done their best to prove that justice is on their side.146  
  
Perelman paints a picture of subjectivity in defining the concept of “justice”. 
However, while Perelman deals with justice in the context of distribution of wealth, 
burdens of life and social standing of people in their communities, he does not 
expressly link justice and law. He covers the element of equal treatment of people in 
the same position in life irrespective of their social standings. I do concur with his six 
principles of justice. 
 
2.10. Hart 
 
Hart links the idea of justice with distribution or compensation. Thus for Hart the 
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derivatives of justice are just or unjust and fair and unfair.147 These derivatives are 
applications of notion of justice, which are explicable once the primary applications 
of justice to matters of distribution and compensation are understood.148 The general 
principle latent in these diverse applications of the idea of justice is that individuals 
are entitled in respect of each other to a certain relative position of equality or 
inequality.149   
 
For Hart justice involves fairness. Thus he emphasises the ‘treat like cases alike’ 
element.150 However, Hart concedes that, though, ‘treat like cases alike’ and 
different cases differently, is a central element in the idea of justice, it is by itself 
incomplete and, until supplemented, cannot afford any determinate guide to a 
conduct.151 The main element in Hart’s theory of justice is to treat like cases alike to 
ensure that just laws are applied fairly in dealing with similar cases. The unjust laws 
would be laws such as the Group Areas Act 77 of 1950 and Suppression of 
Communist Act 44 of 1950.152 I do concur with Hart’s theory of justice; justice 
inherently involves the elements of fairness and equality in law’s dealings with the 
disputes in a society.153  
 
2.11. Hahlo and Kahn 
 
The law has two great objects: to preserve order and to do justice and the two do not 
always coincide, Hahlo said.154 Hahlo and Kahn think that the first and foremost 
purpose of law is to maintain peace and order in the community.155 Justice is the 
chief instrument through which law fulfils its purpose of maintaining peace and order 
in the society.156 The closer the legal system comes to being ‘just’ the more willingly 
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it will be obeyed.157 An unjust system of law, on the other hand, can only be 
enforced by strong sanctions, and sooner or later rebellion will break out, upsetting 
the established order.158 
 
Hahlo and Kahn concede that it is almost impossible to define justice. They say that 
the nearest one can get to defining justice is by considering it to be the prevailing 
sense of men or goodwill as to what is fair and right-the contemporary value 
system.159 According to Hahlo and Kahn, law must be reasonable, and from this 
follow the second criteria of generality and equality, which give rise to the criteria of 
certainty.160 The individual must be ensured fair process in dispute with other 
individuals and with the community itself.161 The law must be based on reason, and 
interpreted by an impartial judge.162 
 
Hahlo and Kahn link justice and law. It is right that justice is the result of the 
interpretation of just laws by an impartial judge. Just laws are laws that are 
reasonable, laws of general application and equal treatment of all subjects in the 
territory of the state. Justice is about fairness, transparency, equality, generality and 
just law. For this reason, justice is inevitably the offspring of the application of the 
just laws. 
  
2.12. Denning 
 
Denning, like Hahlo and Kahn, links law and justice. He says that if people are to 
feel a sense of obligation to the law, then the law must correspond with what they 
consider to be right and just, or at any rate, must not unduly diverge from it, in other 
words, law must correspond, as near as may be, with justice.163  
 
Like Hahlo and Kahn, Denning concedes that no satisfactory answer could be found 
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to the question of what ‘justice’ is.164 Denning says that all he would suggest is that 
‘justice is something one could see, it is not temporal but eternal, and it is not a 
product of man’s intellect but of his spirit.165 Denning continues to conclude that the 
nearest we can get to defining justice is to say that it is “what the right-minded 
members of the community-those who have the right spirit within them-believe to be 
fair”.166 The right-minded members of the community are, according to Denning, the 
lawyers.167 He says that the lawyers represent the right-minded members of the 
community in seeking to do what is fair between man and man and between man 
and the state, and they can only do this by means of just laws justly administered.168 
 
This conception of the task of the lawyer finds its finest expression in the words of 
judicial oaths taken by every judge in the land of his appointment.169 According to 
Denning, these right-minded members of the community would do justice because 
they have taken an oath on assumption of the judicial duty. Denning’s discourse of 
justice is premised on the wrong assumption that lawyers are the only right-minded 
members of the community. Lawyers are not the only role players in the 
administration of justice, other professions play vital roles as well. Other professions 
are invited as expert witnesses in their areas of specialisation. Justice is not about 
how the members of the society think, but it is about how the law is applied in 
dispute resolution in the community. Justice is the fair application of just laws in 
dispute resolutions in the State. 
 
Justice itself is administered by the courts of law, which are manned mainly by 
lawyers and other officials supporting the courts. The miscarriage of justice occurs in 
the courts of law simply because the courts dispense justice. So Denning’s theory 
must fail because miscarriage of justice occurs in courts manned by lawyers, it is not 
necessarily correct that right-minded people are lawyers and we simply believe that 
what they think is just is justice. We learned from history that lawyers enforced the 
unjust laws, in South Africa the courts, including the former Appellate Division in 
                                                 
164 Ibid at 4. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
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Bloemfontein, applied and enforced the unjust laws in cases such Nsindane,170 
Duddley171 and Wyngaard.172 The judges who heard these cases were lawyers but 
turned a blind eye on the unjust and very immoral apartheid laws. How can these 
judges be the right-minded members of our community? Justice should not be 
defined in terms of what the lawyers believe to be fair. Justice is justice whether or 
not lawyers believe it to be fair or not. As indicated above, justice has elements of 
equality and fairness, which emanate from the application and enforcement of just 
laws. Justice is the resultant application of the just laws applied fairly without fear 
and prejudice. Justice comes from the application of law and the application of just 
law in a fair manner is justice. 
 
To conclude the discussion on justice, it is conceded that defining ‘justice’ is a rather 
difficult and subjective exercise in most cases. The ideas and theories of various 
authors on the subject varied slightly. In most cases the elements of equality and 
fairness in law featured prominently. Inherently justice is linked with law, which - if 
applied equally and fairly - results in justice. Since the theme of this dissertation is 
“Inconsistency in judicial decision, the right to life in perspective”, the aim is to show 
how and when the cherished value of justice may have been undermined during the 
process of adjudication. Overall, it may be said that justice is the result of the 
application of just laws. As the courts are the main dispensers of justice,173 the 
question is whether justice will be served by the inconsistent judicial decisions on the 
right to life discussed in the following chapters.  
 
Since the link between law and justice has been established, it is necessary at this 
juncture to investigate their relationship with the concept of public interest. 
 
2.13. The Interactions of Justice, Public Interests and the Law 
 
The interaction between justice and law begins when someone is arrested for being 
suspected of committing a crime, throughout the trial process and if convicted the 
interaction continues in the correctional facility where he serves the sentence, and if 
                                                 
170 1964(1) SA 413 (NPD). 
171 1963 (2) SA 464 (AD). 
172 1964 (2) SA 373 (CPD). 
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acquitted he goes free.174 In civil matters the interaction begins when someone 
receives the letter of demand to kick start the civil proceedings. The relationship 
between law and justice is inevitably an interdependent one in that the fair 
application of just laws result in justice,175 and injustice is always failure on part of 
law.176 In the same vein fair application of unjust laws will not result in justice.177  
 
Justice refers to the quality or fact of being just, or the principle of fairness that like 
cases should be treated alike, or a particular distribution of benefits and burdens 
fairly in accordance with a particular concept of what are to count as like cases, or 
the principle that punishment should be proportional to the offence.178 This definition 
of Justice sums up elements of justice that must emanate from the link with the law. 
The elements of justice referred to here are equality and fairness in the application 
and outcome of the application of the law.179 In short, the few types of justices 
balance the scale, namely, the retributive justice, restorative justice, corrective 
justice and distributive justice.180   
 
The three concepts, namely justice, law and public interests are linked to the 
process of adjudication. Law is fundamentally the interpretation of the rules 
governing these relationships. Justice must, in a constitutional democracy, be the 
end result of the process of adjudication. Adjudication is the process of interpretation 
and application of the law, thus the link between justice and law.  
                                                                                                                                                       
173 See sections 165-180 of the 1996 Constitution. 
174 Section 35 of 1996 Constitution, see also Singh D “The Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial: 
Understanding Section 35(3)(D) Through Cases” (2000) 63 THRHR 121, at 121-133, Axam HS “If the 
Interests of Justice Permit: Individual Liberty, the Limitation Clause and the Qualified Constitutional 
Rights to Bail” (2000) 17 SAJHR 320 at 320-340, Van Zyl DH “The Significance of the Concepts 
‘Justice and Equality’ in The Law and legal Thought” (1988) 105 SALJ 272, Corder H “Administrative 
Justice: A Cornerstone of South Africa’s Democracy” (1998) 14 SAJHR 38. 
175 Van Zyl supra n (174) at 274 where he argues that justice relates to law and judicial functioning 
and the outcome thereof, Wacks R “Judging Judges: A Brief Rejoinder to Professor Dugard” (1984) 
101 SALJ 295 at 295 where he argues that law is a means of attaining justice, see also Dugard J 
“Should Judges Resign?: A Reply to Professor Wacks” (1984) 101 SALJ 286, and Wilson S “The 
Myth of Restorative Justice: Truth, Reconciliation and the Ethics of Amnesty” (2001) 17 SAJHR 531 
at 524-543, Remblay LB (1997) The Rule of Law, Justice and Interpretation, McGill-Queens 
University Press at 166. 
176 Dyzenhaus D “Judges, Equity and Truth” (1995) 102 SALJ 295 at 309. 
177 On application of unjust laws, see Classen supra n (78) at 413, Wacks supra n (70) at 266-270, 
Irving R (2001) The Law is A Ass, Duckbacks at 6 and 12. 
178 Collins English Dictionary 9th ed, 2007, Harper Collins at 880, see also Irving supra n (177) at 3.  
179 Weisheit R, Morn F (2004) Pursuing Justice, Thomson Wadsworth at 1-2. 
180 See Roeder CJ “Wrongfully Conceiving Wrongful Conception: Distributive vs Corrective Justices” 
(2001) 18 SALJ 347 at 347-360, and Wilson supra n (175) at 543-546. 
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The three concepts are so closely interrelated that one may not exist without the 
other, and the other is the result of the fair execution of another. Justice is not law 
and law is not justice. Justice is the product of fair and objective application of law, 
the adjudication process. So justice needs law and law is needed by justice.  
 
The end result of what the courts do right is justice, the absence of justice amount to 
injustice181 The combination of law and justice serves the public interests, thus 
resulting in an orderly and harmonious society. But for all these to happen, judges 
must interpret the law. Will there be justice if judges interpret the law differently? Or 
is it that law itself is not determinable and judges use their own discretion or 
intuition? Is it fair and just for the litigants with the same legal problem to be handed 
down different judgements?182 These are the questions to be to analysed and 
discussed to show that law and legal rules are indeterminable. The investigation is 
on why our Constitutional text and other pieces of legislation are interpreted 
differently; why the judges reach different conclusions on the same issue of the right 
to life. The right to life is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
181 Riddal supra n (23) at 196, see also Jackson P (1973) Modern Legal studies: Natural Justice, 
Sweet and Maxwell  1-10,  Singh K.J, (1995) Distributive Justice in India: A Socio-Legal Study, 
Reliance Publishing House at 1, Friedrich CJ and Chapman JW (eds) (1963) Nomes VI Justice, 
Atherton Press at 1-5. 
182 Wagner A and S Cacciaguldi-Fahy (eds) (2008) Obscurity and Clarity in Law: Prospects and 
Challenges, Ashgate at 24 and 25. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RIGHT TO LIFE DEFINED  
 
3.1. The Right to Life in the South African Bill of Rights 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the right to life as enshrined in the South 
African Bill of Rights and other regional and international documents. The right to life 
is the most important of all the fundamental human rights found in any legal 
instruments. It is therefore important to determine what exactly the right to life 
entails, and whether the courts have bestowed the right to life with a correct and 
adequate meaning. In the next section, the right to life is defined and discussed both 
on national and international level.  
 
The most precious of all the human rights is the right to life. The right to life means 
the right to live, which is the right not to die if we put it differently. The right to life 
also means someone’s right not to have his life ended, to have his life protected, 
preserved and promoted.   
 
The right to life is one the fundamental rights listed in Chapter Two of the 
Constitution.1 The rights in the Bill of Rights are accorded special protection because 
they apply to persons directly. Most of the rights in the Bill of Rights are for the 
benefit of everyone. Section 7 of the Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights is a 
cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our 
country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
Section 7(2) provides that the State must respect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights and section 7(3) qualifies the above by saying that the rights in the Bill 
of Rights are subject to the limitation contained in or referred to in section 36 or 
elsewhere in the Bill. Of all the rights in the Bill of Rights the right to life is the most 
sacred one.2 
                                                 
1 Section 11 of the 1996 Constitution, section 9 of 1993 Constitution. 
2 Menghistu F in Ramcharan BG (1985) The Right to Life in International Law at 63; Ramcharan BG 
in Ramcharan BG (1985) The Right to Life in International Law at 12; see also Vorster’s, definition of 
human life in Vorster WS (1988) The Right To Life: Issues in Bioethics Unisa at 89; Du Plessis LM 
and De Villiers JR in Rights and Constitutionalism The New SA Legal Order at 213.  
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The right to life is the primary right in the Bill of Rights. One cannot exercise any of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights unless he can exercise the right to life first. In S v 
Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court described the right to life and dignity as the 
most important of all human rights, and the source of all the other personal right in 
the Bill of Rights.3 
 
According to O’Regan: 
the right to life is, in one sense, antecedent to all the other rights in the Constitution. 
Without life in the sense of existence, it would not be possible to exercise rights or to 
be the bearer of them. But the right to life as was included in the Constitution not 
simply to enshrine the right to existence. It is not a mere organic matter the 
Constitution cherishes, but the right to human life, the right to share in the 
experience of humanity. This concept of human life is at the center of our 
Constitutional values. The Constitution seeks to establish a society where the 
individual value of each member of the community is recognised and treasured. The 
right to life is central to such a society. The right to life, thus understood, incorporate 
the right to dignity. So the rights to human dignity and life are entwined. The right to 
life is more than existence; it is the right to be treasured as human being with dignity, 
without such dignity, human life is substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot 
be dignity.4 
 
Life is a unique and different phenomenon; it is the quality that distinguishes organic 
and inorganic material and it is not measurable in any particular units.5 Currie and 
De Waal are of the view that the right to life means the right not to be killed and 
vests in every person.6 It means the right not to die from preventable disease, 
actions, and omissions by another, including medical preservation of life in order to 
prolong it. The South African Constitution grants everyone the right to life in an 
unqualified manner.7 This unqualified formulation of section 11 creates problems, as 
                                                 
3 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  
4 Ibid par 326-7. 
5 Ibid par 351. 
6 Currie I & De Waal J (2013) The Bill of Rights Hand Book 6th ed Juta at 260. 
7 Section 11 of 1996 Constitution provides that “Everyone has the right to life”. The provisions of other 
Constitutions and instruments do qualify the right to life, see Article 6 of the Namibian constitution, 
Article 12(1) of Zimbabwean constitution, Section 2 of Lesotho constitution, section of 4(1) of 
Botswana constitution, section 4(1) of Swaziland constitution, Article 3 of Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 6 of International Covenant on Civil  and Political Rights, Article 1 of American 
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it will be showed in subsequent chapters, the Constitutional Court has, at times, 
actually avoided associating the right to life with other secondary rights in the Bill of 
Rights.  
 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution obliges the State to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. In this context, the State must prevent one from 
unlawfully taking another’s life and it must protect the life, which is at risk: In 
Carmichele,8 the State was ordered to put in place effective criminal law provisions 
to deter the commission of offences and had to sanction the breaches of such 
provisions by anyone. The right to life has been interpreted widely by the South 
African courts, especially the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court.  
 
As the right to life in our Constitution is not textually qualified, the Constitutional 
Court has a wide discretion to decide on the vital issue of the meaning and content 
of right to life and any other right associated with it. Therefore, the courts have given 
the right to life what would be called ‘wide margins’: meaning they have read the 
right to life into other rights that supplement or complement the right to life. This 
interpretation of the right to life in a non-restrictive or wide manner indicates the 
degree to which the courts are willing to accept the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of all fundamental human rights with one another, especially the 
right to life.9 The right to life is the most essential right that a human being can enjoy 
                                                                                                                                                       
declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 2 of European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms, Article 4 of the African Charter on Human Rights and 
People’s Rights,  and  Article 2(a) of the Declaration of the Basic Rights of Asean Peoples and 
Governments. 
8 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938(CC); see also Carmichele v Minister 
of Safety   and Security 2003 (3) SA 656 (SCA) and Minister of Safety and Security v. Hamilton 2001 
(3) SA 50 (SCA), In Hamilton v Minister of Safety and Security Court held that police have duty to 
exercise reasonable care in considering, investigating and recommending application for fire arm 
licence and are liable for shooting by unfit person to whom the fire licence was issued, in Minister of  
Safety and Security v Van Duivenoden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) Court held that police were liable for 
damages arising from their negligent failure to prevent dangerous criminals from escaping from 
custody;  see also Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA), in Mohamed 
v President of RSA 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC), Court decided that there was a positive duty on state for 
the deportation of individuals to jurisdiction where they may face death penalty, see also Kaunda v 
President of RSA 2004 (10) BCLR 1009 (CC) and Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Tsebe and 
Others, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another v Tsebe and Others  2012 
(2) SA 467 (CC). 
9 Menghistu supra n (2) at 78, that human rights are indivisible and interrelated, and as such the 
protection of the right to life is therefore essential prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all other human 
rights, see also UN General Assembly Resolution 421(v) of 4 December 1950 and World Conference 
on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and programme of Action, UN doc. A/conf.157/23 part I, par 5;  
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and it is the only right that may not be taken and granted any time or thereafter. The 
right to life is the mother of all human rights, without which one cannot exist. The 
protection, preservation and promotion of the right to life are therefore crucial if we 
are to sustain life.10 However, the right to life - like any other fundamental right - is 
not immune to threat and contravention.11 
 
There are institutions and processes such as abortion, euthanasia, death penalty 
and disease, which may affect the right to life and bring about death.  
 
Death terminates life, thus the right to life comes to an end. Medically, a person is 
dead when his blood circulation and respiration have ceased to function and there is 
associated loss of function in the central nervous system.12 Schwar explains: 
“Everyone understands the inevitability of death. They know that one day they, their 
loved ones, in fact all mankind must die”.13 Death may be classified as natural or 
unnatural. Death as a result of human conduct such as murder and accidents are 
unnatural. Death as result of illness is natural death. The right to life is not complied 
with in cases where the state fails to protect, preserve and promote life. State 
protects life by preventing murders and where life had been ended, punishing the 
perpetrator. The state has an obligation to deploy the police to prevent crime.14  
 
Human life can also be preserved by other measures such as medical treatment. 
Failure to provide medical treatment where the medical intervention would save life, 
is inconsistent with the right to life. What is critically important here is ‘life’. If a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Viljoen F “The Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights/The Travaux Preparatoirs in the Light of 
Subsequent Practice” (2001) 25 HRLJ 313 at 320; Hayson N “Constitutionalism, Majoritarian 
Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights” (1992) 8 SAJHR 451 at 451-452; Mureinik E “Beyond A 
Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the New Constitution” (1992) 8 SAJHR 464 at 465; Asmal K 
“Victims, Survivors and Citizens-Human Rights, Reparations and Reconciliation” (1992) 8 SAJHR 491 
at 509; Blackbeard M “HIV/AIDS: The Right to Privacy v The Right to Life” (2002) 65 THRHR 232 at 
232, Goldman RK Grossman CM, Martin C (2001) The International Dimension of Human Rights, A 
Guide for Application in Domestic Law IDB Publication at 532-534, Ramlogan R (2011) Sustainable 
Developments: Towards a Judicial Interpretation, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden at 148-152, Johnson BR 
(ed) (2011) “Life and Death Matters” Walnut Creek, CA at 9. 
10 Currie and de Waal supra n (6) at 267 argue that life is a guarantee of physical existence, see also 
Van Wyk D, Dugard J, and de Villiers B (eds) (1994) Rights and Constitutionalism at 213-215. 
11 To be discussed below. 
12 Schwar TG, Loubser JD, Olivier JA (1998) The Forensic ABC in Medical Practice, a Practical 
Guide, at 397. 
13 Ibid at 396. 
14 South African Police Services Act 68 of 2005; see also Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v 
Transnet Ltd t/a Metro Rail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC).           
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person is allowed to die due to failure on the part of the state to provide necessary 
medical intervention to keep that person alive, then the right to life in the Constitution 
would have no purpose at all. The purpose of the right to life is to preserve, promote 
and protect life, no other.  
 
The South African law recognises the right to life only after birth and legal 
subjectivity of a person also begins at birth.15 The life of an unborn child does not 
enjoy any legal protection except in some instances where the interests of the 
unborn child are protected, the nasciturus fiction.16 The scope of the right to life in 
law is therefore limited or restricted to after birth with the exception of his or her 
interests in some cases. The law protects only the interests of the unborn child but 
does not recognise the life in the unborn child herself or himself.17 The scope of the 
right to life is not constitutionally defined which left the extent of this vitally important 
right to the judiciary to interpret the provisions of the Constitution in order to 
determine the extent of the right. The Constitutional Court has given the right to life 
narrow interpretation thereby narrowing its scope and protection.18 
 
Let us now consider the international instruments and see how the right to life is 
treated internationally. This is necessary, because section 39 of the Constitution 
requires the courts to consider international law when they interpret the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
3.2. The Right to Life in International Human Rights Instruments 
 
All human rights are part of both national and international law, nationally the Bill of 
Rights in the Constitutions of nations contain detailed scope of the fundamental 
                                                 
15 Kruger H(ed), Skelton A (ed), Carnelly M, Human S, Kruuse H, Mofokeng L and Robinson JA 
(2010) The Law of Persons in South Africa, Oxford University Press at 23-25,  and Van Heerden B, 
Cockrell A, Keightley R,  Heaton J, Clark B, Sinclair J and Mosikatsana T (1999) Bober’s Law of 
Persons and Family Law, Juta at 30-42.  
16 Ibid at 12 and-13, see also Ex parte Boedel Steenkamp 1962 3 SA 954 (O), Chisholm v East Rand 
Proprietary Mines  Ltd 1909 TH 297, Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 (W), 
Christian League of Southern Africa v Rall 1981 2 SA 821 (O) and Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecution 2007 2 SACR 435 (CC). 
17 S v Mashumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E). 
18 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others 1998 4 SA 1113T, Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health Kwa Zulu Natal 1998 1 SA 756. 
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human rights.19 The right to life features in almost all the instruments, be it regional 
or international document.20 The right to life is therefore a universal right which must 
be enforced by national courts and international courts as contained in both national 
law and international law.21 The South African courts must also apply and enforce 
international law.22 Section 233 of 1996 Constitution allows the courts to indirectly 
apply international law when interpreting legislation, that every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law 
over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. The 
courts must also consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.23 The 
most important document containing the right to life on international level is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
In addition to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there are 
several conventions and regional organisations that seek to protect human rights in 
different areas of the world. The Organisation of American States (OAS) has human 
rights treaties and declarations that apply to North, Central and South America. The 
Organisation of African Unity (now called the AU) established the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights. The Council of Europe oversees human rights issues in 
Europe.24 
 
3.2.1. Europe 
 
The right to life in the European Community is covered in the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.25 Article 2 of the 
                                                 
19 In South Africa the Bill of Rights in contained in Chapter Two of the 1996 Constitution.  
20 Section 11 of the 1996 constitution, see also section 9 of the 1993 constitution, article 6(1) of 
ICCPR, article 3 of UDHR, article I of American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, article 4(1) 
of American Convention on Human Rights, article 2(1) of the European  Convention for the Protection 
of Fundamental Freedoms, article 4 of the African Charter on  Human and Peoples’ Rights and article 
1(2)(a) of the Declaration of the Basic Rights  of Asean Peoples and Government. 
21 Implementation of Geneva Conventions Act 4 of 2012, Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002, Prohibition or Restriction of Certain Weapons Act 18 of 
2008 and Geneva Conventions of August 1949. 
22 Section 231(5) states that the Republic is bound by international agreements which are binding on 
the Republic when the constitution took effect. Most importantly section 232 says that customary 
international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or Act of 
Parliament. 
23 Section 39 of the 1996 Constitution. 
24 Redman N and Whalen L (1988) Human Rights 2nd ed at xiv. 
25 Convention imprinted in Clayton R & Tomlison H (1954) The Law of Human Rights Oxford 
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Convention provides that:  
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of court following his conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.26 
 
The European Court of Human Rights sits in Strasbourg and hears matters 
emanating from the European Community. It has heard several cases from different 
European nations involving the right to life and other fundamental rights. The court 
interpreted the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms widely. In Khalidova et al. v Russia,27 the court held that the failure by the 
Russian government to effectively investigate the disappearance of family members 
of the plaintiff was a violation of the right to life and right not to be treated inhumanly. 
The court’s reason for the decision was that Article 2, which safeguards the right to 
life and set out the circumstances when deprivation of life may be justified, ranked 
as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, from which no 
derogation is permitted. The court further indicated that in the light of the importance 
of the protection afforded by Article 2, the court must subject the deprivation of  life 
to the most careful scrutiny, taking into account consideration not only the actions of 
the State but surrounding circumstances.28 The court reached this important 
decision because it rated the right to life as the most important of all fundamental 
rights. The court interpreted the right to life as widely as possible to provide for much 
wider protection when it comes to the right to life. The European Court of Human 
Rights prefers the wider protection of life as evidenced in Kemaloglu’s case where 
the failure by school principal to inform municipality that classes would be dismissed 
early resulted in the death of a pupil who tried to walk home and froze to death on 
the way, the court found that the State had a positive duty to protect the right to life 
                                                                                                                                                       
University Press at 55. 
26 Article 1(2) provides that the “deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of 
this article when it results from the use of force which is more than:(a) In defence of any person from   
unlawful violence (b) In order to effect lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained 
and (c) In action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection”.    
27 2008 (29) HRLJ 279 and Open Door & Dublin Well Women v Ireland 467 ECHR Series A Vol.246. 
On inhuman treatment see also Gafgen v Germany 2008 (29) HRLJ 56, M.S.S v. Belgium and 
Greece 2011 (31) HRLJ 121, N v UK 2008 (29) HRLJ 289 and Giszczak v Poland 2011 (31) HRLJ 
424; Buntuv v Russia (2012) 32 HRLJ 69 and A, B and C v. Ireland (GC) 2011 (31) HRLJ 344 on 
restriction on obtaining abortion in Ireland. 
28 Par [88] 284; on right to life see also Kemaloglu v Turkey (2012) 32 HRLJ 122; European Court R.R  
and Others v Hungary (2012) 32 HRLJ 419. 
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and that the conduct violated Article 2 of the Convention.29 
 
Unlike the South African Constitution, the right to life in the European Convention is 
textually qualified. The death penalty is still permitted in those European countries 
where the law provides for it as a form of punishment. The European Court of 
Human Rights is given the mammoth task of interpreting the provisions of this 
Convention, but it has a somewhat easier task in interpreting the right to life because 
the latter has been textually qualified by the state parties. However, it seems that the 
right to life is protected against the state only. This Convention does not expressly 
protect human life against the threat by another human being or against a threat 
arising from the failure to enforce other rights such as the right to medical treatment, 
right to nutrition, right to accommodation. These are the secondary rights supporting 
the primary right to life. The right to life on its own is meaningless unless buttressed 
by these rights.  
 
3.2.2. America 
 
In the American Human Rights System, the right to life is covered in two 
instruments, namely, the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man and the 
American Convention on Human Rights.30 In the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, the right to life is covered in article 1, which reads: “Every human 
being has the right to life, liberty and security of his person”.  
 
As Patel et al state: 
The right to life in this convention is not textually qualified. The distinctive feature of 
this convention is that it also provides for or imposes duties on everyone or 
individuals in that member state or country or the community in which the person 
lives.31 
 
The second instrument, the American Convention on Human Rights also imposes 
                                                 
29 Par 32-38. 
30 Both Instruments imprinted in Patel E & Watters C (1994) Human Rights Fundamental Instruments 
and Documents at 89 and 94 respectively. 
31 See Chapter Two of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, in Patel supra n (30) at 
93. 
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responsibilities on everyone.32 The right to life in this convention is covered in Article 
4.33 
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as 
IACHR, heard the matter brought before by Gretel Artavia Murillo against Costa 
Rica.34 The applicants lodged several petitions with the IACHR in which they 
contended that the ruling by a Costa Rican Court (in which the practice of in vitro 
fertilisation in the country was prohibited) violated the right to private life and to 
found a family, as included in the Convention. The IACHR referred the matter to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and recommended that Costa Rica lift the 
ban on in vitro fertilisation through necessary legal procedures. This judgment 
supports the right to life as it allows legal measures to be put in place to assist in 
production of human life through artificial and scientific means. In vitro fertilisation 
would assist couples who would not or could not conceive through the natural 
means. The prohibition of in vitro fertilisation as indeed the violation of private life of 
individuals who chose or are forced to use the method to conceive and have children 
and family. 
 
The right to life in the American Convention is linked to the death penalty and more 
importantly it recognises the life of a person not yet born. The death penalty is 
allowed in those states in which their respective laws provide for it as a punishment 
for a particular crime. The tone of Article 4(2) of the Convention tells us that the 
death penalty is not preferred; the States would rather have it abolished. The 
Convention still does not expressly protect life against threat imposed by other 
human beings, but stipulates that the punishment for taking someone’s life may be 
                                                 
32 Ibid at 94. 
33 Article 4 reads: “1. Everyone has the right to have his right to life respected. This right shall be 
protected by law, and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life. 2. In Countries that have not abolished death penalty, it may be imposed only for the most 
serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent Court and in accordance 
with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the crime. The 
application of such punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not apply and 3. The 
death penalty shall not be re-established in states that have abolished it.”   
34 Gretel Artavia Murillo et al. v Costa Rica 2011 (31) HRLJ 295, see also Carcazo v Venezuela, 
available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulus/series-58-ing;The Last Temptation of Christ v 
Chile available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulus/seriec-73-ing; Barrios Altos v Peru, 
available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulus/seriec-75-ing;  Plan de Sanchez Massacre v 
Guatemala available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulus/seriec-105-ing (all sites last visited on 
15 January 2014). 
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the death penalty. Still, the Convention does not link the right to life to socio-
economic rights such as the right to medical treatment. However, it clearly protects 
the life of the unborn foetus against the decision of its mother to abort it. Abortion is 
thus not allowed in terms of this Convention.35  
 
3.2.3. Africa 
 
The African Human Right instrument is called the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.36 The right to life in this Convention is covered in article 4, which 
reads:  
Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his 
life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
 
The right to life in this Charter is textually qualified by implication. The last sentence 
in article 4 reads: “No one may be arbitrarily deprived of his life”, meaning that a 
person may be divested of his right to life where substantial and procedural fairness 
is followed. The institution tasked with the implementation of the Charter is the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights established by member states of the 
African Union to ensure protection of Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa. The 
court was established by Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on The Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the Protocol.37 The judgment of the court is decided by majority and 
is final not subject to appeal.38 The court is yet to decide a case involving the right to 
life directly. 
 
3.2.4. Asia 
 
The Declaration of Basic Rights of Asian Peoples and Government was adopted by 
                                                 
35 The Right to life is protected from moment of conception: see Article 4 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights in supra n (29), see also section 1841 of the United States Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act 2004 alternatively cited as “Laci and Conner’s law”. 
36 Charter imprinted in Patel supra n (30) at 142, see also Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights on the Rights to Women and Children, Article 4. 
37 Protocol available at www.african-court/images/documents/court/establishment/africancourt-
humanrights.pdf site visited on 15 January 2015. 
38 See Article 28(2) of the Protocol. 
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the Asian countries to deal with human rights in Asia.39  Article 1 of the Declaration 
provides that it is the duty of every government to ensure  and protect basic rights of 
all persons to life, a decent standard of living, security, dignity, sovereignty, 
independence, self-determination, autonomous, cultural, social, economic and 
political development. The Convention covers both political and socio-economic 
rights by placing an obligation on the government to ensure a decent standard of 
living. The right to life is not singled out as a right on its own as it is in other regional 
instruments. The right to life is complemented by other civil and political rights. The 
right to life is also not textually qualified. The linkage of the right to life to socio-
economic rights will encourage the courts to enforce the right to medical treatment 
as the right to life. The right to medical treatment is the right to life because if a 
patient does not get medical attention quickly when sick, his life may end. The 
protection and preservation of life means the right not to die where death is 
preventable. However, the Convention does not place any obligations on the 
individual members to respect, promote and preserve life. 
 
3.3. The Right to Life in Domestic Bills of Rights 
 
Most of the Southern African countries’ Bills of Rights textually qualify the right to 
life. Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe have similar provision on the right 
to life or the protection of life.40  These countries are chosen because of their 
proximity to South Africa which, in my view, may result in similar socio-political and 
socio-economic environment. These countries experienced almost similar political 
struggle as South Africa prior to their independence from the colonial masters. 
Section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution obliges the court or tribunal to consider 
foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, thus the reference to these countries’ 
constitutional provisions on the right to life is important. 
 
The provisions on the right to life or protection of life in these four countries are 
identical and read as follows: 
 
      No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of a sentence of a 
                                                 
39 Patel supra n (30) at 149. 
40 Patel supra n (30), the respective instruments. 
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court in respect of which a criminal offence of which he has been convicted. A person 
shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of subsection 
(1) if he dies as a result of the use of, to such an extent and such circumstances as are 
permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the 
case: 
For the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property. 
         In order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained. 
      For the purposes of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny of or dispersing an 
unlawful gathering; or in order to prevent the commission by that person of criminal 
offence or if he dies as a result of a lawful act of war.41 
 
It is clear that the four countries drafted the provision on the right to life or protection 
of life in such a manner that it would allow the imposition of the death penalty. On 
the other hand, the South African and Namibian Bills of Rights differ with that of 
Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe in that both South Africa and Namibia 
have abolished the death penalty. Article 6 of the Namibian Constitution provides 
that: 
 
 The right to life shall be respected and protected. No law may prescribe death 
penalty as competent sentence. No Court or Tribunal shall have the power to impose 
sentence of death upon any person. No execution shall take place in Namibia.42 
 
The Namibian Constitution is very clear on the death penalty issue, but still it does 
not distinctly indicate how the right to life is to be protected and respected. It is very 
clear on death penalty - the judiciary need not dwell much thereon as the legislature 
did not leave this policy issue to the judiciary. The legislature determined it in the 
interests of the electorate. 
 
In conclusion, the right to life is dealt with extensively in international, regional and 
domestic human rights instruments. In all these human rights instruments there 
seems to be a linkage between the right to life and the death penalty only, and not to 
the other causes of death. Anything that causes or prevents someone from 
                                                 
41 Section 8 of Lesotho Constitution, section 4 of Botswana Constitution, section 4 of Swaziland 
Constitution and section 12 of Zimbabwe Constitution. All these Constitutions are imprinted in Patel 
supra n (30) 433-504. 
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exercising the right to life should be covered in the provisions of these human rights 
instruments.  
 
Death terminates the right to life - death from starvation or illness; death inflicted as 
punishment, or death caused by other human conduct (such as murder and culpable 
homicide) - they all signal the end of life and therefore infringe on the constitutionally 
enshrined right to life. A human being has to be alive in order to be able to exercise 
the right to life, and anything that ends life unnaturally, may contravene the right to 
life. Thus, it is the responsibility of the state to put measures in place to prevent the 
demise of life. Such measures may include: the provision of medical treatment 
where the right to life is threatened by illness, the provision of food where the right to 
life is threatened by starvation, or adequate policing where the right to life is 
endangered by criminal activities. Therefore, the last question is: How enforceable 
are the rights in the Bill of Rights, especially the right to life. Our penultimate 
discussion is the aspect of justiciability of the rights in the Bill of Rights.  
 
3.4. Justiciability 
 
Justiciability simply refers to the ability to bring a matter to court, in which a person 
will have an interest, and which can be heard by the court. Widely justiciability in 
relation to any issue refers to the ability of the court to adjudicate the dispute, 
whether the solution to the problem requires judicial intervention or not.43 
Justiciablity as an ability of both the court and the litigant to entertain the dispute has 
not experienced a smooth existence, as a legal concept with no fixed content and 
not susceptible to scientific verification, is incapable of accurate definition.44 
Justiciablity therefore has several factors inhibiting it and by extension inhibiting 
enforcement of rights by courts. 
 
Factors inhibiting justiciablity include jurisdiction of the court on the subject matter 
before the court, the subject matter, the standing of the party initiating the litigation, 
                                                                                                                                                       
42 Patel supra n (30) at 505. 
43 Okpaluba C “Justiciability and Constitutional Adjudication in Commonwealth: The Problem of 
Definition (1)” (2003) 66 THRHR 424 at 428; see also The Justiciability Doctrines, Barriers to 
Constitutional Adjudication at www.law.lmu.edu.manheim/c11 site visited on 06 Nov 2014. 
44 Ibid at 430. 
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the constitutional provisions limiting jurisdiction, or excluding judicial review.  
 
The court can only hear the matter before it if it has jurisdiction to do so. The 
provisions of the Constitution or Act of Parliament or the Convention or Treaty may 
expressly limit the jurisdiction of a court.44 The lack of jurisdiction by a court results 
in non-enforceability of a right which has an adverse impact on the enjoyment of the 
right claimed. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights could not hear many 
cases because it lacked jurisdiction to hear the cases which resulted in people not 
being able to enforce the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Right. Article 3(1) of the Protocol provided that: 
 
Jurisdiction of the court shall extent to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant Human 
Rights Instrument ratified by the States concerned.45  
 
Article 3(1) makes it almost impossible to enforce the rights of the African Charter as 
the Court can only hear cases against States that ratified the Protocol, many cases 
by individuals submitted to the Court could not be adjudicated because the of lack of 
jurisdiction by court due to non-ratification of the Protocol by states complained of.46  
 
Standing of the person initiating the litigation process plays crucial role in 
determining justiciability of the matter. The person initiating the legal action must 
have standing in that he can approach the court acting in his own interests, acting on 
behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name, acting as a member of 
or in the interests of a group or class of persons; acting in public interests or an 
                                                 
44 In South Africa the Constitution sets out the powers of all court, sections 167-170; see also Chapter 
11 of the Namibian Constitution which exclude judicial enforcement of state policy; see also Okpaluba 
C “Justiciability and Constitutional Adjudication: Problem of Definition (2)” (2003) 66 THRHR 610 at 
611-612; De Villiers B “The Socio-Economic Consequences of Directive Principles of State Policy. 
Limitations on Fundamental Rights” (1992) 8 SAJHR 188 at 188-199; De Villiers B “Directive 
Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: Indian Experience” (1992) 8 SAJHR 29; Article 
3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
45 African Protocol supra n (37). 
46 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights lacked jurisdiction in the following cases, Frank David  
Omary and Others v The United Republic of Tanzania, Delta International Investments v Republic of 
South Africa; Peter Joseph Chacha v The United Republic of Tanzania; Emmanuel Uko v Republic of 
South Africa; Amir Adam Timan v Republic of Sudan; Baghdadi Ali v Republic of Tunisia; Femi Fana 
v African Union these cases are available at www.african-
court/en/images/documents/court/cases/judgment, site visited on 06 November 2014. 
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association acting in the interests of its members.47 The person cannot obtain the 
enforcement and enjoyment of a right unless he or she has interests in the outcome 
of the matter, which means he or she stands to gain or lose should the matter go 
either way. 
 
Justiciability is not only affected by the standing of the person initiating the legal 
case, the nature of the disputes may also affect justiciability of the legal matter 
before court. The dispute must be of legal nature, emanating from or has a root in 
law, disputes that do not have roots in law constitutional, statutory or common law 
are not justiciable and therefore not adjudicable by court of law.48  
 
The timing of when to bring the matter to court plays important role in the 
justiciability of any dispute. The dispute must be ready for adjudication, that means 
the dispute must be ripe for court to entertain it.49 This ensures courts do not 
entertain legal disputes prematurely. Directly related to ripeness is the concept of 
mootness, mootness refers to a situation where the issue before court has become 
irrelevant, overtaken by events and longer a disputes, the dispute disappeared and 
the issue at hand has become academic and therefore no longer justiciable.50  
 
3.5   Conclusion 
 
The right to life is the most important right of all the rights enshrined in various 
instruments including the regional and international documents. The right to life is 
the mother of all rights and as such cannot exist in isolation of other rights. Although 
the right to life is a civil and political right, its enforceability is inevitably through 
socio-economic rights. Non-enforceability of social economic rights such as the right 
to health care may result in death which may infringe the right to life. Thus the 
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights and other instruments are indivisible, they 
complement each other. The direct infringement of socio-economic rights may result 
in an indirect infringement of civil and political rights, which is an infringement of 
                                                 
47 Section 38 of 1996 SA Constitution; see also Article 5 of the Protocol supra n (37), Okpaluba supra 
n (43) at 453-436. 
48 Okpaluba supra n (43) at 437. 
49 Currie I & De Waal J (2013) The Bill of Rights Hand Book 6th ed Juta at 85; see also Okpaluba 
supra n (43) at 437. 
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constitutional right. The infringement of socio-economic rights is therefore an 
infringement of the right to life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
50 Okpaluba supra n (43) at 442. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RIGHT TO LIFE: MEDICAL TREATMENT 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the dimension of the right to life in the 
context of the socio-economic rights, the right to access health care services.  
 
In this Chapter the decision of the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney is 
scrutinised.1 It is argued that the right to medical treatment in section 27 of the 
Constitution is indirectly the right to life as the failure to enforce the right to medical 
treatment may result in death, thus failure to enforce the right to health care 
indirectly infringes the right to life. 
 
The right to life has been described as the mother of all the rights in the Bill of Rights 
by Kriegler J.2 All the fundamental human rights are linked to the right to life, for 
them (fundamental rights) to be exercised there must be life, thus the right to life. 
Other rights in the Bill of Rights complement the right to life. These rights, such as 
the right to access to medical treatment, are essential if life is to be preserved and 
protected by the State.  
 
 Although the right to life is not absolute, it is argued that the right to life should not 
be qualified by means such as whether there are enough resources or not. If such 
factors should be taken into account then the state should be forced to make the 
resources available in its budgetary planning to meet its constitutional duties to 
protect, promote, preserve and fulfill the right to life. Alternatively it is further argued 
                                                 
1 Soobramoney v Minister of Health KZN 1998 1 SA 430 (CC). 
2 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 par 214; see also Langa J par 217, see also Menghistu F “The  
Satisfaction of Survival Requirements” in Ramcharan BG (1985)The Right to Life in International Law 
at 63; on survival interests see Bilchitz D “Towards A Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: 
Laying Foundation for Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 at 12, 14 
&15 Vorster WS (1988) The Right To Life: Issues in Bioethics Unisa at 89, Tellis & Others v Bombay 
Municipality Corporation & Others and  Kuppusami  & Others vs State of Maharasha & Others AIR 
1987 LRC 351, Law Reform Commission of Canada: “Working Paper 28, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide 
and Cessation of Treatment” at 2-4 where it was argued that protection of human life is a fundamental 
value of all legal systems. 
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that socio- economic enforcement such as the right to access to health care services 
should be interpreted to mean the right to survival.  The Constitutional Court, when 
interpreting the right to access to medical treatment clause of the Constitution, does 
not give the right to life the value it deserves. The right to life in the Court’s 
perspective is not really the right to life as enshrined in the 1996 Constitution as the 
Court did not consider the consequences of its decision as it will become clear in my 
discussion of Soobramoney below.  
 
4.2. Socio-Economic Rights 
 
Section 27 of the Constitution enshrines the socio-economic rights of access to 
health care, food, water and social security in the Bill of Rights. The right to health 
care services is provided for in the Constitution, section 27. This section provides as 
follows: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to: 
                 (a) Health care services, including reproductive health care; 
      (b) Sufficient food and water; and  
 (c) Social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their  
     dependents appropriate social assistants; 
 (2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its     
      available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these    
      rights. 
 (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
 
Other socio-economic rights are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights, such as 
education in section 29 and housing in section 26. Socio economic rights are 
second-generation rights. The first generation rights are civil and political rights.3  
The close relationship between human rights is described as the indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights.4  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
3 Liebenberg S & Pillay K (2000) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa University of the Western 
Cape at 15. 
4 Grootboom v Government of RSA 2000 (11) SA 1169 (CC). Chenwi argues that socio-economic 
rights should be treated on the same footing as civil and political rights, see Chenwi L “Correcting the 
Historical Asymmetry Between Rights: The Optical Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (2009) 9 AHRLJ 23 at 23. See also Mbazira C “A Path to 
Realising Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: A Critique of the New Partnership for 
70 
 
The right to life on its own might be meaningless or redundant unless other 
fundamental rights complement it, hence my argument that the right to medical 
treatment is in fact indirectly the right to life. The right to life is inevitably linked to or 
dependent on the successful exercise of the other rights in the Bill of Rights, such as 
the right to health care in instances where life is threatened by diseases or illness or 
even emergency catastrophe such an accidents and natural disasters. The 
infringement of the right to health care in section 27(1) (a) of the Constitution will 
ultimately lead to infringement of the right to life in section 11 of the Constitution. 
Human rights are interdependent, indivisible and symbolic.5 Civil and political rights 
cannot be effectively protected without adequate enjoyment of basic social and 
economic entitlements.6 
 
The main reason why people seek medical intervention when they are sick is that 
they want to avert the negative consequences of the disease; they want to be cured 
of the threatening disease and thus to prolong their lives.  In this context the right to 
medical treatment is the right to preserve, to protect and to prolong life. The 
preservation of life can be achieved by means of medical treatment where the 
disease threatens the health of a person. The state must then provide medical 
treatment to such people to avert the possible harm. The state has obligations to 
respect, promote, protect and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights.7 In the case of the 
right to life, this translates into both negative and positive duties.8 
 
The socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights give the right to life, “life” and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Africa’s Development” (2004) 4 AHRLJ 34, Bollyky TJ “R if C>P+B: A Paradigm for Judicial Remedies 
of Socio Economic Rights Violations” (2002) 18 SAJHR 161. 
5 Pieterse M “A Different Shade of Red: Socio-Economic Dimensions of the Right to Life in South   
 Africa”  (1999) 15  SAJHR  at 372; see also Liebenberg S “Interpretation of socio-economic rights” in 
Woolman S et al (eds) (2006) Constitutional law of South Africa at 33-1; Proclamation of Tehnran 
1968, Final Act of International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, UN Doc A/Conf 32/41, art 13; 
Du Plessis LM & De Villiers JR “Personal Rights: Life, Freedom and  Security of the Person, Privacy 
and Freedom of Movement” in Van Wyk D, Dugard J, De Villiers B and Davis DM (eds)(1994) Rights 
and Constitutionalism Juta, at 213; article 6 of ICCPR. 
6 Menghistu supra n (2), “The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements” in Ramcharan BG (1985) (ed) 
The Right to Life in International Law at 63; see also Indian Supreme Court in Tellis & Others v 
Bombay Municipality Corporation & Others and Kuppusami & Others v State of Maharasha & Others 
AIR 1987LRC 351 and Himachel Pradesh & Another v Umed Ram Sharma & Others AIR 1986 SC 
847, Iles K “Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond Internal limitation Clauses (2004) 20 SAJHR 
448. 
7 Section 7(2) of the 1996 Constitution; see also Currie I and De Waal J (2013) The Bill of Rights 
Handbook 6th ed at 262. 
8 Ibid. 
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meaning. The socio-economic right of access health care in this context means 
access to survival medical treatment to protect and preserve life. The right to life is 
indirectly enforced through the access to health care services by patients, including 
patients who cannot afford the costly medical treatment in both private and public 
health sector in South Africa. The denial or failure to provide medical treatment to 
sick person that lead to his death is in fact failure to preserve his life through medical 
intervention.  
 
The infringement of section 27 of the Constitution may eventually infringe section 11. 
The main objective of the right to life is to preserve, protect and prolong life through 
interpretation or reading it together with other provisions in the Bill of Rights. The 
real life experience shows that the two groups of rights cannot be separated. Each 
depends on the other to be real and meaningful. I do concur with the viewpoint that 
human rights depend on each other. The exercise of the socio economic rights 
depends largely on the existence of the civil and political rights, the right to life in 
particular.9  
 
4.3.    Sobramoney v Minister of Health KZN  
 
The appellant was 41 years old unemployed diabetic man who suffered from 
ischemic heart disease, cerebro-vascaular disease which caused him to have stroke 
during 1996.10 His life could be prolonged by means of regular dialysis treatment.11 
He approached the Addington Hospital with a view of receiving the ongoing dialysis 
treatment in its renal unit.12 The Hospital refused him admission to its renal unit due 
to limited facilities that are available for kidney dialysis13. Department’s decision was 
based on a policy with regard to the use of dialysis resources of the hospital.14 The 
Hospital did  not to admit the patient due to shortage of resources and had adopted 
a set of guidelines to determine which persons with chronic renal failure would be 
given dialysis treatment.15 According to the guidelines the primary requirement for 
                                                 
9 Makwanayane supra n (2) par 217, Chenwi supra n (4) at 23. 
10 Soobramoney supra n (1), at 769D. 
11 Ibid at 769D-E. 
12 Ibid par [1] 769D-E. 
13 Ibid par [1] 769E-F. 
14 Ibid par [3] 769 I. 
15 Ibid par [3] 770A-B. 
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admission to dialysis was eligibility for kidney transplant.16 Such persons would be 
provided with dialysis until the donor was found and kidney transplant performed.17 
The guidelines provided that an applicant is not eligible for a transplant unless he or 
she is free of significant vascular or cardiac disease.18 The appellant suffered from 
other conditions including heart disease and consequently failed to be eligible for 
kidney transplant.19 
 
The appellant had unsuccessfully approached the Durban High Court for an order 
directing the Hospital to provide him with the treatment he desired and interdicted 
the respondent from refusing him admission to the renal unit of the Hospital.20 The 
application was dismissed.21 The appellant thereafter appealed to the Constitutional 
Court against the judgment of the local division of the High Court. The appellant 
based his claim on section 27(3) of the Constitution, which provides that: 
 
No one may be refused emergency medical treatment’ and also on section 11, which 
provides that ‘Everyone has the right to life. 
 
The Constitutional Court found unanimously that the appeal had to fail because it 
had not been shown that the State’s failure to provide renal dialysis facilities for all 
persons suffering from chronic renal failure constitutes a breach of the obligation 
imposed by section 27.22 The appellant contended that the patients who suffered 
from terminal illness and required treatment in order to prolong their lives were 
entitled in terms of section 27(3) of the Constitution to be provided with such 
treatment by the State. He argued that the State was obliged to provide funding and 
resources necessary to discharge that obligation. Section 27(3) of the Constitution, 
so it was argued, should be construed consistently with the right to life entrenched in 
section 11 of the Constitution.23 This required section 27(3) to be read as meaning 
everyone requiring lifesaving treatment and was unable to pay for such treatment be 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid par [4] 770C. 
19 Ibid par [1] 769D-EC. 
20 Ibid par [5] 770E. 
21 Ibid par [5] 770F. 
22 Ibid par [36] 778A-CS. 
23 Ibid par [14] 772C. 
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entitled to have the treatment at the State Hospital free of charge.24 The 
Constitutional Court observed the words ‘emergency medical treatment’ and 
concluded that they did not bear the meaning contended for as their ordinary 
meaning.25 The Court held that the words might possibly be open to a broad 
construction, which would include the ongoing treatment of chronic illness for the 
purpose of prolonging life, but remarked that this was not their ordinary meaning and 
if this had been the purpose which section 27(3) was intended to serve, one would 
have expect it to have been expressed in positive and more specific terms.26 The 
Court observed that the purpose of the right in section 27(3) seems to ensure that 
treatment is given in emergency and that the right should not be frustrated by other 
formalities. The Court thought that the section requires the remedial treatment that is 
necessary and available be given immediately to avert harm.27 The Constitutional 
Court therefore came to the conclusion that, since the appellant required dialysis 
treatment two to three times a week, that was not an emergency which called for 
remedial treatment but an ongoing state of affairs resulting from the deterioration of 
the appellant’s renal failure which was incurable.28   
 
4.3.1. Critical analysis of Court’s decision and the reasoning 
 
The Constitutional Court interpreted section 27(3) to refer to sudden catastrophic 
incidents such as accidents, natural disasters and sudden illness only.29 The Court 
did not specifically refer to the element of preservation of human life, as part of the 
right to life nor did it consider what would be the effect of not admitting the patient to 
the kidney dialysis programme. Therefore  the definition is found wanting. The 
phrase “emergency medical treatment” in section 27(3) of the Constitution should 
have been defined as follows: medical treatment which must be administered within 
a short period of time on an urgent basis in order to preserve the human life which 
has been threatened by the circumstances existing at the time. Emergency 
treatment is only called for in situations, in which life has been threatened. Yet, this 
was exactly the position in Soobramoney’s case; his life was at risk due to the 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid par [13] 772B. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid par [20] 774B-E. 
28 Ibid par [21] 774D-F. 
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kidney disease he suffered from. The Court should have interpreted “emergency” 
widely enough to include all situations, not only the types of emergency enumerated 
by the Court, in which there is a high risk that human life will be lost if medical 
treatment is not provided immediately. The Court should always consider whether 
the irreparable damage would result if the relief sought is not granted and  in this 
case the consequences of not granting the relief was death, the permanent loss of 
human life. 
 
It should be noted that most medical conditions are emergencies when viewed from 
the patient’s perspective.30 Indeed Mubangizi is correct, what would have been the 
case if the appellant were brought to the hospital causality on the brink of death; 
would the hospital refuse him admission because he had other diseases and not 
attend to him? Let us say they admit him and later realise that it was the appellant 
and he was suffering from an incurable renal disease, would they discontinue 
treatment? The immediate threat to human life is the factor that makes a situation an 
emergency. 
 
The rapid deterioration of life due to an incurable illness should have been the 
Court’s main focus. Thus, the Court would have had the opportunity to stop such 
deterioration and preserve the life that has been threatened. The threat to human life 
seemed not to have been the focus of the Court but rather the availability of 
resources. The Court did not satisfy itself that indeed resources were not available; it 
just believed what was presented by the state. The obligation entrenched in section 
27(2) is not applicable to the situation of emergency medical treatment the patient 
was facing. The threat to his life was real and imminent. The Court should have 
considered the threat to human life and then pronounced on the state affordability of 
maintaining such chronic life. 
 
 Although the case before the Court involved the right to access to health care 
services and the Court based its decision on the availability of resources, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
29 Ibid par [20] 774C-D.  
30 Mubangizi JC “Public Health, SA Bill of Rights and Socio-Economic Polemic” (2002) 2 TSAR at 
345; see also Twinomugisha BK “Exploring Judicial Strategies to Protect the Right of Access to 
Emergency Obstetric Care in Uganda” (2007) 7 AHRLJ 283 at 299. 
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message, which the Court appears to be sending, is that the quality of life 
determines whether or not that life is worth saving. The availability of resources 
should have been the second phase of the inquiry, the first phase being whether 
human life was being threatened or not. The express reference to “available 
resources” and “progressive realization” automatically qualifies the right to the extent 
of making it almost untenable.31  
 
By deciding that Mr. Soobramoney was not entitled to medical treatment at the state 
expense due to lack of resources, the Constitutional Court played the role of 
administrator and judiciary at the same time: it rationalised health care services. 
Rationing entails denying individuals some measure of health care that otherwise 
would benefit them.32 Rationing is felt to be unfair, unethical and potentially 
discriminatory.33 
 
The Addington Hospital’s admission guidelines amounted to rationing policy, 
rationing health care services. Califano argues that rationing of health care services 
may decide who should suffer how much pain, how long, who should walk and who 
should limp, and who will live, who die and when.34 I concur with Califano that 
rationing health care is an unnecessary solution especially in South Africa where 
there is massive underspending by Government departments.35 It is ironic that the 
government fails to use resources on the one hand and claims lack of the same on 
the other hand. Budgets and accompanying resource limitation that shapes the 
context of rationing decisions are political, rather than natural.36 Rather than the 
                                                 
31 Mubangizi JC supra n (35) at 345. 
32 Lamm RD “Rationing Health Care:  Inevitable and Desirable” (1992) 140 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review at 511; see also Pieterse M “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 124 
SALJ 514 at 515, 517-520, and Moellendorf  D ‘Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the 
Future Socio-Economic Rights Claim” (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 at 332; Callahan D “Setting Limits in 
Health Care” at 55-64; Glick S “Rationing and Priority Setting” at 77-86, both in Allebeck P & Jansson 
B (eds) (1990) Health Care Limits: Ethics in Medicine Individual Intergrity versus Demands of Society 
Raven Press. 
33 Lamm RD supra n (32) at 511. In SA sec 9(1) of 1996 Constitution provides that “Everyone is equal 
before the law and has equal protection and benefit of the law”, the Court did not protect the patient in 
this case. See also sec 7(2). 
34 Califano JA Jr “Rationing Health Care: The Unnecessary Solution” (1992) 140 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review at 525-526. 
35 Business Day of 08 and 28 March 2000 reported that Government rolled out over R582.6 million 
from 1997/98 and 1998/99 financial years after National and Provincial Departments failed to spend 
their budget allocations. Unspent money was earmarked for poverty relief program and fighting 
HIV/AIDS. 
36 Pieterse M “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” supra n (32) at 516. 
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‘inevitable consequence of tragic reality’ of resource scarcity, rationing of resources 
available for medical treatment is ‘inescapably’ a political process, therefore the 
judiciary is not an appropriate forum to decide on rationing for medical resources,37 
but should decide whether or not the rationing of resources would contravene the 
constitutionally protected right. 
 
The Constitutional Court was supposed to rule on whether or not the right to life, 
would, as a result of rationing be contravened or threatened. The Court avoided the 
real issue of threat to human life and dealt with the case as if the hospital or 
department was forced to make an inevitable and tragic choice.38 The Court 
interpreted ‘available resources’ as if it referred to the hospital or department’s 
resources only, and not state resources.  The available resources refer to the real 
resources of the country, and are not to be equated with the budgetary 
appropriations.39 The Court did not inquire whether resources could be available 
from other state organs but concluded that life could be lost on account of lack of 
resources. The Court’s main concern was whether the admission guidelines were 
rational or not, not the effect of the guidelines. 
 
The Court ignored the real reason the matter was before it, the survival of a human 
being. The socio-economic judicial enforcement is the last resort for the poor to 
survive; indeed it was the last resort for Mr. Soobramoney.40 The Court, in adopting 
the particular approach to adjudicating socio-economic rights, has succeeded in 
removing itself one step away from the concrete realities of hunger, homelessness, 
disease and illiteracy that socio-economic rights are meant to deal with.41 Brand 
suggests that the Constitutional Court has effectively proceduralised its socio-
economic rights in the sense that its first concern in adjudicating socio-economic 
rights are structural principles of good governance, rather than deprivation and the 
                                                 
37 Ibid at 517. 
38 Ibid at 518, see also Soobramoney par 29. 
39 Liebenberg S “The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its 
Implications for South Africa” (1995) 11 SAJHR 359 at 366. 
40 Menghistu supra n (2) “The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements” in Ramcharan BG (ed) (1985) 
The Right to Life in International Law at 63, see also Bilchitz D “Is the Constitutional Court Wasting 
Away the Rights of the Poor: Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality” (2010) 127 SALJ 
591; Kelton S “Girls’ Socio-Economic Rights in SA” (2010) 26 SALJ 141. 
41 Brand D in Botha H, van Der Walt A, & van Der Walt J (eds) (2002) The Right and Democracy at 
36. 
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need and its alleviation.42 The Court was concerned more about the reasonableness 
of the policy than with the content of the right in question.43 The reasonableness 
standard seems an appropriate yardstick for financial and budgetary measures that 
shape the context of rationing decisions, since it allows the courts to establish 
whether such measures comply with constitutional directives without the courts 
engaging in financial or budgeting policy making.44  
 
The Court should have focused on the constitutional interests protected by the 
access to health care and the reasonableness adopted by the state must also 
involve inquiry into the content of rights in section 26 and 27 of the Constitution.45 
The Court’s approach attempted to sidestep the need to give content to the rights in 
section 27(1) of the Constitution.46 Should the Court find that a constitutional right 
has been infringed or threatened, it could then determine whether such an 
infringement is justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.47 The court could 
not be in a position to adjudicate the infringement properly, because its focus was 
whether the policy and the procedures followed in making the policy, were 
reasonable. The Hospital Policy in Soobramoney, would not have passed the 
provision of section 36 of the Constitution as the Policy was not of general 
application. The Policy also unfairly discriminated against patients who suffered from 
renal failure on the basis of additional disease. The implementation of the Policy as 
rationing measure was also not the less restrictive means available to achieve the 
purpose of rationing as the State could have appropriated funds from other not so 
urgent items, or overspent or overcommitted funds, and save life. All these were 
overlooked because the Constitutional Court was only concerned with the 
reasonableness of the policy and not the content of the right in question. 
 
Brand is right that the Constitutional Court’s concern, in adjudicating socio-economic 
                                                 
42 Ibid at 43. 
43 Soobramoney supra  n (1) par [25] 775D; on reasonableness see Kruus H “The Art of the Possible 
in Realising Socio-Economic Rights: The SCA Decision in City of JHB Metro Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd” (2011) 128 SALJ 620; Steinberg C “Can Reasonableness Protects 
the Poor: A Review of SA’s Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2006) 123 SALJ 264; Ray B 
“Procedurilisation’s and Engagement’s Promise in  Socio-Economic Litigation” (2011) 27 SALJ 107. 
44 Pieterse supra n (32) at 534. 
45 Bilchitz supra n (2) at 6; Pillay A “Reviewing Reasonableness: An Appropriate Standard for 
Evaluating State Action and Inaction’ (2005) 122 SALJ 419 at 429-432. 
46 Ibid. 
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rights, seems not to be with the possible outcome of the government’s policies; its 
main concern is whether government acts in a manner consistent with procedural 
good governance standards in its attempt to realise socio-economic rights.48 Brand’s 
reaction to the Constitutional Court’s decision in Soobramoney is right in that the 
Court confined its review to the manner in which the hospital’s admission guidelines 
were conceived and applied, rather than to the question what they were likely to 
achieve.49 
 
The Court did not see beyond the application of the hospital’s guidelines, what would 
happen if the guidelines were to be applied. That would have given the court an 
opportunity to go beyond the reasonableness of the guidelines and looked at why 
the resources were not sufficient. The court failed to link the exercise of the right to 
life and the availability of resources and its management. The issue on hand was the 
right to life and how to interpret or read section 27(3) into section 11, the right to life. 
 
On the question of whether section 27(3) should be interpreted consistently with the 
right to life and that everyone who required lifesaving treatment and who was unable 
to pay for it was entitled to have treatment provided by the State without charge, the 
Constitutional Court said that the right to medical treatment is directly dealt with in 
section 27, so there was no need to make any inferences on the right to medical 
treatment.50 The Court held that if the appellant’s constructions were to be accepted, 
it would make it difficult for the State to provide health services to everyone within its 
available resources.51 However, not everybody was in the appellant’s position at that 
time. There were no statistics to show whether there were many people in the 
appellant’s position who had applied to court for similar relief. The Court’s argument 
was therefore moot. 
 
The obligations imposed on the State by sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution in 
                                                                                                                                                       
47 De Waal & Curie supra n (7) at 164-165. 
48 Brand D supra n (41) at 49; see Soobramoney par [25] 775 C-D. The Court said that it had not 
been suggested that the guidelines were unreasonable or that they were not applied fairly and 
rationally when the decision was taken that the appellant did not qualify for dialysis. 
49 Soobramoney supra n (1); par [25] 775D. 
50 Ibid par [19] 773H. 
51 Ibid. 
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respect of access to health care, housing, water, food and social security are 
qualified by the provisions of subsections two in both sections to the effect that ‘the 
State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights. The qualification 
brings the issue of availability of resources, which is an integral part of the realisation 
of all socio-economic rights. The progressive realisation used in these subsections 
mean the realisation is over a period of time, which was definitely not referring to 
emergency situations or cases where life may be lost. The emergency situation, by 
its nature, would not exist over a period of time since the unpleasant event that 
brought the emergency would eventuate into catastrophic results. The Constitutional 
Court was not correct when it said that the appellant’s situation was not an 
emergency, for as long as there was a need to avert harm to human life, there was 
an emergency.  
 
The other aspect the Court considered was the guidelines, which were established 
by the Department to deal with the issue of admitting chronic patients in the 
Province. The Court found that by using the machines according to the guidelines 
more patients would benefit than would be the case if they used the machines to 
keep alive persons with chronic renal failure.52  The Constitutional Court said that 
the outcome of the treatment was more likely to be beneficial because it would be 
aimed at curing patients rather than maintaining them in a chronic ill state.53 The 
Court held that the appellant’s case must be seen in the context of needs that the 
health services have to meet, for if treatment had to be provided to the appellant, it 
would also have to be provided to everyone in similar circumstances.54 The Court 
considered the costs to the state of treating the chronically ill patients by means of 
dialysis provided twice a week and held that if persons suffering from renal failure 
were to be provided with renal dialysis, the costs of doing so would make substantial 
inroads into the health budget.55 On these premises the Constitutional Court held 
that it had not been shown that the state’s failure to provide renal dialysis facilities to 
all persons suffering from chronic renal failure constituted a breach of its obligation 
                                                 
52 Ibid par [25] 775 C-D. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid par [28] 775H. 
55 Ibid par [28] 775J-776A. 
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under sections 27 of the Constitution.56 Shortly after the Court’s disappointing 
decision, the appellant died.  
 
Chaskalson P, with Madala J and Sachs J concurring, in this case wrote the 
judgment. Essentially, in practical terms, the Court decided that persons suffering 
from chronic illness must die so as not to waste money on the dying.57 To me the 
Court indirectly said to Mr. Soobramoney ‘it is too late’ and it would serve no 
purpose at all to fight the losing battle anyway. Sachs J said: 
 
however the right to life may come to be defined in South Africa, there is in reality no 
meaningful way in which it can constitutionally be extended to encompass the right 
indefinitely to evade death.58 
 
There was no logic in this statement; it is known that death is inevitably part of any 
living human society. This statement was correct but irrelevant to the case before 
the Court, as the appellant was not requesting the court to indefinitely extend his life, 
and the Court would not have been able to do so, even if the appellant so wished. 
The appellant was requesting the Court to force the State to preserve his life. The 
statement showed that the Judge was pre-empting the appellant’s death, the very 
same thing the appellant wanted to avoid for a few more years through medical 
intervention as his life was threatened by the disease with the end of life imminent. 
 
The honourable Judge Sachs supports his view on life further by referring to Stevens 
J and said ‘dying is part of life, its completion rather than its opposite’.59  Justice 
Sachs continued and said: 
we can, however, influence the manner in which we come to terms with our mortality, 
it is precisely here where scarce artificial life prolonging resources have to be called 
upon, that tragic medical choices have to be made.60 
 
 Sachs J’s statement is not relevant in this case; the Court was not requested to 
                                                 
56 Ibid par [36] 778B-C. 
57 Ibid par [25] 775C-D, the Court emphasised the number of patients being cured rather than the life 
to be lost, see also Shandu S “Prisoners Waiting to Die with Dignity” (2004) November De Rebus 18.  
58 Ibid par [57] 784 B-C. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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make a medical choice, but to confirm or dismiss the decision of the High Court. The 
Constitutional Court was not supposed to entertain the medical choice issue, but to 
tell us whether the appellant was entitled to medical treatment at the state’s expense 
or not. The most important issue before the Constitutional Court was whether or not 
the appellant’s constitutional right to life was infringed or threatened. The 
infringement or threat to constitutional right would probably be determined by what 
would happen if the order sought was not granted. Then the Constitutional Court 
must have considered what would happen to the patient if his prayer was not 
granted. 
 
The Constitutional Court’s decision in this matter may effectively be interpreted to 
mean that the life of any patient who suffers from incurable disease and in chronic 
stage is not worth saving. It indirectly said that the quality of life left in the person, 
and the life itself, determined whether or not the patient was worth living or dying. In 
the circumstances this decision, it is presumed, may affect people with HIV/AIDS, 
because they are suffering from a chronic incurable disease. It is further presumed 
the Constitutional Court would not want lots of money used to maintain or prolong 
lives of HIV/AIDS sufferers while that money could be used to buy drugs for patient 
suffering from curable diseases.61 It seems to me that is what the Constitutional 
Court was concerned with in this decision, was certainly not the threat to life posed 
by the chronic incurable disease, but with the usage of resources and the resultant 
benefits thereof.  
 
4.3.2. Interpretation of Section 11 of the 1996 Constitution 
 
The Constitutional Court should have interpreted section 11 and section 27 of the 
Constitution generously. If the Court used the purposive interpretation, then it 
ignored the purpose of section 11 of the Constitution. Section 11 of the Constitution 
provides that ‘Everyone has the right to life’. The word ‘everyone’ in this section 
means or refers to every human being. It is submitted that ‘everyone’ refers to 
                                                 
61 In par [25] 775C-D the Court stresses the number of patients benefiting, that it would have been the 
case of keeping chronic ill patients and in par [57] 784 B-C the Court admits that policy was a tragic 
medical choice. 
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anybody including convicted murderers,62 chronically ill patients,63 vegetative 
patients64 and unborn babies.65 
 
The South African law recognises both statutory and common law methods of 
interpreting the law.66 Our law recognises two broad theories of interpretations, 
namely, the literal and purposive methods. The literal method requires the courts 
and other fora to look at the ordinary grammatical words used in the statute, where 
the words used are clear and unambiguous, the meaning that flows therefrom can 
be adopted.67 The intention of the legislature can then be deduced from the wording 
of the statute. 
 
The second common law theory on interpreting statutes is the purposive method or 
golden rule. Purposive method requires the court to ascertain the purpose of which 
the legislation was promulgated, that is the intention of the legislature.68 By using the 
literal method of interpretation, the court can ascertain the intention of the legislature 
and deduce the purpose for promulgating the statute using the purposive method. 
The two methods of interpretation should be used interdependently. However, the 
theories should be used in such a way that they do not conflict with the 
Constitution.69   
 
                                                 
62 S v Makwanyane and Others supra n (2). 
63 Soobramoney supra n (1). 
64 S v Hartman 1975 3 SA 532. 
65 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002(5) SA 721(CC) or 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 
(CC). 
66 Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 was enacted to assist the Court in interpreting statutes; section 39 of 
the 1996 Constitution determines how the Bill of Rights should be interpreted, common law methods 
of interpretation include the literal method and the purposive method, see also Du Plessis A “SA’s   
Environmental Constitutional Right (generously) Interpreted: What is in it for the Poor” (2011) 27 
SALJ 279 at 304-307 for generous interpretation of statute; see also Motala Z. “The Constitution is 
Not Anything the Court Wants It to Be: The Mhlungu Decision and the Need for Disciplining Rules” 
(1998) 115 SALJ 141. 
67 Burger AJ (2001) A Guide to Legislative Drafting in South Africa Juta at 25; see also Kellaway EA 
(1995) Principles of Legal Interpretation Statues Contracts and Wills 1 Butterworths at 49-50; Du 
Plessis L (2004) Re-Interpretation of Statutes Butterworths at 93; Cockram GM (1983) Interpretation 
of Statutes 2nd ed Juta at 49; Bloom LH Jr (2009) Methods of Interpretation Oxford Univ Press at 1-5, 
10-14 and 31-36. 
68 Ibid; Du Plessis L supra n (67) at 96; Cockram supra n (67) at 60-68, Kellaway EA supra n (67) at 
57 and Andrews AJ at 25-26; see also De Waal and Currie supra n (7) at 148-150. 
69 If they are inconsistent with the Constitution they will be declared invalid section 2 of the 
Constitution. 
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The interpretation of the Bill of Rights is clearly set out in the Constitution itself.70  
The wording of section 39 of the Constitution indicates the framers of the 
Constitution preferred the purposive method of interpretation. This constitutional 
clause requires the court or tribunal to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation. Section 39 deals specifically with the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. It requires the court to promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom. Section 7(1) lists the democratic values as human dignity, equality and 
freedom. 
 
In Soobramoney the court used the purposive method of interpretation and said that 
the purpose of section 27(3) of the constitution was to ensure that treatment was 
given in an emergency and treatment was not frustrated by bureaucracy and other 
formalities.71 Yet, the Court still interpreted section 27(3) narrowly and restrictively 
and as such missed the purpose thereof, which is to avert harm, whether immediate 
or potential. The Court conceded that the section required that remedial treatment 
that is necessary and available be given immediately to avert harm.72 It is submitted 
that the applicant’s situation was an “emergency” as the harm would materialise if 
treatment was not given immediately. The purpose of section 27(3) is to ensure that 
people are not denied emergency treatment simply because they would die if not 
treated urgently. The harm the patients wanted to avoid in any emergency medical 
situation is the resultant death due to late or lack of medical intervention. The 
applicant’s life was threatened by an incurable kidney disease, which can be averted 
by kidney dialysis.73 The purpose of section 27(3) read together with section 11 of 
the Constitution is to preserve life. Section 27(3) seeks to ensure that persons 
receive emergency treatment to preserve life, while section 11 gives the right 
content, which is life. The Court therefore must, in the process of interpreting these 
interrelated rights, look at the text of the document as a whole, and not 
compartmentalise the individual rights. 
 
                                                 
70 Sections 39 and 233 of the Constitution. See also Ka Mdumbe F “Socio-Economic Rights: Van 
Biljon v Soobramoney” (1998) 13 SAPR/PL 461 at 465. 
71 Soobramoney supra n (1) par 20 at 774C-D. 
72 Ibid par 20 at 774D. 
73 Ibid par 1 at 769D-E. 
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The second method of interpretation used by the Court is the literal method. This 
method requires the Court to interpret the words in the statute in their ordinary, literal 
meaning. The Court looked at the negative wording of section 27(3) and concluded 
that the section was not applicable to the applicant’s situation.74 The Court 
effectively decided that the applicant’s situation was not an emergency as required 
by section 27(3). Section 27(3) provides that ‘No one may be refused emergency 
medical treatment’ and does not classify or categorise the types of emergencies. 
This is an open text, which needs both the literal and intention theories to interpret 
and give it meaning. The literal method alone is not sufficient, because the text is 
open to various interpretations.75 
 
The Court had to ascertain the intention of the framers of the constitution which, it is 
submitted would not have been to let people die simply because their cases were 
not considered to be emergencies irrespective of the threat to their lives. This 
decision did not promote the value of human dignity, as the Court did not consider 
the threat to the applicant’s life to be a paramount factor; Soobramoney had to lose 
his life because his situation was not medically classified as being an ‘emergency’ by 
the Court.76 
 
4.3.3. Comparative and International Law Dimension of Socio-Economic 
Rights 
 
The Constitutional Court referred extensively to foreign law to make an analogy with 
Soobramoney’s case.77 The court was within its right, in terms of section 39(1) (c) of 
                                                 
74 Soobramoney supra n 1 par 21 at 774E. 
75 Cockram supra n (67) at 60 where he says that if the literal interpretation does not lead to the 
intention of the legislature the Court may reject literal interpretation and use the Golden rule to 
ascertain the intention of the legislature. See also De Vos P “A Bridge Too Far? History As Context in 
the Interpretation of the SA Constitution” (2001) 17 SAJHR at 5-12; Lenta P “A Neat Trick If You Can 
Do It: Legal Interpretation as Literary Reading” (2004) 121 SALJ 216, 218, 237-238.On common law 
compliance and constitutional compliance, see Hopkins K ‘Constitutional Values and the Rule of Law: 
They Don’t Mean Whatever You Want Them to Mean’ (2004) 19 SAPR/PL 432, 432-437; Kriel RR 
“On How to Deal with Textual Ambiguity’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 311, 311-315; see also; Currie  and De 
Waal supra n (7)  at 147-148 where they argue that constitutional interpretation unavoidably involves 
more than the determination of  the literal meaning of particular provisions, for various methodologies 
of interpretation; see also Brown LN & Kennedy T (1994) The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities at 323- 343. 
76 See Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” (2005) 21 
SAJHR 1 at 2-5. 
77 Soobramoney supra n (1) par [18] at 773B-I. 
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the Constitution to consider the foreign law in interpreting the Bill of Rights. The 
Court was also obliged to consider international law.78 The Court did not see any 
reason why international law should have been used in interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
Had the court considered international law it would have reached a different 
conclusion because of the international law concept of minimum core obligations in 
the context of socio-economic rights.79 
 
The obligation to consider international law, in the context of human rights 
interpretation, is enshrined in the Constitution.80  The international law, which must 
be considered, includes both binding and non-binding international instruments.81  
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
deals with socio-economic issues on the international plane, while political and civil 
rights are covered, on international level by the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).82 When interpreting provisions of the constitution, which 
have a socio-economic dimension, the Court must consider the provisions of the 
ICESCR. 
 
The ICESCR requires states to recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of mental and physical health.83 Article 2 of ICESCR 
requires member states to take reasonable steps to the maximum of their resources 
                                                 
78 Section 39 (1) (b) of the 1996 Constitution. 
79 Bilchitz D “Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights” SAHRJ at 139-141, Bilchitz supra n (2) at 1; Russel S ‘Minimum State Obligations: 
International Dimensions” in Brand D, Russel S (eds) (2002) Exploring the Core Content of  Socio-
Economic Rights: SA and International Perspective at 1-11; Chapman AR ‘Core Obligations Related 
to the Right to Health and their Relevance to South Africa’  35-60; Pillay K  South Africa’s 
Commitment  on the Right to Health in the Spotlight: Do We Meet the International standard at 61- 
70,  Pieterse M  supra n (32) at 522 and 523. 
80 Section 39(1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution; see De Waal and Curries supra n (68) The Bill of 
Rights Handbook at 160. 
81 Only those treaties that South Africa ratified, and which have become parts of South African law in 
terms of section 231(4) may be applied directly by the Court. However, both binding and non-binding  
international law may be used as a tool of interpretation: see Makwanyane supra n (2) paras 36-7; 
see section 231(4) of the Constitution, for applicability of international law in Africa; See Dugard J 
(2010) International Law: A South African Perspective 4th ed; Dugard J “The Role of International Law 
in Interpreting the Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAHR 208, 208-215 and Dugard J “International Law and 
the Final Constitution” (1995) 11 SAJHR 239 at 239-242. 
82 Both these articles are imprinted in Patel EM & Watters C (1994) Human Rights Fundamental 
Instruments and Documents Butterworths at 16 and 21 respectively. 
83 ICESCR article 12. 
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with the view of achieving progressive realisation of the rights in the Covenant.84 It is 
therefore submitted that the provisions of ICESCR were applicable in the 
Soobramoney case as it involved the survival requirement and – therefore - a 
minimum core. The minimum core is the nature or essence of a right, without which 
the right would lose its substantive significance as a human right.85 The minimum 
right in the Bill of Rights is the right to life without which one cannot exercise any of 
the fundamental rights. The right to access health care is therefore a survival 
requirements which cannot be divorced from the right to life as a core minimum right 
of all the rights in the constitution.86 The content of the right to access health care or 
the threshold thereof can only be exercised if the person is alive; therefore the 
Constitutional Court’s failure to recognise the minimum core in interpreting socio-
economic rights is unfortunate.87  
 
The interest protected by the provisions of section 26 and 27 of the Constitution is 
survival, which may not necessarily be achievable progressively.88 The 
Constitutional Court avoided the provisions of section 11 of the Constitution, the right 
to life, of which should have been the main focus, not the interpretation of section 
27, or rather the interplay between the two rights. If section 27 were to be interpreted 
                                                 
84 Ibid Article 2. 
85 Russel S supra n (79) at 15. See also the General Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) on interpretation of minimum core or threshold imprinted in 
Dowel-Jones M (2004) Contextualising ICESCR: Assessing the Economic Deficit  Martinus Nijhoff  at 
21, See also Liebenberg supra n (39) at 366; see also Kapindu RE “Social Protection for Malawian 
Migrants in Johannesburg: Access, Exclusion and Survival Strategies” (2011) AHRLJ 93; Yeeshanew 
SA “Approaches to Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Jurisprudence of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights: Progress and Perspectives” (2011) 11 AHRLJ 
317.  
86 On survival requirements see Menghistu supra n (2) pp 63-83; see also Bilchitz supra n (2) at 12-
13, Ramlogan R (2011) Sustainable Developments: Towards a Judicial Interpretation Martinus Nijhoff 
Leiden Boston at 148-152; Johnson BR (2011) (Ed) Life and Death Matters 2nd Ed at 9. 
87 See Scott C & Macklem P ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights 
in a New South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 Univ of Pennsylvania LR1 at 77; Liebenberg S 
“Socio-Economic Rights” in Chalskalson M  et al (1996) Constitutional law of South Africa  at 41-43, 
and De Vos P ‘Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights: Social and Economic Rights in 
South Africa’s 1996 Constitution (1997) 13 SAJHR at 67, 97, and Scott C & Alston P “Adjudicating 
Constitutional Priorities in a Transformational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and 
Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16  SAJHR 206, 250.  
88 The Right to Life cannot be achieved progressively as human being die once, but right to housing 
can be achieved over a period of time as people can be sheltered in community halls or temporary 
structures but the same cannot be said about the outbreak of deadly disease, in the latter instance 
the state must act quickly as the immediate threat is to human life. See also Du Plessis LM and De 
Villiers JR “The Personal Rights: Life, Freedom, and Security of the Person, Privacy, and Freedom of 
Movement” in Van Wyk, Dugard, De Villiers and Davis supra n (5) at 215. 
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narrowly, then section 11 of the Constitution would not be important anymore. Its 
main objective, the right to life, would be valueless if not enforceable.  
 
In this context, section 7(2) of the Constitution means the State must protect, respect 
and promote the right to life of everyone. The State protects the right to life by, 
amongst others, providing necessary medical treatment to preserve and prolong life. 
The State respects the right to life by enforcing the civil and political rights such as 
the right to privacy, the right not to be subjected to inhuman punishment. The State 
protects life by providing drugs to those whose lives are under threat, such as the 
unborn babies of HIV positive mothers to avoid pre-natal mother-to-baby 
transmission. So in our case here, the appellant’s life was threatened by chronic 
incurable renal disease, but his life could have been prolonged artificially by dialysis 
had the Constitutional Court realised that the consequences of not granting the order 
would be death.  
 
The whole idea of a person being admitted to hospital and treated so as to preserve 
life, without any further interpretation, is the idea behind section 11 of the 
Constitution: the right not to die or the right to continue living.89 Thus, the right to life 
is a constitutional right. The right in section 11 of the Constitution is preservable by 
medical treatment in case of illness. The medicals treat life that is in danger of fading 
to comply with the provisions of this section. This section is concerned with the 
protection and preservation of life, no matter the conditions surrounding that life. The 
Constitutional Court avoided the provisions of this section and used section 27 to 
narrow the right to life90.  
 
The reasoning by the Constitutional Court that the right to have access to health 
care services is subject to section 27(2) of the Constitution poses a perpetual 
avoidance of implementing the rights in this section. How would an ordinary person 
know if the state has available resources to meet its Constitutional obligations? What 
if the State deliberately allocates small resources to health, would the Court be in a 
position to know if the State allocated insufficient resources to health? The Court 
                                                 
89 See Ramcharan B.C in Ramcharan (1985) The Right to Life in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, on the concept and dimensions of the right to life, at 6-7. 
90 Ibid at 6, Ramcharan correctly argues that “narrow approaches to life are no longer adequate and 
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could have considered that there would be funds from other budgeted items rather 
than to allow government to use lack of resources as an excuse for its failure to plan 
properly.91 The KZN Health overspent their budget in 1996/1997 and anticipated the 
same in 1998/99, a clear sign of incompetence on the part of government in its 
financial management and planning.  
 
The other disturbing reasoning by the Constitutional Court and the respondent was 
that only patients waiting for kidney transplant were eligible to be treated in the renal 
unit. There was no difference at all between the appellant, and patients waiting for 
kidney transplant, and the donor. Such patients are received in the renal unit to have 
kidney transplant later when they have found the donor simply because they would 
die if not on dialysis treatment. This is what the appellant sought, not to die. The 
appellant’s life was in danger just like that of the patients waiting for kidney 
transplant. The appellant’s disease was chronic and incurable, but this is also true of 
patients waiting for a kidney donor: In cases where a donor is not found for a very 
long time, they would remain on kidney dialysis and that would definitely have 
serious cost implications. For as long as the donor is not found for patients waiting 
kidney transplant, they were in chronic incurable disease and that would cost 
substantial amounts of money. If the cost element was the deciding factor, as the 
Constitutional Court wants us to believe, then the law treated Mr. Soobramoney 
unfairly. Patients who wait for a donor for a very long time are in the same position 
as Mr. Soobramoney, as costs for dialysis would be wasteful expenditure if a donor 
is not found. Section 9 of the Constitution 1996 provides that ‘everyone is equal 
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law’; section 
11 provides that ‘everyone has the right to life’. The availability of resources should 
not have been the deciding factor as it has been shown that the state was prepared 
to allocate funds for patients waiting for a kidney donor for an indefinite period of 
time.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
that indeed the right to life as a modern concept goes considerably beyond the traditional view”. 
91 Section 27(2) of the Constitution provides that state must make reasonable legislative and other 
measures within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights, so 
resources referred to here is the state’s resources not the hospital or provinces’ resources, therefore 
the Court misinterpreted the constitution. On available resources see Liebenberg supra n (39) at 366 
and General Comment 3 of CESCR imprinted in Dugard J (2011) International Law: A SA 
Perspective 4th ed Juta Leiden at 331. 
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This was an incorrect interpretation, because the right to life (viewed on its own) was 
rendered meaningless on this occasion. The situation may be slightly different in 
cases such as the death penalty, euthanasia and abortion, because in these 
instances the right to life can be applied and enforced directly without relying on the 
enforcement of other associated socio-economic rights.  
 
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court did not value human life, as it preferred a 
restrictive or narrow interpretation of the right to life. The Court did not want to link 
the right to life to other associated rights in the Bill of Right and only checked the 
reasonableness of the hospital policy. The Court did not also determine whether the 
constitutional right was infringed or threatened, instead it only focused its attention 
on the proceduralisation of socio-economic rights enforcement, and thus it restricted 
its interpretation of the right concerned. Had the Court used the two-stage approach 
to the dispute in the case, it would have determined whether the alleged 
infringement of threat to human life was justifiable or not. The threat to life would not 
have been justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. The Court would 
have realised that the Hospital Admission Policy would not have been of general 
application as other chronic patients were treated  because they were waiting for a 
kidney donor. The Court would also not be able to point the less restrictive way of 
limiting the right to life. While the appellant’s right to medical treatment was denied in 
Soobramoney due to a lack of resources, the same right was not denied to prisoners 
suffering from a chronic disease, HIV/AIDS.  
 
4.4. Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 
 
 Other people whose right to life may be threatened by the limitation of the right to 
access to medical treatment, are those infected by HIV/AIDS. In Van Biljon 92 HIV 
positive inmates at Pollsmoor prison in the Cape sought an order compelling the 
Department of Correctional Services, the Prison Authorities and the Western Cape 
Government to provide them and other HIV positive prisoners with anti-viral drugs.93 
The anti-viral medication had been prescribed for the first and the second applicants 
                                                 
92 Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997(4) SA 441 (C). 
93 Ibid par [1] 443J-444A-E. 
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but had not been provided to them by the Prison Authorities.94 The applicants relied 
on the provisions of section 35(2) (e) of the Constitution. The relevant part of the 
section provides that:  
 
everyone who is detained, including the sentenced prisoner, has the right 
to…conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including the at 
least exercise and the provision, at the state expense, of adequate accommodation, 
nutrition, reading material and medical treatment. 
 
The respondents’ case was argued on the basis that ‘adequate medical treatment 
for the prisoners’ had to be determined by, or had to be of a similar standard to, the 
treatment provided to patients outside prison at the Provincial Hospital.95 Evidence 
tendered by their expert witness was that patients at Provincial Hospitals in a 
condition similar to that of the applicants were not provided with anti-viral medication 
at the state’s expense, mainly because of budgetary constraints.96 
 
It was the applicants’ case that, since the right to adequate medical treatment was 
guaranteed to prisoners in terms of section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution, prison 
authorities could never be heard to say that they were unable to provide such 
treatment as a result of budgetary constraints or lack of funds.97 It further argued 
that it was the Department of Correctional Services and not the provincial hospitals, 
which was responsible for providing health services to the prisoners, and that the 
respondents had not made out a proper case that the treatment claimed by the 
applicants was unaffordable to the Department.98  
 
Lack of funds could not be an answer to a prisoner’s constitutional claim to adequate 
medical treatment,99 and that therefore, once it was established that anything less 
than a particular form of medical treatment would not be adequate, the prisoner 
would have the constitutional right to that form of treatment.100  
                                                 
94 Ibid par [18] 447F. 
95 Ibid par [43] 453F. 
96 Ibid par  [44] 453G. 
97 Ibid par [48] 455B. 
98 Ibid par [50] 455G. 
99 Ibid par [49} 455C. 
100 Ibid par [49] 455D. 
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The Court concluded that the applicants had established that anti-viral therapy was, 
at present, the only prophylactic and that the benefits of such treatment, in the form 
of extended life expectation, and enhanced quality of life, were such that treatment 
claimed by first and second applicants had to be regarded as no more than 
adequate medical treatment to which they were entitled in terms of section 35(2) (e) 
of the Constitution.101 The respondents were accordingly ordered to provide the first 
and the second applicants with the anti-viral medication, which had been prescribed 
for them for as long as it was prescribed for them on medical grounds.102 
 
4.4.1. Analysis of Court’s Decision and Reasoning 
 
The Cape High Court interpreted the Constitutional text correctly in this matter. The 
Court referred on several occasions to the right to life inherent in the right 
protected.103 However, there were a number of other issues raised during the 
proceedings, which the court misinterpreted. The first example of incorrect 
interpretation on the part of the learned judge was the court’s concurrence with the 
applicants’ argument that it was the Department of Correctional Services and not the 
provincial hospital that was responsible for providing health services to all prisoners.  
Although the Department of Correctional Services was responsible for providing 
health services to the prisoners in prisons, the funding is from one national revenue 
fund.104 The section the applicants relied on to claim their constitutional right to 
adequate medical treatment refers to the ‘State expense’ and not the Departmental 
expense. The Constitutional claim was against the State, not the Department. The 
issue of who provides services was irrelevant in interpreting the Constitution as the 
Constitution consistently refers to “State” not “Department”. The Department of 
Correctional Services is an organ of state in terms of section 239 of the Constitution, 
the Court artificially differentiated between Provincial Hospitals and the Department 
of Correctional Services. The Constitution refers to State resources not to a 
particular Department; lack of resources should therefore be that of the state not a 
                                                 
101 Ibid par [60] 458H. 
102 Ibid par [65] 459I-J. 
103 Ibid par [12] 446D Court said that treatment enhanced the patient’s quality of life and extends the 
patient’s life expectancy and par [28] 449F Court mentioned the survival and quality of life of the 
patients. 
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particular institution.105 
 
On the contention that the State owes no higher duty to prisoners than to citizens in 
general,106 the Court misinterpreted the Constitution. The Court agreed with the 
applicant’s contention that indeed the state owed higher duty of care to HIV 
prisoners than to than to a citizen who suffers from the same infection. The reason 
for the Court to agree to this contention was that the Constitution itself creates a 
difference between prisoners and people outside prison. This interpretation is not 
correct. If section 35(2) (e) makes the distinction, then there is a conflict between 
section 9 and section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution.107 The differentiation would not 
serve the purpose as the objective here is to preserve life, lives of people in prison 
and people outside should be treated the same. 
 
The decision of the Cape High Court indirectly means that people outside prison 
who are HIV positive are subjected to the restriction of section 27(2) and the 
restriction of ‘available resources’ in section 27(2) would not apply to the prisoners 
by virtue of them being inside the prison.108 Then the last question for this part is, 
would Mr. Soobramoney have won his case if he had appeared before the Cape 
High Court? Or would he have won his case if he had been a prisoner? Before the 
analyses and contrast the two cases, namely Van Biljon and Soobramoney, it is 
imperative that another case involving the provision of life-saving medication is 
discussed.  
 
4.5.  TAC v Department of Health: The Right to Life: Provision of Lifesaving 
Drug 
 
Menghistu says that “there are two main ways of depriving the right to life, namely, 
by executing, disappearance, torture and various forms of cold-blooded murder, and 
secondly by starvation and lack of fulfillment of basic needs such as food, basic 
                                                                                                                                                       
104 S 213 of the Constitution. 
105 Soobramoney supra (n) 1 par 775H-J and 776A-B. 
106 Van Biljon  supra (n) 92 at par [51] 456C. 
107 Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998(1) SA 300 (CC). 
108 The restriction of ‘available resources’ in section 27(2) would not apply to them by virtue of being 
incarcerated in terms of section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution. Section 35(2)(e) would prima facie confer 
more rights to prisoners than to the other people in the community. 
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health facilities and medical care”.109 The right to life has been described by various 
authors as the most fundamental, the most primordial and supreme right of all 
human rights.110 In 3.1 above, it was argued that the right to medical treatment 
should be interpreted to mean ‘the right not to die’ from treatable causes, mainly 
because it can only be enjoyed by a living human being. However, there is a 
situation where life in earnest (developmental stage) could be protected, that is the 
life of the unborn persons. Does the foetus have the right to life?  
 
In 4.1 above it is further argued that the right to medical treatment was in fact an 
indirect right to life. People seek medical treatment when they are sick in order to 
preserve, protect and prolong their lives, thus the right to life. The socio-economic 
rights in the Constitution support the right to life. The right to access to health care 
services is a socio-economic right enshrined in the constitution, s 27(1) (a) reads 
“Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, including 
reproductive care…” 
 
 This right is immediately qualified by subsection (2) in that the State must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources to achieve 
the progressive realisation of the right.111 However, there is a situation where the 
access to health care becomes a survival requirement, such as the case of HIV 
AIDS patients who need AZT to extend their life medically. The Constitutional Court 
had an opportunity to adjudicate on the access to health care issue in Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC) and Others.112   
 
This case dealt with the provision of life saving anti-retroviral drugs to pregnant 
mothers who did not have the means to afford these drugs themselves. This case 
was based on the above-mentioned section 27(1) (a) of the Constitution, which – as 
stated - is limited by the provisions contained in subsection (2), namely that the 
                                                 
109 Menghistu supra n (2) at 63. 
110 Ibid; see also Bajwa DK (1994) The Right to Life at 1, Deshta S & Deshta K  (2003) Fundamental 
Human Rights: Right  to Life and Personal Liberty  at 3, Makwanyane supra  n (2) – see J O’Regan 
paras 326-7 or 506D-F. 
111 Section 27(2) of 1996 Constitution. 
112 Treatment Action Campaign supra n (65); see also Onyemelukwe C “Access to Anti-Retroviral 
Drugs as a Component of the Right to Health in International Law: Examining the Application of the 
Right in Nigerian Jurisprudence” (2007) 7 AHRLJ 446. 
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State must take reasonable and legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to realise these rights progressively. 
 
In this case the applicant claimed the right to have access to medical care services 
because they could not afford the drugs themselves. In brief, the case started as an 
application in Pretoria High Court on 21 August 2001.113 The applicants were a 
number of associations and members of the civil society concerned with the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS and the prevention of new infections. The principal actor 
among them was the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).114 The Government had 
devised a programme to deal with the mother-to-child transmission of HIV at birth 
and identified Nevirapine as its drug of choice for this purpose.115 However the 
programme imposed a restriction on the availability of Nevirapine in public health 
sector to 18 research and training sites only.116 The drug was however readily 
available in the private health sector. Mothers who stayed outside the training and 
research sites could not access the drug even if the doctor so ordered.117 
 
The applicants contended that measures adopted by Government to provide access 
to health care services to HIV positive pregnant women were deficient in two 
material aspects. Firstly, they prohibited the administration of Nevirapine at public 
hospitals and clinics outside the research and training sites.  Secondly, they failed to 
implement a comprehensive programme for the prevention of mother-to-child-
transmission of HIV.118 
 
The legal question before the court, therefore, was not whether the socio-economic 
rights were justiciable, but whether the applicants had shown that the measures 
adopted by the government to provide access to health care services for HIV 
positive mothers and their babies fall short of its obligations under the 
Constitution.119 
 
                                                 
113 Ibid par [3] at 728G and 729A. 
114 Ibid par [3] at 728G. 
115 Ibid par [4] 729B-C. 
116 Ibid par [11] 732H-I. 
117 Ibid par [17] 733H-I. 
118 Ibid par [44] 742C-D. 
119 Ibid par [25] 736H. 
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The High Court ordered the Government to make Nevirapine available to pregnant 
women with HIV who give birth in the public health sector, and to their babies in 
public health facilities to which the programme had not been extended. The Minister 
of Health appealed against this decision to the Constitutional Court.  
 
The appeal to the Constitutional Court was directed at reversing the orders made in 
the High Court against the Government. The High Court had found that the 
Government had not acted reasonably in addressing the need to reduce the risk of 
HIV positive mothers transmitting the disease to their babies at birth. The 
Constitutional Court declared that government had to devise and implement (within 
its available resources) a comprehensive and co-coordinated programme, remove 
restrictions that prevent Nevirapine from being made available, take reasonable 
measures to extend testing and counselling facilities at hospitals and clinics 
throughout the public health sector.120 
 
In this case resources were not an issue since the Nevirapine was offered free of 
charge by the manufacturer. What was important to the Court was whether the 
government programme, which restricted the provision of the lifesaving drug, was 
reasonable or not. The High Court and the Constitutional Court rightfully concluded 
that the policy was unreasonable and discriminatory. However, the crux of this case 
should not have been the reasonableness of the policy only, but should also been 
about the importance of life. The drugs sought by HIV pregnant women were to be 
used to save the lives of their unborn babies.121 
 
4.5.1. Analysis of the Court’s Decision and Reasoning 
 
The right to medical treatment or health care supplements the right to life. When a 
disease threatens the right to life, the patient invokes the right to medical treatment 
or health care to save his life. So, effectively, the decision of the Court on the right to 
                                                 
120 Ibid par [135] 764H-J and 765A-J. 
121 In par [72] 748I Court mentioned ‘babies’ lives’ in passing in the context of policy evaluation; in 
paras [73] at 749A-b, [80] at 750C-D, [93] 754C-D and [131] 763I the Court’s tone did not indicate 
concern about the lives to be lost but contextualised lives in passing dealing with the policy. It never 
mentioned the consequences of government policy, fearing that would remove its proceduralisation of 
adjudicating socio-economic rights. 
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access to health care services is a decision on the right to life. The legal question in 
this case should not have been only whether or not the policy was reasonable or not, 
but also what would happen to the children of HIV positive mothers outside the 
research and training sites if the policy were to continue to apply?  
 
HIV/AIDS, like any other deadly disease of our times, results in death if medical 
treatment is not provided quickly. The HIV positive mothers and their new born 
children outside the research and training sites would perish if the policy continued 
unchanged. This would be the result of the policy, no other. The right of access to 
health care services and the right to medical treatment indirectly enforce the right to 
life.  
 
The Constitutional Court impliedly acknowledged that this case was about life.122 
The Court rightfully confirmed the decision of the High Court but did not expressly 
state that the right to have access to health care services and the right to medical 
treatment were the rights to life. This is the reason the Constitutional Court arrived at 
the wrong decision in Soobramoney. The Constitutional Court does not, in its 
adjudication of the socio-economic rights cases, link the other rights in the Bill of 
Rights with the socio-economic rights. Socio-economic rights are in fact survival 
rights, unlike many other rights in the Bill of Rights. 
 
The right to medical treatment in section 27 of the Constitution supplements the right 
to life. Section 11 of the Constitution should not be considered on its own, because 
for it to be infringed (except in the case of a direct infringement, such as murder) 
other rights in the Bill of Rights must be infringed as well, especially socio-economic 
rights. The infringement of the right to have access to health care services may lead 
to the infringement of the right to life. If those HIV positive mothers and their new 
born babies were not provided with Nevirapine they would definitely die, thus 
infringing their constitutional right to life. 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 See supra n (121). 
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4.6.   Inconsistency in Judicial Decisions 
 
Inconsistency occurs when the courts of law, while interpreting the same text, reach 
different conclusions in adjudicating the same subject matter.123 In the cases 
discussed above, two different courts interpreted the right to medical treatment of 
people in different positions in society. Although the courts were interpreting different 
provisions of the Constitution, in both cases the applicants could not afford medical 
costs, as a result which they would have died if the order was not granted. The 
Constitutional Court did not give the right to access medical treatment any measure 
of life, while the High Court did give the prisoner’s right to medical treatment a 
certain measure of the right to life. The one was in prison and the other was outside 
the prison. The main feature of the cases was the provision of medical treatment at 
the State’s expense. The decisions of the courts were inconsistent in that in both 
cases the patients wanted to preserve and extend their lives medically and were 
suffering from chronic incurable diseases. In both cases it was possible to extend or 
prolong the life of the patient medically but the treatment would be expensive, and if 
the medical treatment sought were not provided, the patients would die.  
 
In my interpretation, the right to medical treatment should have been read into the 
right to life; the applicants begged the courts to force the State to prolong their lives 
medically. In Soobramoney’s case the Constitutional Court found that the State, by 
refusing a patient admission to its renal unit for dialysis purposes to preserve his life, 
had not infringed his constitutional right to medical treatment,124 notwithstanding the 
fact that the applicant will, if not admitted, die. 
 
The Constitutional Court interpreted the Constitution narrowly so as to exclude the 
right to life. In Makwanyane the court held that whilst paying due regard to the 
language that has been used, an interpretation should be generous and purposive 
and give expression to the underlying values of the Constitution.125 The generous 
                                                 
123 Unreported Case S v  Zuma, Pietermaritzburg High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal on  
interpretation of section 179(5)(d)(i)-(ii) on whether the accused person had to be consulted or 
allowed representation when the NPA review its decision to prosecute. The High Court said the 
accused had to be offered an opportunity to make representation before he can be charged again, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals said he did not. 
124 Soobramoney supra n (1) pa [36] 778B. 
125 Makwanyane supra n (2) at par [9] 403D. 
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approach recognises that the supreme constitution cannot be interpreted in a narrow 
and legalistic way. 
 
The purpose of section 11 of the Constitution is to preserve and promote life. Had 
the Constitutional Court interpreted sections 11 and 27 of the Constitution 
generously it would have reached a different conclusion. The purpose of the 
application to the Constitutional Court was to save life. The Constitutional Court 
incorrectly or artificially differentiated the quality of life in Mr. Soobramoney and the 
life of a healthy person. The Court was really not concerned with life, but with the 
quality of life. Its acceptance of lack of funds as being a good reason for not 
admitting the applicant and the Court’s acceptance that it would be better to use the 
scarce resources on more lives than one, meant the Constitutional Court attached 
certain monetary value on life but did not quantify it.  
 
On the other hand, in the Van Biljon case, the Cape High Court reached a different 
decision on the right to medical treatment. The applicants sought an order to force 
the State to provide the prescribed medical treatment at the State expense. The 
State raised a lack of funds as a defence and the court said that in principle lack of 
funds could not be an answer to a prisoner’s constitutional claim. In Soobramoney, 
the Constitutional Court accepted lack of funds as a defence. The High Court 
concluded in Van Biljon that it was the Department of Correctional Services and not 
the provincial hospitals which was responsible for providing health services to 
prisoners, since no case had been made by the Department of Correctional Services 
that, as result of budgetary constraints, they could not afford to provide the 
prescribed anti-viral medication, failure to provide such treatment to the applicants 
amounted to the infringement of their constitutional right. 
 
4.7. Conclusion: The Right to Access Health Care Services 
 
It is submitted that the way in which the Constitutional Court interpreted the 
Constitution in Soobramoney may still effectively deter the taking away of life 
through an act of killing, but it does not seem to expressly deal with the taking of life 
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by the denial of the essential elements that sustain the life of human beings.126 
Access to medical treatment is a survival requirement. Lack of basic needs such as 
food, basic health facilities and medical care may deprive one of his life,127 therefore 
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights should be seen as survival requirements in 
some instances. The Constitutional Court did not perceive the right to medical 
treatment as a survival requirement and this was unfortunate, because the issue 
before them was that the applicant would die if not admitted. The Cape High Court, 
on the other hand gave the socio-economic right of prisoners some measure of the 
right to life.128 
 
The Constitutional Court and the High Court’s perspective on the right to life differ; 
the former is too restrictive in interpreting the constitutional provisions with bearing 
on the right to life, while the latter is generous in interpreting the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court’s perspective on the right to life lacks the recognition of the 
magnitude of the interest protected by the right to life and socio-economic rights. 
Human life, the right protected and preserved indirectly by the socio-economic right 
of access to medical treatment, is the mother of all rights in the Constitution.129 
Therefore it is submitted that the courts when interpreting the Constitution have to 
take cognizance of the nature of the right protected. The Court could have 
interpreted the right to life generously and determined the ambit of the right.130 Court 
failed to use International Law as required by section 39(1) (b) and consequently did 
not use the minimum core obligation recognised by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. By using the reasonableness tests to 
determine whether there had been compliance with the Constitution, the Court 
proceduralised the socio-economic right in question, and ignored the content of the 
right.131 
 
Because of the Constitutional Court’s restrictive interpretation of the provisions 
                                                 
126 Menghistu F supra n (2) at 63. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Van Biljon supra n (92) par [12] 446D. 
129 Menghistu F  supra n(2) at 63. 
130 Mdumbe supra n (70) at 467. 
131 Pieterse M “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” (2004) 20 
SAJHR 381 at 406-407. 
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relating to socio-economic rights, precious life was lost in Soobramoney. It is 
therefore imperative to repeat the words of Rautenbach: 
 
after all, the Constitution is supposed to be a living document, and unless one 
understands and accepts the indeterminacy and evolving nature of the constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional jurisprudence, there is the danger of falling back into 
another new stifling orthodoxy; not sovereignty of parliament, but pronouncement of 
constitutional oracle of Brammfontein.132 
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Constitutional Court and High Courts, when 
adjudicating socio-economic rights, fail to consider the consequences of their 
decisions and they do not give socio-economic rights any measure of the right to life 
even though such denial may result in death. The perspective of the Court on the 
right to life is too narrow. However, the Court interpreted the right to life in 
Makwanyane, the death penalty matter, generously, purposively and contextually to 
give expression to the values underlying the Constitution, and to read the right to 
equality, the right to life and the right to dignity as together giving the meaning to the 
right to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.133 The Court interpreted 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights widely to secure the prisoners the full measure of 
protection of the constitutional provisions relied upon.   
 
Apart from the right to have access to health care services as survival requirement, 
the right to life can also be threatened directly by abortion, death penalty and 
euthanasia. The right to life in the context of abortion, euthanasia and death penalty 
is discussed and dealt with in the next chapter. 
                                                 
132 Rauntebach C, Jansen van Rensburg L, Venter F Politics (2004) Socio-Economic Issues and 
Culture in Constitutional Adjudication North West University at 20. 
133 Makwanyane supra  n (2) para [10] at 403 G-H and 404 A-B and note 11. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN THE CONTEXT OF ABORTION, EUTHANASIA AND 
DEATH PENALTY 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Apart from the right to have access to health care services as survival requirements, 
the right to life can also be threatened directly by abortion, death penalty and 
euthanasia.1 
 
These three institutions place people in different, contrasting and precarious 
positions in the course of their lives.  In the first case the foetus is not born yet, but 
its development is terminated in the early stages of pregnancy by his mother. In the 
second case, euthanasia, the person is in a permanent coma or in a vegetative 
state, or is terminally ill with full capacity and he decides to request the others to 
assist him to die; or it may be that family members, or even the physician, may out of 
compassion let him die by disconnecting the life maintenance machine or ceasing 
the medication. In the last case, the death penalty, the convicted person is 
sentenced to death by a court of law whereby he is executed as a form of 
punishment. The discussion on death penalty is not about its validity in South Africa 
but the discussion is based on a decision taken in the context of the right to life and 
the consistency of the courts in this regard. 
 
The question posed is a logical one: Why does the law protect the life of a person 
who has taken someone’s life,2 and yet it allows a pregnant woman to terminate the 
life of a developing, unborn, human being.3 I discuss the three topics below whereby 
I contrast and compare the different positions of human life and its ultimate ending. 
There seems to be a contradiction as the law allows abortion which does not support 
the right to life; it also allows passive euthanasia which does not support life, and 
finally – it disallows the death penalty which (if allowed) would not support life. 
                                                 
1 Jayapan defines the right to life to mean the duty to live, see Jayapan N (2000) Human Rights, New 
Delhi Publishers at 5-6; see also Van Oosten F “Financial Resources and Patients Right to Health 
Care: Myths and Reality” (1992) 32 De Jure 1 at 4. 
2 Makwanyane and Others v State 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
3 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others 1998 (4) SA 1113 T. 
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5.2. Abortion 
 
Abortion has been the issue of controversy for a long time. Some have argued for 
and some have argued against abortion. Abortion is a method of terminating a 
developing life. Abortion ends life, thus it is, in my view, in conflict with the right to life 
enshrined in both the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions.4 Some people argue that 
abortion is not in conflict with the right to life because the foetus does not enjoy the 
right to life until - at least - birth. Then, the question is: when does life begin, at 
conception or at birth? The exact moment when life begins would tell whether 
abortion terminates life or potential life.   
 
The anti-abortionists argue that abortion terminates life; on the other hand the pro-
abortionists argue that the foetus does not enjoy the right to life.5 Clearly there are 
competing rights: those of the pregnant woman and that of the embryo. The focus of 
this dissertation is not the evaluation of pro-abortion and anti-abortion arguments; 
rather - the focus is on the right to life in perspective. It is the right to life in the 
court’s perspective, the question of how the court interprets the right to life that is the 
right not to die unnaturally. The writer is neither pro- nor anti-abortion; abortion is 
used to argue the point that the courts seemingly fail to give the right to life full 
recognition and conclude that while there is life in an embryo; life can be limited by 
the application of section 36 of the 1996 Constitution. 
 
5.2.1. Abortion Defined 
 
Abortion, according to Dworkin, means deliberately killing a developing human 
embryo.6 Abortion terminates life in earnest, Dworkin argues.7 Dworkin 
acknowledged that there was life in an embryo. One may not kill something that is 
dead. What is important in Dworkin’s definition of abortion is the usage of the word 
‘killing’: in this context killing is associated with life. Therefore, according to 
                                                 
4 Section 9 of 1993 Constitution and section 11 of 1996 Constitution. 
5 Judith J &Thomson A “Defence of Abortion” in Bennet, B (ed) (2004) The International Library of 
Medicine, Ethics and the Law: Abortion at 28, Biggers JD “Generation of the Human Rights” in 
Bondeson WB, Engelhardt TH Jr, Spicker SF & Winship DH (ed) (1983) Abortion and the Status of 
the Foetus  at  31, see also Glantz L in the same book at 107.   
6 Dworkin RM (1993) Life’s Dominion: An Argument on Abortion and Euthanasia Harper Collins at 3. 
7 Ibid. 
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Dworkin’s definition of abortion, the embryo is alive, although it is still developing. 
Developing in this context means growth due to the natural cell division and 
elongation of the live organism.8 Abortion stops the development of the embryo, 
taking life out of it. The question of when we begin to exist is much more 
philosophical, scientific and religious than real. It is more about the individual’s 
perspective on life than reality.  
 
McMahan has developed an interesting theory on the issue of the beginning of life.9 
MacMahan assumes that we are human organisms.10 Human organisms begin to 
exist before they acquire a mental life sufficiently complex to allow them to qualify as 
persons, and it is equally clear that they may lose the capacity for self-
consciousness and therefore cease to be persons, and yet not only continue to exist 
but also remain alive and conscious.11 This may be the reason why Dworkin thinks 
both abortion and euthanasia are choices for death.12 
 
Abortion is the waste of the start of human life; death intervenes before life in the 
earnest has even begun.13 Dworkin was right, abortion is a waste of life; and the 
issue of when life begins or whether the foetus has the right to life or any interests in 
its potential for life, become irrelevant. Life begins when the embryo is formed, that 
is at conception. Regardless of whether the view that life begins at birth is correct or 
not, there will still be an inevitably linkage of abortion and life.14  Abortion is in fact 
termination of an embryo which would have developed into a human being  had it 
                                                 
8 Jordaan DW “The Legal Status of the Pre-Embryo in the Context of Genetic Revolution” (2005) 122  
SALJ 237 at 238. Jordaan admits that the pre-embryo is alive and human, but denies it human life, at 
241, also Slabbert MN (2000) The Human Embryo and Foetus: Constitutional and Other Issues (LLD 
Thesis Unisa) at 210; Kaczor CR (1969) The Edge of Life: Human Dignity and Contemporary 
Bioethics”  Springer, Dordrecht at 41-46; Gillon R “Is there a new ethics of abortion” (2001) 27 Journal 
of Medical Ethics , where he argues that human could not answer the question when does foetus 
acquire personhood at 3-7; see also Du Toit AP in Vorster WS (ed) 1988 The Right To Life: Issues in 
Bioethics Unisa at 1-5 on the origin and meaning of life, 
9 MacMahan J  (2002) The Ethics of Killing-The Problems at the Margins of Life at 24-25; see also 
Biggers JD “Generation of Life” supra n (5) at 31 where he argues that life is a continuous cycle so 
defining the beginning  and the end of life not necessary, see also Pillay R “The Beginning of 
Personhood: Is South African Law Outdated?” (2010) 2 Stell Law Review 230.     
10 Ibid at 24.   
11 Ibid at 25, see also Sarvis B & Rodman H (1974) The Abortion Controversy at 15. 
12 Dworkin supra n (6) at 13. 
13 Ibid at 179. 
14 Steinbock B (1992) Life before Birth explains that as potential persons, embryos and foetuses have 
‘symbolic values’ at 41; see also Kruuse HJ “Fetal Rights? The Need for Unified Approach to the 
Fetus in the Context of Festicide (2009) 72 THRHR 126; Du Plessis LM “Jurisprudential Reflections 
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not been terminated at that particular phase in its development, so abortion 
terminates life that is not yet recognised legally, but it is life nonetheless. In South 
Africa abortion is regulated by the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 
1996.  
 
5.2.2. Abortion Regulated 
 
The Act defines termination of pregnancy as the separation and expulsion, by 
medical or surgical means, of the contents of the uterus of a pregnant woman.15  The 
Act is silent on what constitutes the contents of the uterus. This Act allows the 
termination of pregnancy under certain circumstances listed in section 2. The Act 
allows termination of pregnancy, upon request by a woman during the first 12 weeks 
of the gestation period of her pregnancy. From the 13th week up to the 20th week of 
gestation period, the pregnancy may be terminated if the medical practitioner, after 
consultation with the pregnant woman, is of the opinion that the continued 
pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman’s physical or mental health, or 
there exists a substantial risk that the foetus would suffer from a severe physical or 
mental abnormality or, the continued pregnancy would significantly affect the social 
or economic circumstances of the woman or the pregnancy resulted from rape or 
incest. 
 
After the 20th week of gestation, pregnancy may be terminated if a medical 
practitioner, after consulting with another medical practitioner or registered midwife, 
is of the opinion that continued pregnancy would endanger the woman’s life, or 
would result in a severe malformation of the foetus or, would pose a risk of injury to 
the foetus.   
 
Section 2(1) of the Act is the most controversial provision of the Act. It allows a 
woman to terminate pregnancy during the first 12 weeks on request. Effectively the 
Act allows a woman to fall pregnant, but if she decides that she does not want a 
baby, she can terminate the pregnancy for as long as it is still within the first 12 
                                                                                                                                                       
on the Status of Unborn Life” 1990 TSAR 44. 
15 See section 1 of Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, Act No. 92 of 1996.  
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weeks. In Dworkin’s definition of abortion,16 this would amount to a deliberate killing 
of the developing human embryo on request. The issue of life and foetus came 
before the Transvaal Provincial Division in Christian Lawyers Association v Minister 
of Health and Others.17  
 
5.2.3. Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 
 
In this case, the Court was called upon to declare the entire Act to be 
unconstitutional.18 The plaintiffs contended that life begins at conception, that 
abortion terminates the life of a human being.19 They contended further that section 
11 of the Constitution applies to an unborn child from the moment of conception.20 
Therefore the Act is in conflict with section 11 of the Constitution in that it allows the 
termination of human life at any stage after conception and at any stage before 
birth.21 The Act is consequently unconstitutional and must be struck down entirely, 
the plaintiffs argued. 
 
The defendants noted an exception, in the notice of exception the defendants 
alleged that a foetus is not a bearer of rights in terms of section 11 of the 
Constitution, that section 11 of the Constitution does preclude the termination of 
pregnancy in the circumstances and manner contemplated by the Act and that the 
right of women to choose to have their pregnancy terminated in the circumstances 
and manner contemplated by the Act is protected under ss 9,10,11,12.14,15(1) and 
27(1)(a) of the Constitution.22 
 
The Court upheld the exception and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim.23 The plaintiffs 
relied solely on section 11 of the Constitution, which provides that everyone has the 
right to life.24 The Court said that there was no express provision in the Constitution 
                                                 
16 Dworkin supra  n (6) at 3.  
17 Christian Lawyers Association supra n (3). 
18 Ibid at 1116B-C. 
19 Ibid at 1116H. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid at 1116I. 
22 Ibid at 1117A-B. 
23 Ibid at 1126G. 
24 Ibid at 1118C. 
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affording the foetus legal personality or protection;25 consequently the word 
‘everyone’ used in section 11 could not refer to a foetus or unborn child.  
 
5.2.4. Analysis of the Court’s Decision and Reasoning 
 
The Court avoided answering the question whether abortion terminated human life 
or not.26 The Court instead chose to deal with the issue of whether a foetus or 
embryo is afforded legal personality or protection;27 however legal personality is not 
a prerequisite to possess life. Court could have acknowledged that abortion 
terminates life, however, that the right to life in such circumstances would be limited 
by section 36 of the Constitution. Whether or not a foetus has legal personality was 
irrelevant since the foetus is still in its mother’s womb and shares personhood and 
any other rights with its mother. The question should have been about the foetus’ 
life, potential or actual.  
 
Meyerson explains that the court was correct in finding that the word “everyone” in 
section 11 of the Constitution did not apply to the foetus.28 However, Meyerson 
disagrees with the judge’s interpretation, as he believes that “everyone” is broader 
than “every person”.29 He generally agrees with the Court that a foetus does not 
have the right to life.30 However, Meyerson gives the foetus a degree of value. It is 
the value of human dignity, which is most obviously under threat when abortion is 
permitted because it is hard to deny that the destruction of foetal life, although it 
violates no constitutionally protected subject’s right, nevertheless undermines 
human dignity.31 A foetus is not just like a bit of human tissue, comparable to 
something like appendix; it is a living human organism, whose destruction is not a 
morally trivial matter but something to be regretted.32 
 
Meyerson acknowledges that there is life in the foetus, although the foetus itself is 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at 1121H. 
27 Ibid at 1121H. 
28 Meyerson D “Abortion: Constitutional Issues” (1999)116 SALJ at 53.  
29 Ibid at 53. 
30 Ibid at 54. 
31 Ibid at 56. 
32 Ibid. 
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not constitutionally protected.33 It is submitted that there is life in the foetus, which 
must be protected and not be terminated on request. Life starts at conception and as 
such it must be recognised from that moment. Life is a condition that distinguishes 
animals and plants from non-organic matter, including the capacity for growth, 
functional activity and continual change preceding death.34 The fact that the foetus 
grows in the womb shows that there is life, a human life that is still developing, 
dependent and attached to its mother. After twelve weeks of gestation the foetus 
would have grown significantly compared to the tiny zygote at conception. Clearly 
there is life and that life is not protected constitutionally as the mother can still 
terminate it on request. The only time it is protected is at birth, if born alive. 
 
The Court’s decision was partially correct although it missed an opportunity to 
interpret the right to life generously and decide that abortion terminates life; that the 
Act is constitutional and that the foetus’ potential right to life is outweighed by the 
woman’s right of choice.35 The woman has the right to make decisions concerning 
her reproduction and the right to security in and control of her body.36 However, it 
must be pointed out that the foetus’ right seems to be recognised gradually by the 
Act.37    
 
5.2.5.  Conclusion: Abortion 
 
The Act seems to recognise the foetus’ interest in its life gradually: during the first 12 
weeks of gestation a woman can terminate her pregnancy on request; from the 13th 
week the Act takes away that unconditional right, since some restrictions on the 
termination are imposed. The interest of the foetus is directly proportional to the time 
period of gestation.38 The Court acknowledged that the foetus was not the bearer of 
rights in terms of section 11 of the Constitution, while the Act imposed provisos on 
the termination of the pregnancy after the 12th week. Then the question is, would the 
                                                 
33 Supra n (31). 
34 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th Ed at 820. 
35 Section 12(2) (a) and (b) of the Constitution 1996; 
36  Williams C (2010) In the Words of Nelson Mandela at 1 where Mandela is quoted as saying that 
women have the right to decide what they want to do with their bodies; for women’s autonomy and 
right to respect for private life see Llantoy Huaman v Peru (2005) HRLJ 26, 348, Tysiac v Poland 
2007 (28) HRLJ 228, Pfeifer v Australia 2007 (28) HRLJ 286.  
37 The longer the gestation the more strongly the interests of the foetus they become.  
38 Steinbock supra n (14) at 41. 
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woman be acting in contravention of the Act if she terminates her pregnancy after 
the first 12 weeks of gestation where the conditions listed in section 2 (1) are non-
existent? If the answer is in the affirmative, it would mean that the foetus enjoys 
some kind recognition with some measure of protection.39 If not, then it would mean 
that pregnant women could terminate pregnancy up until birth.40  
 
In conclusion, the Court decision in this matter indicates that the Courts’ perspective 
on the right to life is narrow; the Court failed to recognise the foetus’ potential right to 
life during the first 12 weeks of the gestation period and beyond as it said that the 
foetus was not the bearer of rights.41 Although the foetus might not enjoy 
constitutional protection, it is submitted that the foetus possesses life and its life 
starts at conception but that life can be limited by the application of other 
constitutional provisions.42 The argument is not whether or not foetus enjoys legal 
protection as a human being, but whether the foetus possesses human life or not. It 
is further submitted that the foetus possesses life, and life does not begin at birth but 
at conception although it is only recognised legally at birth.43  
 
Although the foetus possesses life, the value of the life in the foetus does not carry 
more weight than that of the pregnant woman, the pregnant woman should be 
allowed to terminate the foetal life on medical grounds,44 and also she should be 
                                                 
39 The Court should in fact recognise that there is life in the foetus, but that life is not constitutionally 
protected as against the pregnant woman. 
40 Even if a woman does not abort, it would still be problematic where the foetus is shot in the womb 
by someone else, would that someone not be guilty of murder as he would have taken a life, in this 
case see S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126(E) where the Court found that the act of killing the unborn 
baby was not an offence; see also Masiya v Director of Public Prosecution 2007 2 SACR 435 (CC); 
on the beginning of legal personality, see Pinchin and Another NO v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 
(2) SA 254 (W); Ex parte Administrator Estate Asmall 1954 (1) PH G4 (N) and Ex parte Boedel 
Steenkamp 1962 (3) SA 953 (O). 
41 Christian Lawyers Association supra n (3) at 1121H; see also Slabbert MN (2000) The Human 
Embryo and Foetus: Constitutional and other Issues at 33 where she accepts that the foetus is not 
the bearer of the constitutional right to life.   
42 See section 36 of the Constitution. 
43 For recognition of personhood and the beginning of life, see Davel CJ & Jordaan RA (1998) The 
Law of Persons at 10-18; Kruuse supra n (14) at 136; see also Du Plessis LM Jurisprudential 
Reflections on the Status of Unborn Life (1990) TSAR 4; Van Niekerk (ed) (1991)The Status of Pre 
Natal Life; Kahn (ed) (1983) The Sanctity of Life; Meyerson D “Abortion: The Constitutional Issues” 
(1999) SALJ 50; Williams G “The Foetus and the Right to Life” (1994) 53 Cambridge LJ 71; Reeder 
JP Jr (1992) Killing and Saving: Abortion, Hunger and War 41-46, Judith and Thomson   supra n (5) 
at 91 where he argues that very early abortion is the killing of a person; Moreland JP and Geisler NL 
(1990) The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time Praeger Publishers New York at 34-35. 
44 In Llantoy Huaman v Peru (2005) HRLJ 26, 348, a pregnant woman with an anencephalic foetus 
was refused permission to abort the foetus, she approach the UN Human Rights Committee. The 
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allowed to decide whether she would like to have the baby or not, it is entirely her 
private decision and should be given that autonomy.45 
 
The point is that abortion terminates life; my argument therefore is not whether or 
not the foetus enjoys legal protection as a human being, but whether the foetus 
possesses life or not. It is therefore not relevant at what stage of the gestation period 
the pregnancy is terminated, what count is that life is terminated. Abortion terminates 
life that is not constitutionally recognised or protected. The Court’s decision of 
recognising abortion does not support the right to life. The other institution which 
does not support the right to life is euthanasia. 
 
5.3. Euthanasia 
 
5.3.1. Euthanasia Defined 
 
The second controversial institution that may have negative impact on life is 
euthanasia. Euthanasia means deliberately killing a person out of kindness.46 
                                                                                                                                                       
committee was of the view that Article 17 of ICCPR was violated since the Article protects woman 
from interference in decisions affecting their bodies and their lives. See also Tyslac v Poland (2007) 
HRLJ 28, 228 where a pregnant woman intended to terminate her pregnancy on medical grounds but 
the hospital refused, the woman gave birth and her health deteriorated after birth. She took the matter 
to European Court Of Human Rights. She complained that her right to due respect for her private life 
and her physical and moral integrity had been violated. The Court concluded by six votes to one that 
there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in that the state failed to comply with its 
positive obligation to secure to the woman the effective respect for her private life. On the value of 
life, see Hall RE and Jones CI “The value of life and the rise of health care spending” (2007) 122 (1) 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics at 39-72;  Yorke J (2012) The Right to Life and Value of  
 Life at 1; Viscusi WK “The value of life and health” (1993) 31 Journal of Economic Literature 1912- 
1946; Feldman AM “The value of life” available at www.econ.brown.edu/fac/fallen-feldman/files (site 
last visited 31 Oct 2012); Brannon I “What is a life worth?” available at 
www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regu27n4/v27n4 (site last visited 15 Jan 2014) .    
45 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973), District Attorney of Dallas County, where the Texas statutes 
prohibited abortion and were challenged constitutionally by Ms Roe in Texas on the basis that the 
statutes were vague and abridged her personal privacy. The Court decided that a woman’s privacy 
allows her to terminate pregnancy within a regulated environment. see also Doe v Bolton 410 US 179 
(1973), Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danforth Attorney General of Missouri 505 US 833 
(1992). 
46 Dworkin RM supra n (6), at 3, See also Glick HR (1992)The Right to Die: Policy Innovations and its 
Consequences at 98; Schwar TG, Loubser JD, Olivier JA (1988) Forensic  ABC in  Medical Practice 
at 24; Wennberg RN (1989) Terminal Choices: Euthanasia, Suicide and the Right To Die at 7-8; M 
Somerville MA (2001) Death Talk, the Case against Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide 13-
23; Humphrey D (1992) Dying with Dignity: Understanding Euthanasia at 111; Berger AS (ed) 1990 
To Die or Not to Die: Cross –disciplinary, Cultural and Legal Perspective on the Right to Choose 
Death at 25, 31-34; Moreland JP (1990) The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time 
Praeger Publishers New York at 63-65. 
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Euthanasia can also be described as the action of bringing about a seriously 
suffering person’s death by at least one person, where the motive for ending the life 
is merciful and the means chosen is as painless as possible.47 Euthanasia amounts 
to the patient’s right to die when he wishes to. The right to die in this context means 
the right not to continue living a miserable life, a life which is no longer as valuable 
as it used to be in the eyes of the suffering patient. Patients who want to die should 
not be kept alive against their will if they are terminally ill and in a permanent 
vegetative stage.48 Persistence or permanent vegetative stage refers to the stage 
where a vegetative patient’s cerebral cortex - the thinking, feeling part of brain is out 
of action.49 The question to be answered when dealing with euthanasia cases is: Do 
terminally ill patients with no prospect of recovery enjoy the right to life or should we 
alleviate them of their suffering by letting them die, or should we actively assist them 
to die?  
 
Active euthanasia occurs when one, whether on request or not, terminates the life of 
someone for mercy, on the other hand passive euthanasia occurs when a terminally 
ill person is let to die.50 Active euthanasia and assisted suicide are still not lawful but 
passive euthanasia, just letting a person die, is lawful. There are a few cases of 
euthanasia decided by our courts; the legality of euthanasia in South Africa is 
discussed below and the landmark cases on euthanasia in South Africa and abroad 
are also discussed. The common feature in the South African cases, and the cases 
heard and decided elsewhere in the world, is the remarkable leniency accompanying 
the convictions therein. 
 
                                                 
47 Beauchamp TL & Perlin S (1978) Ethical Issues in Death and Dying at 218 and 219; see also Egan 
A “Should the State Support the Right to Die?” (2008) 2 SAJBL 47; Gula RM (1994) Euthanasia: 
Moral and Pastoral Perspectives Paulist Press New York at 21-22; Humphrey D (1992) Dying with 
Dignity: Understanding Euthanasia Carol Publishing Group at 21, 191-196; Miley LD (1981) 
Euthanasia: Mercy or Murder, Randal House at 14; Momeyer RW (1988) Confronting Death, Indiana 
Univ Press at 121-122 and Paterson C (2008) Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Ashgate at 11-12. 
48 Berger AS (1920) Dying and Death in Law and Medicine: A Forensic Premier for Health and Legal  
Professionals at 45.  
49 Bryan Jennet in Sheila ED & McLean AM (eds) (1996) Death, Dying and the Law at 19. 
50 On differences between active and passive euthanasia see supra n (43), Schwar TG et al (1998) 
Forensic ABC in Medical Practice at 24, James Rachel in Baird RM & Rosenbaum SE (eds)  (1989) 
Euthanasia The Moral Issues at 45; Thomas D. Sullivan ibid at 53-59, Yount L The Library in a Book: 
The Right to Die and Euthanasia at 4-5, Moreland JP & Geiser NL (1990) The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time at 65-66, The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law (1994) 
When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context at 63-64, Young R 
(2007) Medically Assisted Death at 85-97 and Gomez FG (1991) Regulating Death at 14-15.   
111 
 
5.3.2. Clark v Hurst and Others 
 
In Clark v Hurst and Others,51 the patient went into cardiac arrest and suffered 
serious and irreversible brain damage due to the prolonged deprivation of oxygen to 
the brain. He had become deeply comatose and had remained in that condition 
since 1988 until the trial date, 30 July 1992. The patient had lost all bodily functions; 
he was fed artificially by means of a naso-gastric tube. There was no prospect of 
improvement and no possibility of recovery. The patient was in a persistent 
vegetative stage.52 The patient’s wife applied to the Court to be appointed as curatrix 
to the patient’s person with the capacity to agree or withhold agreement to any 
medical or surgical treatment for the patient, to authorise any discontinuance of any 
treatment to which the patient was subjected or to which the patient may in future be 
subjected, including the discontinuance of any naso-gastric or other non-natural 
feeding regime and to act likewise despite that the implementation of her decision 
may hasten the death of the patient.53  
 
The applicant argued that the discontinuance of artificial feeding or the removal of 
the tube would not cause death and that what would cause the patient’s death was 
the cardiac arrest that occurred five years earlier. All that the various medical 
attendants have been able to do was to suspend the process of death, not to save 
the patient’s life, the applicant argued.54 
 
The patient was a qualified medical doctor and a life member of the SA Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society. The patient had signed a living will in which he had directed his 
family, physician and any hospital not to be kept alive by artificial means should he 
suffer irreversible damage with no prospect of recovery.55 The patient did not want to 
be kept alive artificially. 
 
The Attorney General of Natal opposed the application and filed an affidavit in which 
                                                 
51 Clark v Hurst and Other 1992(4) SA 630 NDP, see also S v Nkwanyana 2003 (1) SA 303 (W), S v  
Smorenberg 1992 (2) SACR 289 (C), S v Robinson 1968 (1) SA 666 (A) and S v Grotjon 1970 (2) SA 
355 (A).  
52 Ibid at 632C-E. 
53 Ibid at H-J. 
54 Ibid at 633B-D. 
55 Ibid at 633G. 
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he said that he was not prepared to undertake in advance not to prosecute should 
the steps be taken to terminate the patient’s life and that he was not prepared to 
declare in advance what his decision would be in the event of such steps being 
taken.56 
 
The Court said that the decision whether the discontinuance of artificial nutritioning 
of the patient and the resultant death would be wrong, depended on the society’s 
boni mores.57 The boni mores decision depends on the quality of life which remained 
to the patient, the physical and mental status of the patient’s life.58 After careful 
consideration of all facts and the expertise of various role players,59 Court concluded 
that the patient’s brain had permanently lost the capacity to induce a physical and 
mental existence at the level which qualified as human life, and that the feeding of 
the patient did not serve the purpose of supporting human life as it was commonly 
known, and the applicant, if appointed as curatrix, would act reasonably and would 
be justified in discontinuing the artificial feeding and would therefore not be acting 
wrongfully if she were to do so.60  
 
The Court’s decision in this matter was correct. What would be the purpose of 
postponing the inevitable death of a person who would not even recognise he or she 
is alive. The patient had potentially lost the right to life when he slipped into coma 
with no prospect of recovering. The right to life, like any other fundamental human 
right, should be exercises consciously. The permanent vegetative stage patients 
cannot exercise, nor will they ever exercise or enforce any right, as they cannot even 
recognize that they are alive. Although this matter was decided before the new 
constitutional dispensation in South Africa, it would probably have been 
constitutional. The limitation of the right to life in this scenario would be reasonable 
and justifiable. It would be reasonable in that that right in question is no longer being 
enjoyed by the bearer to the fullest, that the bearer of the right no longer wants to 
enjoy it, and must be given the freedom to choose how he or she dies. So the nature 
of the right in question plays an important role. The limitation, that is the taking away 
                                                 
56 Ibid at 634B-D. 
57 Ibid at 653B. 
58Ibid at 653C, see also Gay-Williams J “The Wrongfulness’ of Euthanasia” in Baird RM & 
Rosenbaum SE (eds) (1989) Euthanasia The Moral Issues at  97-98.   
59 Ibid: see various reports of experts at 641C-F, 642I-J and 634A. 
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the right to life, serves the purpose intended by the bearer of the right, that is to 
relieve him of pain and suffering.61 
 
5.3.3. State v Hartman 
 
In Hartman,62 the medical practitioner was accused of killing his father out of 
compassion.63  The deceased, aged 87 when he died, had for a number of years 
been suffering from a carcinoma of the prostate. The condition had spread and 
secondary cancer had manifested itself in his bones. The deceased had been living 
in Pretoria with the accused’s brother. The accused visited on occasion and during 
the earlier part of 1974 found his father bedridden and suffering in great pain.64 
 
The accused convinced his father to visit him in Cape Town where the father later 
entered the Ceres Hospital as the private patient of the accused on 22 August 1974. 
At that stage the deceased was on symptomatic treatment, and there was no longer 
any question of cure.65 The deceased was, on admission, completely bedridden, 
very emaciated, incontinent and on pain-killing drugs. The accused, seeing his father 
in great pain instructed the nursing sister to give his father half-a-gram of morphine, 
which she did.66  The accused administered another dose of morphine and injected 
Pentothal into the drip and within seconds of his doing so, his father died.67 
 
The witnesses testified that the immediate cause of the deceased’s death was the 
administration by the accused to the deceased of Pentothal.68 The accused did not 
dispute the evidence.69 The court conceded that the deceased was in dying 
condition when the dose of Pentothal was administered and that there was evidence 
that the deceased may very well have died as little as a few hours later, but the 
Court continued and said that nonetheless such an act constitutes a crime of murder 
                                                                                                                                                       
60 Ibid at 659A-C.  
61 S 36 of the 1996 Constitution provides for the limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights. 
62 S v Hartman 1975 (3) SA 532 CPD. 
63 Ibid at 553C.  
64 Ibid at 532C-D.  
65 Ibid 533D. 
66 Ibid 533G. 
67 Ibid at 533H. 
68 Ibid at 534A. 
69 Ibid at 534C. 
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even if all the accused had done was to hasten the death of a human being due to 
die in any event.70 
 
The Court classified the accused’s action in this case as a “mercy killing”. The Court 
nevertheless found the accused guilty of murder.71 The accused’s sentence was the 
detainment until the rising of the Court and the balance was suspended for one year 
on condition that the accused would not; during the period, commit an offence 
involving the intentional infliction of bodily injury.72 
 
The Court’s lenient sentence might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of 
euthanasia. However, that might not be the case. The Court’s intention was to do 
justice, which is to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. In this matter all 
elements of murder were present and the Court correctly found the accused guilty of 
murder. The court recognised that the crime committed was not an ordinary murder, 
but mercy killing. The perspective of the Court was right in that it recognised that 
there was life in the deceased, life that was inevitably ending at the time the accused 
injected the Pentothal to hasten the deceased’s death. The Court recognised the 
deceased’s right to life and realistically admitted that the accused’s action was 
understandable. The accused’s action of killing his father in this case was noble but 
not legal. Judged from the stance of boni mores, the accused would not have acted 
wrongfully, however, still would have acted illegally.  
 
5.3.4. State v Bellocq 
 
In another case involving mercy killing, S v Bellocq, a woman was found guilty for 
killing her baby for being an idiot.73 The accused gave birth to a premature baby. 
The baby was kept at the hospital to be put in an incubator.74 A few days later the 
accused learned that the child had had a lumber puncture and the diagnosis was 
that the child suffered from a disease known as toxoplasmosis. The accused knew 
                                                 
70 Ibid at 534E. 
71 Ibid at 535C.  
72 Ibid at 537G. 
73 S v Bellocq 1975 (3) SA TPD 538.  
74 Ibid at 538F-G. 
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that the child was already an idiot.75 In bathing the child she suddenly decided it 
would be best to do away with the child and she drowned the child.76  
 
It was argued that her conduct amounted to culpable homicide but not murder. The 
Court concluded that since the accused confessed that she did intend to kill the 
child, she must be found guilty of murder.77 The law does not allow any person to be 
killed whether the person is an imbecile or very ill. The killing of such person as an 
unlawful act and it amounts to murder in law.78 Like in Hartman, the sentence was 
very lenient;79 the accused was discharged on condition that she enters into 
recognizance to come up for a sentence within the following six months if called 
upon.80 The leniency of the sentences in cases involving mercy killing is the 
recognition by the judiciary of the end of the right to life of the human being who is in 
a permanent vegetative stage. However, the same cannot be said about the 
recognition of the beginning of the right to life at the other end of the life circle.81  
 
5.3.5. Conclusion: Euthanasia 
 
The judiciary recognises that the right to life extends to those who no longer wish to 
live; on the other hand the judiciary indirectly recognises that the quality of life 
determines whether a person should continue to live or not.82 The Courts’ 
perspective on euthanasia and the right to life is clear; people who wish to die due to 
irreversible vegetative state or any other irreversible medical condition have the right 
to life but that right is limited by the interests of the patients.83  
                                                 
75 Ibid at 538G-H.  
76 Ibid at 538H. 
77 Ibid at 539B. 
78 Ibid at 539D. 
79 Supra n (51) at 537G. 
80 Supra n (62) at 539E-F. 
81 Christian Lawyers Association supra n (3) at 1121H.  
82 In Cruzan v Director Missouri Dept of Health 497 US 261(1990) the US Supreme Court allowed 
Nancy’s parents to direct the hospital to withhold nutrition to hasten her death, see also in the matter 
between Quinlan, the Supreme Court, State of New Jersey 355 A2D 647, 1976, Bouvia v Superior 
Court ex rel Glenchur cal Repter 297 C. CT APP (1986), Compassion in dying ET al v State of 
Washington 850 F. SUPP.1454 (1994)/79 F.3RD 790 (9th Cir 1996), Quill v Koppel 870F.SUPP. 
78(S.D.N.Y)(1994), Washington  State v Glucksberg 1175.CT.2258(1997), New York State v Quill 
1175.CT.2293 (1993).  
83 See David v Schapira in Berger AS (ed) (1990) To Die or Not to Die: Cross Disciplinary, Cultural 
and Legal Perspective on the Right To Choose Death at 9-10 where it is argued that patients have 
the ultimate right to control all aspects of medical care; see also Humphrey D (1992) Dying with 
Dignity: Understanding Euthanasia at 103-107; Battin MP (1994) The Least Worst Death: Essays in 
116 
 
 
The decision to die is a personal decision which must be respected. People should 
be allowed to die in dignity and not be forced to live the life they no longer enjoy. Are 
people allowed to make life and death decisions? People make life and death 
decisions when they procreate, they also make life and death decisions when they 
decide to abort the developing embryo or when they request others to end their lives 
when they no longer want to live or when others make decisions on their behalf that 
they must die as they may no longer be able to take that decision.84 
 
Do people have the right to die? Not exactly, as dying is the natural process that 
need not be conferred by law. Whether people have the right to die or not, they 
would die anyway. There is no need to exercise a right to die, but there is a need to 
exercise the right to take a decision about how one dies, especially when one no 
longer enjoys the life he or she lives at a particular moment in life. The question is 
whether the decision of how or when his life should end violates the right to life?   
 
The answer to the question posed in the preceding paragraph is not in the 
affirmative. The right to die is a personal decision and people have the right to 
decide what happens to them for as long as that decision does not affect the 
community negatively. The right to life would be limited in this case because the 
limitation would be reasonable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity equality and freedom. People who want to die would be allowed to die with 
dignity. Euthanasia would serve the purpose of the limitation as far as the nature of 
the right and the interests of the patients who want die are concerned.85 The 
purpose of euthanasia would be to relieve the person of his intense and unbearable 
suffering, which cannot be otherwise alleviated, when the end of his life is inevitable 
and he no longer wishes to continue with it; or to put an end to the vegetative state 
he is in – the termination of such existence would be the less restrictive method of 
achieving the object.86 The relation between the limitation and the purpose in 
                                                                                                                                                       
Bioethics on the End of Life at 279, also see Pretoria News of 3 November 2011 where Prof Sean 
Davidson admitted aiding her sick mother to die,  and Pretoria News of 12 January 2012 wherein 
Sean indicated no remorse for assisting his mother to die in dignity. He served five months home 
detention in New Zealand (Pretoria News 03 May 2012).  
84 See also Dworkin RM supra n (6) at 179,183 and 184. 
85 S 36(1) of 1996 Constitution. 
86 S 36(1)(e) of  1996 Constitution, see also Battin  MP (1994) The Least Worst Death: Essays in 
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euthanasia is the reason why the patient wants to end his or her life, to be allowed to 
die in dignity. The patient would benefit from death, as death also signals the end of 
suffering. I believe there would not be any less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose, which in this case is to end torment. It is therefore concluded that 
euthanasia would pass the requirements set out in section 36 of the Constitution, 
should a court ever be required to pronounce on that issue.  
 
While some may decide to take their own lives, others’ lives may be under threat 
from being taken by the State: I have thus come to the final section of this chapter - 
the death penalty. 
 
5.4. Death Penalty 
 
After euthanasia and abortion, death penalty is the last controversial matter 
enveloping both the developed and the developing world, including South Africa (for 
the purposes of discussing the judicial decision on the right to life) and the United 
States of America, the latter still practicing the death penalty. The death penalty is a 
form of punishment where a convicted person is put to death. The death penalty was 
a controversial form of punishment in South Africa; until it was abolished by the 
Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane.87  The death penalty brings life to an end, 
which prima facie violates the right to life. The right to life is enshrined in section 11 
of the 1996 Constitution (section 9 in the 1993 Constitution). In this section the right 
to life in the context of the death penalty is discussed and contrasted with the 
decision in the access to medical treatment case.88  These cases are analysed and 
contrasted and at the end of the Chapter the conclusion is presented as to whether 
the Constitutional Court has been consistent in its approach to the right to life.  
 
For purposes of this discussion, death penalty is the putting to death of a convicted 
                                                                                                                                                       
Bioethics on the End  of Life at 101 where he argues that the case of euthanasia rests on three 
fundamental moral principles of autonomy, mercy and justice. See also Pretoria News of 15 July 2014 
wherein Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu argued that Euthanasia would constitute a dignified 
death where someone is terminally ill with no prospect of recovery, in the Citizen 15 July 2014 the 
Political Opposition leaders Helen Zille argued that Euthanasia is a personal choice, personal matter. 
Meanwhile Pretoria News of 20 August 2014 reported that IFP Parliamentarian Mario Oriani-
Ambrosini took his life to end his suffering from rare form of inoperable lung cancer.  
87 Makwanyane supra n (2). 
88 Soobramoney v Minister of Health KZN 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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person as a form of punishment; murder on the other hand is the intentional killing of 
a human being or unlawful premeditated killing of one person by another.89 Both the 
death penalty and murder involve the taking of someone’s life; in the former case the 
State takes life legally as a form of punishment, while in the latter the perpetrator 
intentionally and unlawfully takes someone’s life. Does the word “everyone” used in 
section 11 of the Constitution include the murderer, the foetus, the poor and the 
dying? The Constitutional Court was called upon to decide whether the death 
penalty would violate the right to life. The decision was taken in terms of the 1993 
Constitution, and became the landmark case on death penalty, the right to life, 
dignity and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, degrading and unusual 
punishment in South African constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
5.4.1. State v Makwanayane and Others 
 
The accused applied to the Constitutional Court to have section 277(1) (a) of the 
Criminal procedure Act 51 of 1977 declared unconstitutional. The accused were 
convicted on four counts of murder, one of account of attempted murder and one 
account of robbery with aggravating circumstances.90 On appeal to the then 
Appellate Division (now Supreme Court of Appeals) the appeals against the 
conviction and sentences were dismissed and the further hearing of the appeals 
against the death sentence were postponed until such time as the newly constituted 
Constitutional Court should determine the constitutionality of the death sentence.91 
No execution had taken place in South Africa since 1989.92 In the interim the 
convicted persons were waiting on death row for the issue to be resolved.93 
 
The issue before the Constitutional Court was the constitutionality of section 277(1) 
(a) of Criminal Procedure Act. This section prescribed the death penalty as a 
competent sentence for murder and other capital offences. The counsel for the 
South African Government informed the court that Government had accepted that 
the death penalty was cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and should be 
                                                 
89 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th Ed at 938, see also Kahn E “What is happening to the death 
penalty?” (1981) 98 SALJ 103, Kahn defines death penalty as a dreadful homicide at 105. 
90 Makwanyane supra n (2) par [1]401C-D. 
91 Ibid par [3] 401G. 
92 Ibid par [6] 402 D. 
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declared unconstitutional.94 The Attorney General on the other hand contended that 
death penalty was necessary and accepted form of punishment was not cruel, 
inhuman and degrading within the meaning of section 11(2) of the 1993 
constitution.95 
 
Chaskalson P delivered the judgment, with all judges concurring. The Court looked 
and used international and foreign law extensively in its interpretation of the 
Constitution to support its decision that death penalty is inhuman and degrading 
punishment.96 The argument brought forward by the applicants in support of their 
contention was that the imposition of the death penalty for murder was cruel, 
inhuman and degrading, that the death penalty was an affront to human dignity, 
inconsistent with the unqualified right to life entrenched in the Constitution; that it 
could not be corrected in the case of error; that it was enforced in a manner that was 
arbitrary, and that it negated the essential content of the right to life and other rights 
which flow from it.97  
 
The Court rejected the Attorney General’s contention that the death penalty was a 
necessary and deterrent form of punishment and accepted the applicant’s contention 
that death penalty was cruel, inhuman and degrading form of punishment. The Court 
said that it had not been shown that the death sentence would be materially more 
effective to deter or prevent murder than the alternative sentence of life 
imprisonment would be. Taking these factors into account, as well as the element of 
arbitrariness and the possibility of error in enforcing the death penalty, the clear and 
concise case that is required to justify the death sentence as a penalty for murder, 
had not been made out.98 
 
5.4.2. Analysis of Court’s Decision and Reasoning 
 
The court decided that the requirements of section 33, the limitation clause, had not 
been satisfied and the provisions of section 277(1) (a) of Criminal Procedure Act 
                                                                                                                                                       
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid par [11] 404C-D. 
95 Ibid par [11] 404C-D. 
96 Ibid paras [33] to [79]. 
97 Ibid par [27] 410C. 
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were unconstitutional. The decision of the Court was correct; however, Chaskalson 
P seemed to emphasise the issues of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment 
over the destruction of life caused by the death sentence. He mentioned that the 
right to life and dignity were the most important of all human rights, and the source of 
all other rights in Chapter 3,99 but his conclusion was based on the death penalty 
being a cruel, inhuman and degrading form of punishment.100 Chaskalson’s 
protection of the right to life was very narrow. It is noteworthy that other judges 
emphasised the right to life, as well as the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment, before outlawing the death penalty.101 
 
As mentioned above, it is disappointing that the court did not focus its decision on 
the breach of the right to life, but on the cruel, inhuman and degrading element 
inherent in the death penalty.102 On its own, this reason could have easily failed 
because one may have argued against the cruelty of that form of punishment. The 
elements of arbitrariness and the possibility of error are good reasons to outlaw 
death penalty.103 
 
5.4.3.  Conclusion: Death Penalty 
 
The Court’s decision was correct although Chaskalson differed with other judges on 
the right to life relationship with the death sentence. He clearly did not have or share 
the same understanding as the other judges who emphasised that the death 
sentence was a cruel, inhuman and degrading form punishment and breached the 
right to life as well. Death sentence destroys life before it can even be classified as 
                                                                                                                                                       
98 Ibid par [146] 451G-H.  
99 Ibid par [144] 451D. 
100 Ibid par [146] 451G-I 
101 Ibid. Ackerman J par [166] 458B-C, Didcott J par [174] 461E, Langa J par [217] 479C, O’Regan J 
par [318] 504B-C.   
102 Ibid Chaskalson P par [146] 451-I, on inhuman treatment see N v UK 2008 (29) HRLJ 289, Gafgen 
v Germany 2008 (29) HRLJ 56, and Article 13 of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949; Gaitan A & Kuschnik B “Tanzania’s death penalty debate: An 
epilogue on Republic v Mbushuu” (2009) 9 AHRLJ 459 at 463 where it is stated that Tanzania hangs 
the accused to death. 
103 Ibid par [145] 451E-F, see also Chenwi L “Breaking New Ground: The Need for a Protocol to the 
African Charter on Abolition of Death Penalty in Africa” (2005) 5 AHRLJ 89, at 96 where Chenwi 
argues that arbitrariness in the use of death penalty cannot be eliminated because of the 
imperfections inherent in criminal trials; Bojosi K “The Death Row Phenomenon and Prohibition 
against Torture, Cruel or Degrading Treatment” (2004) 4 AHRLJ 303, Van Zyl Smit D “The Death 
Penalty in Africa” (2004) 4 AHRLJ 1 and Laubscher P “The Death Penalty” (1998) 115 SALJ 773. 
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punishment. Punishment should not destroy the right but rather be used as a 
corrective measure and clearly one will not correct another by killing him or her. 
 
 The Court rightfully concluded that the death penalty failed to meet the 
requirements of the limitation clause in that it would not qualify as the less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose for limiting the right.104 Life sentence could be used 
as a less restrictive means to punish the convicted criminal. The nature of the right in 
question is that once taken away it could not be restored.105 The right to life is the 
mother of all human rights contained in both national constitutions and international 
human rights instruments.106 Therefore the right to life must always be valued above 
any other right in the overall scheme of things.107 “Human life bears inestimable 
worth regardless of externally applied criteria”, Thomasma argues.108 
 
The death penalty is cruel punishment in that in most cases the convicted prisoners 
have to wait for a very long period of time before the actual execution.109 It is a 
mental torture for a prisoner as a human being to wait for his or her demise. Then 
life sentence would be a less restrictive means to remove the convicted killer from 
                                                 
104 Currie I & De Waal J (2013) The Bill of Rights Handbook, 6th Ed Juta at 170, Davis D, Cheadle H, 
Hayson N (1997) Fundamental Rights in the Constitution at 319-320; on the appropriateness of death 
penalty see S v Mafu 1992 (2) SACR 494(A), S v Van Niekerk 1992 (1) SACR 1 (A), S v Mazibuko & 
Another 1992 (2) SACR 491; on the question of less restrictive or alternate punishment to death 
penalty see Viljoen F “End Notes to the Death Penalty Decision” (1996) 113 SALJ 652, although life 
imprisonment is viewed as alternative to death penalty, some writers have indicated that even life 
imprisonment is cruel and degrading punishment, see Verrier C “Is Imprisonment in South Africa 
Legally Defensible?” (2009) December Advocate at 41; Gumboh E “The Penalty of Life Imprisonment 
under International Criminal Law” (2011) 11 AHRLJ 75 and Metz T “Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and 
Human Rights in South Africa” (2011) 11 AHRLJ 532. 
105 Ibid  at 178-179. 
106 Van Wyk D, Dugard J, de Villiers B and Davis D (eds) (1994) Rights and Constitutionalism: The 
New SA Legal Order at 213, see also article 6 of ICCPR, Article 3 of UDHR, article 1 of American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, article 4 of American Convention on Human Rights, 
article 2 of European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Article 4 of African Charter on Human Rights and People’s Rights, section 1(a) of the Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Lesotho, Section 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Botswana, section 4 of the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland, section 12 of the constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 
Article 6 of the constitution of the Republic of Namibia, and section 11 of the constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa.  
107 Thomasma DC (1990) Human Life in Balance John Knox Press at 39. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Van Niekerk BVD “Hanged by the Neck Until You are Dead” 1969 (86) SALJ 457; Van Niekerk 
BVD “Hanged by the Neck Until You are Dead” 1970 (87) SALJ 60 at 68; see also Kahn E “The 
Death Penalty in South Africa” (1970) 33 THRHR 108 at 134; Mihalik J “The Death Penalty in 
Bophuthatswana: A New Deal for Condemned Prisoners?” (1990) 107 SALJ 465; Mujuzi JD “Why the 
Supreme Court of Uganda should Reject the Constitutional Court’s Understanding of Imprisonment 
for Life” (2008) 8 AHRLJ 163, Mujuzi argues that whole life imprisonment is cruel, inhuman and 
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the community.110 The other reason why it was correct to abolish the death penalty, 
is that sentencing involves discretion on the part of individual judges who might 
harbour prejudices and as such the death penalty is arbitrary.111 The last and most 
important reason for not supporting death penalty is that there can be mistakes 
during the trial and an innocent person may be convicted; the sentence of execution 
cannot be reversed, unlike life imprisonment. Most importantly, I do not support the 
death penalty because it destroys life.112 Life is something that once lost may not be 
regained by whatever means.113 
 
5.5. Conclusion on the Right to Life in the Context of Abortion, Euthanasia and 
Death Penalty  
 
The three institutions, abortion, euthanasia and death penalty teach us that the right 
to life, like any other fundamental human right, is not absolute, it can also be limited 
in terms of section 36 of the 1996 Constitution.  The prohibition of the death penalty 
supports the right to life, while the acceptance of euthanasia does not. Abortion is 
also against the right to life. The perspective of the Court before which a person 
appears in connection with one of these institutions determines his or her fate. It is 
from these decisions where the inconsistency emanates: the judiciary has outlawed 
the death penalty,114 therefore supporting the right to life, while it allowed legislation 
regulating abortion115 to stand and failed to recognise pre natal life.116  
 
The three institutions, namely, the death penalty, euthanasia and abortion are part of 
the process of life. They are inevitably part and parcel of human existence in 
                                                                                                                                                       
degrading punishment at 185. 
110 Viljoen supra n (104), at 670-71 where he argues that life imprisonment is an adequate alternative 
available.  
111 Some judges favoured the death penalty: Viljoen supra n (104) at 653; see also Angus L, Grant E, 
“Sentencing in Capital Cases: Transvaal Provincial Division and Witwatersrand Local Division 1987-
1989” (1991) 7 SALJ 50; Murray C, Nielsen J & Tredoux C “The Death Penalty in the Cape Provincial 
Division 1986-1988” (1989) 5 SAJHR 154;  on the arbitrariness of death penalty see Hintzel MD “The 
Cost of Retaining the Death Penalty: Some Lessons from the American Experience” (1994) 111 SALJ 
55 at 57. 
112 Chenwi supra n (103). 
113 Van Niekerk BVD “Hanged by the Neck until You are Dead” 1970 (87) SALJ 60: Van Niekerk 
argues correctly that death penalty is gruesome, absolute and irrevocable, and irremediable in case 
of judicial error. 
114 Makwanyane supra n (2). 
115 Christian Lawyers Association supra n (3). 
116 Mshumpa supra n (40). 
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different phases of his or her life. Abortion involves the deliberate destruction of the 
embryo in its developmental stages before birth, the death penalty is the judicially 
sanctioned killing of the convicted person, and euthanasia involves the taking of a 
life for mercy. The death penalty does not support the right to life, and neither do 
euthanasia and abortion. The abolition of the death penalty by the Court in 
Makwanyane supported the right to life, while on the other hand the confirmation by 
the same Court of the Termination of Pregnancy Act did not support the right to life, 
hence one can argue that an inconsistency is shown by courts in decisions involving 
the right to life. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: INCONSISTENCY IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS: THE RIGHT TO 
LIFE IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
6.1. Right to Life in Perspective 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to undertake a comparative study and to critically 
analyse the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the High Courts on the right to 
life. The right to life is used as a means to show the inconsistency by the judiciary in 
taking the decision on similar matters.  The right to life is chosen as it is the most 
important of all human rights and it is the mother all rights in the Bill of Rights and 
other international instruments. Therefore the legal institutions that affect life both 
positively and negatively have been used to indicate and show the inconsistency of 
judicial decisions relating to, or involving life, namely, access to health care services, 
abortion, euthanasia, and the death penalty. 
 
The right to life for the purpose of this dissertation is viewed from two perspectives, 
namely, the protection and preservation of life. Protection of life refers to the 
situation where, for example, life is threatened by external factors such as criminal 
activities or other human activities and the police or authorities are called in to 
protect the communities or individuals against such threats.1 Preservation of life 
refers to the situation where life is threatened by factors such hunger, disease,2 and 
natural disasters and where human intervention in the form of medical intervention 
and provision of life saving necessities is possible but would require financial 
resources.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See section 14 of SAPS Act 68 of 2005, Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Lts 
t/a Metro Rail and Others 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC); Twinomugisha BK “Exploring Judicial Strategies to 
Protect the Right of Access to Emergency Obstetric Care in Uganda” (2007) AHRLJ 283 at 302 
where the writer contends that the State must not only prevent physical termination of life, but must 
work towards quality and sustainability of life. 
2 Menghistu F “The satisfaction of survival requirements” in Ramcharan BG (1985) The Right to Life  
in International law at 63, where links the right to life to starvation and lack of other basic needs 
required for survival. 
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6.2. Right to Life: Perspective of the Court 
 
The courts, as arbiters in the human society are called upon to adjudicate and 
interpret the law to give effect to it and thus protect and preserve human life. As 
indicated in the previous Chapters, various cases have come before both the 
Constitutional Court and the High Courts in which the courts were requested to 
interpret the law, the constitutional right to life. The decisions of the Courts in the 
right to life cases are therefore very important as it determines whether one’s life is 
preserved or not.3 The judgments of both the High Court and the Constitutional 
Court indicate without a doubt that conflicting decisions have been issued by both 
courts on the right to life, or that their perspective on the right to life differs.  
 
Although the South African jurisprudence on euthanasia has not developed, the 
courts issued favourable decisions in matters involving euthanasia.4 Euthanasia, as 
its main objective is to end life, does not support the right to life. The Courts have 
found people who have killed others out of mercy to be guilty of murder, but the 
punishments that followed have been lenient. However, the trend by the judiciary of 
being lenient on people who have committed euthanasia is not unique to South 
Africa.5  
 
Euthanasia may constitute a justifiable ground to limit the right to life in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. The limitation would be 
reasonable in that the right in question is no longer being enjoyed by the bearer to its 
fullest extent, that the bearer of the right no longer wants to enjoy it and must be 
given the freedom to choose how he or she dies.6 While euthanasia is the right that 
                                                 
3 In Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and Others 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) the Court ruled in favour of the applicant who sued State for not supplying life-saving drugs free 
of charge to pregnant mothers, Court saved millions of lives, and in Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
KZN 1998 1 SA 430 (CC) the Constitutional Court denied the ailing man the right to medical 
treatment at state expense and the patient died after that decision. 
4 Clark v Hurst and Other 1992(4) SA 630 NDP, see also S v Nkwanyana 2003 (1) SA 303 (W), S v   
Smorenberg 1992 (2) SACR 289 (C), S v Robinson 1968 (1) SA 666 (A) and S v Grotjon 1970 (2) SA 
355 (A). 
5 See Humphrey D (1992) Dying with Dignity: Understanding Euthanasia Carol Pub Group at 191-196 
where it is indicated that eleven doctors where accused of practising euthanasia in the United States 
but none of them was sent to prison.  
6 Paterson C (2008) Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Ashgate at 21 where he argues that decisions 
made by individuals that shape the course of their lives should be respected as long as they do not 
significantly injure or harm others; see also Momeyer RW (1988) Confronting Death, Indiana Univ 
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can be exercised to end a life which is inevitably on the edge, or almost at the end, 
of the life journey of an individual,7 abortion is the intentional ending of life at the 
beginning of life itself. 
 
The abortion controversy in South Africa is argued from religious perspective rather 
than a legal one, and religious groupings do not represent all citizens of the country 
more than an elected representative does.8 The matter of abortion is regulated by a 
statute.9 The Act allows a woman to terminate pregnancy during the first twelve 
weeks on request, meaning the woman is free to choose whether or not to keep her 
baby. The court has already decided that the foetus was not the bearer of any 
right.10 The court therefore avoided resolving the question as to whether abortion 
terminated life or not. I have argued that abortion terminates life, life that is not 
ordinarily constitutionally protected and thus it would seem that the Constitution 
would give more weight to the right of the mother to decide whether she intends to 
have the baby or not. My view is that life begins on conception and as such abortion 
terminates life.11 The above-mentioned High Court decision does not support the 
right to life; the Court did not give the right to life the widest possible interpretation.  
 
Another aspect discussed in this dissertation has been the fact that the right to 
access to health care services also indirectly supports the right to life. When the right 
to life is construed in the context of preservation and protection of life, the right to 
health becomes inevitably part of the equation of life.12 Adequate health care 
                                                                                                                                                       
Press at 121-123 and 146; Humphrey supra n(5) at 21. 
7 Euthanasia effectively means killing or ending someone’s life to relieve that person of the pain due 
to irreversible medical conditions the patient suffers, for different definitions of this concept, see 
Moreland JP and Geisler NL (1990) The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time Prager 
Publishers New York at 64; Swanepoel M “End of Life Decisions with Regard to Mentally Disordered 
Patient in SA (2011) 74 THRHR 402, South African Law Reform Commission: Report on Euthanasia 
and Artificial Preservation of Life (1998) RP 186/1999 ISBN 062129831X; Young R (2007) Medically 
Assisted Death at 61-83, Shandu S “Prisoners Waiting to Die with Dignity” (2004) Nov DR 18; Boyd K 
Callghan B, Shotter E (1986) Life before Birth: Consensus in Medical Ethics Bell and Bain Ltd 
Glasgow at 2-5, Gula RM (1994) Euthanasia: Moral and Pastoral Perspective Paulists Press New 
York at 20, 21-33; Humphrey supra n (5) at 21. 
8 Parliamentary members are elected by the electorate; see section 1(d) of the 1996 Constitution. 
9 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
10 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others 1998 (4) 111 (T). 
11 Moreland and Geisler supra n (7) at 34-35; see also Thomasma DC (1990) Human Life in the 
Balance at 41 where he argues that embryos and foetuses are pre-persons who enjoys peripheral or 
secondary rights.  
12 Menghistu supra n (2) at 63; and Ramcharan BG ibid  at 12; see also WS Vorster’s, definition of 
human life at 89; Du Plessis L.M and De Villiers, JR in Rights and Constitutionalism The New SA 
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services therefore preserve the right to life. The main reason people seek medical 
treatment is to cure the disease so as to save their lives against an imminent threat 
brought by the diseases or ailment or injuries in cases of car accident and other 
accidents. The right to access health care services then becomes a survival 
requirement, as the elongation of life depends on it when people are sick.  
 
The courts have decided three cases involving the right to health care linked to the 
right to life.13 In Soobramoney, the court interpreted the right to life, as entrenched in 
section 11, narrowly. The Court could have interpreted the Constitution generously; 
it could have explored further the interplay between socio-economic rights and the 
right to life, and concluded that Soobramoney enjoyed the right to life. The patient 
died after the judgment. This judgment did not support the right to life. 
 
In Van Biljon the Cape High Court ruled in favour of the prisoner who sought access 
to health care at the state’s expense and ordered the Government to provide the 
prisoners with treatment as prescribed to them by their physicians.14  The Court 
decided that lack of resources could not be a good reason to deny prisoners access 
to treatment at the State expense. This decision is in contrast with the Constitutional 
Court decision in Soobramoney, as both patients suffered from chronic ailments and 
wanted to prolong their lives medically. Although the other was a prisoner, both 
wanted to save their lives which I suppose had the same value at any given time. 
The decision in Van Biljon supported the right to life. 
 
The last case involving the right to medical treatment was that of the Treatment 
Action Campaign against the Department of Health.15 The applicants argued that 
that they could not afford the drugs themselves. The Court ordered the Government 
to provide anti-retroviral drugs to such mothers, as it found that the programme 
which the government had put in place was unreasonable. This Constitutional Court 
judgment supported the right to life although the Court’s decision was focused on the 
unreasonableness of the programme, rather than the preservation of life. The Court 
                                                                                                                                                       
Legal Order at 213. 
13 Menghistu supra n (2). 
14 Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) SA 441 C. 
15 Treatment Action Campaign supra n (3). 
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failed to link the right to life to access to health care services.16 
 
The right in the context of abortion came before the Court in Christian Lawyers 
Association.17 The Court ruled in favour of the defendants and concluded that foetus 
did not enjoy legal personality or protection. The decision was therefore not based 
on the right to life as foetus and the unborn children do not have legal personality 
and cannot enjoy any personal right.18 The decision did not support the right to life. 
 
Although euthanasia case was decided before the commencement of the 1996 
Constitution, that decision has never been reviewed or set aside by the 
Constitutional Court or Supreme Court of Appeal. In all the cases that came before 
the Courts the accused were found guilty but the sentences were so lenient that the 
inference drawn can be the judiciary recognizes that the right to life extends to those 
who no longer wish to live, on the other hand the judiciary indirectly recognized that 
the quality of life determines whether a person should continue to live or not. The 
decisions partially supported the right to life, however, the picture drawn from the 
decisions indicated legislative vacuum to guide the judiciary and public on the 
euthanasia matter once and for all. 
 
The Constitutional Court dealt with the right to life directly in Makwanyane when it 
rightfully outlawed the death penalty.19 The Court unanimously concluded that the 
death penalty was an inhuman and degrading form of punishment and therefore it 
was unconstitutional.20 The Court did not base its decision on the violation of the 
right to life only. But for the purpose of this dissertation, it must be emphasised that 
the death penalty violates the right to life as its result signals the end of life. The 
death penalty should be outlawed because it breaches the right to life, the nature of 
                                                 
16 Chirwa DM “The Right to Health in International Law: Its Implications for the Obligations of State 
and Non- State actors in Ensuring Access to Essential Medicine” (2003) 19 SAJHR 541 at 541 and 
565; see also Nthai S “The Implementation of socio-economic rights in South Africa” 1999 (July) De 
Rebus 41. 
17 Christian Lawyers Association supra n (10). 
18 Kruger H (ed), Skelton A (ed), Carnelley M, Human S, Kruuse H, Mofokeng L and Robinson JA 
(2010) The Law of Persons in South Africa, Oxford university Press at 21-23, Van Heerden B, 
Cockrell A, Keightley R, Heaton J (ed), Clark B (ed), Sinclair J (ed), and Mosikatsana T (ed) (1999) 
Boberg’s Law of Persons and Family 2nd ed Juta at 28-41. 
19 Makwanyane and Others v State 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
20 Ibid par [11] 404C-D. 
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which indicates that once destroyed, it cannot be reinstated;21 it also has elements 
of arbitrariness and prejudice.  
 
The Constitutional Court’s judgment supported that right to life indirectly.  The term 
‘indirectly’ is used because the Court’s own decision focused more on the aspect of 
inhuman treatment, rather than the right to life. Overall, however, the Court was 
correct in deciding that the death sentence was an inhuman and degrading form of 
punishment in a civilised society. Life imprisonment is a very good substitute and 
less restrictive alternative to the death sentence.22 The last and most important 
reason why the death sentence should be outlawed is that sometimes wrong people 
are convicted for a crime they did not commit.23  
 
6.3. Inconsistency in Judicial Decisions 
 
The courts, as arbiters in society, are called upon to adjudicate and interpret the law 
and to give effect to it, and must therefore - inter alia - protect and preserve human 
life.  The decisions of the Constitutional Court and the High Courts discussed in this 
dissertation indicated that the judiciary is not consistent on its decisions relating to 
the right to life presented in different context. The Court’s decision supported the 
right to life in one case involving access to health care, and the other decision of the 
same court did not support the right to life even though the facts were almost similar. 
In Van Biljon the Court’s decision supported the right to life while in Soobramoney it 
did not.24 Both cases involved access to health care to save lives. 
                                                 
21 When State Kills: The Death Penalty v. Human Rights, 1989 Amnesty International Publication at 1;  
Carpenter G “Case Law Constitutional Court Sounds the Death Knell for Capital Punishment S v 
Makwanyane” 1996 (59) THRHR 145 at 164; Le Roux J, Bekink B “The Abrogation of Death Penalty 
in South Africa: Participating in the Ongoing Debate” 2006 (69) THRHR 201 at 201-215. 
22 Recent decision of European Court of Human Rights in Venter and Others v. The United Kingdom,  
available at echhr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx visited on 10 July 2013 found that life sentence is 
inhuman and degrading punishment. See also Camarer S “What about the Victims” (1999) De Rebus 
at 22-25; Ngalwana V “Perverts Rights are Also Worthy of Constitutional Protection” (1998) De Rebus 
59-61; Gafgen . Germany HRLJ 2008 (29) 56; M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece HRLJ 2011 (31) 121; 
Giuliani and Gagglio v. Italy HRLJ 2011 (31) 185. 
23 When State Kills: supra n (21) at 2, where it is argued that the irrevocability of death sentence 
removes not only the victims right to legal redress for wrongful conviction but also judicial system’s 
capacity to correct its error, see also Nkosinathi Chiya Release after being convicted of murder and 
new evidence indicated that he may not have been the killer, www. iol.co.za visited 19 April 2013, 
Eikenhof Three released after six years for triple murder during the apartheid era, but PAC members 
took responsibility for attack and murder during the TRC Amnesty application, 
www.justice.gov/trc/media/1999/9911/p991109c (site last visited on 24 April 2013). 
24 See Soobramoney supra n (3), Van Biljon supra n (14). 
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The Court decision in Christian Lawyers did not support the right to life, while in 
Makwanayane it supported the right to life.25 Although the facts of the cases are not 
similar, life or the right to life features in both cases. The decision of the Court affects 
life either negatively or positively. So the judges must at least reach similar decisions 
for similar cases before them. 
 
The judges reach the correct decision when two or more judges arrive at the same 
conclusion when adjudicating the same subject matter or interpreting the same 
text.26 If the judges arrive at different conclusions, that means that the law does not 
determine the outcome, but rather the outcome is based on the different 
interpretation and understanding of the very law which the judges have been called 
upon to interpret. The courts have shown on different and many occasions that 
judges interpret and understand the law differently and that is the reason we have 
unanimous decisions,27 and split decision.28 An unanimous decision signals that all 
adjudicating judges agree and have reached the same conclusion in the case,29 and 
a split decision means that judges reached different conclusions, and those judges 
would have to vote: the majority decision would become the decision of the court.30  
 
For the most part, the Constitutional Court has since its inception been issuing 
conflicting decisions on the right to life. In the death penalty case, the Constitutional 
Court protected the life of the convicted murderer,31  and in contrast the Transvaal 
Provincial Division allowed the Termination of Pregnancy Act in an abortion matter 
                                                 
25 Christian Lawyers Association supra n (10) and Makwanayane supra n (19). 
26 Some decisions of the Constitutional Court are not unanimous, meaning some judges held different 
view on the subject matter. 
27 All eleven judges in Soobramoney v Minister of Health KZN 1998 (1) SA 765 CC; see other 
unanimous decisions: S v Vermaas 1995 (3) SA 292 (CC), S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC), 
Premier Kwazulu Natal and Others v President of RSA and Others 1996 (1) SA 769 (CC), Tshabalala 
and Others v Attorney General Transvaal and Another 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC), S v Ntuli  1996 (1) SA 
1218 (CC). 
28 In Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) out of eleven judges only Kriegler J dissented, Du Plessis 
and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (4) 331 (CC) where Kriegler J and Didcott J dissented. 
29 See Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996(4) SA 197 (CC), Key v Attorney-General Cape Provincial Division 
and Another 1996 (4) SA 187 (CC). 
30 In President RSA and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) only two judges dissented and the rest 
concurred, see also Executive Council, Western cape Legislature and Others v President of RSA and 
Others 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC), S v Coetzee and Others 1997 (3) SA 153 (CC). 
31 Makwanyane supra n (19). 
 
131 
 
which clearly was not supporting the right to life.32 In a socio-economic case, the 
Constitutional Court denied an indigent man the right to treatment, because he was 
suffering from chronic incurable disease,33 and in contrast the same Court granted 
anti-retroviral drugs to HIV positive pregnant women to save their unborn babies 
even though HIV is a chronic and incurable disease.34 In the abortion controversy it 
has been decided that developing embryo or unborn human beings did not enjoy the 
right to life as enshrined in the Constitution,35 this is in contrast to the anti-retroviral 
case where the mothers were seeking life-saving drugs for their unborn babies.36 
 
The Courts have given the right to life different degrees of protection and different 
perspectives; the Court outlawed the death penalty wherein most judges based their 
decision on the right to life.37 It is common cause that the death penalty does not 
support the right to life. In this case the court protected the right to life of the murder 
because even though a murderer, he still enjoyed the right to life as a human being. 
 
The inconsistency appears where the courts interpret the matter relating to the 
protection and preservation of the right to life differently as indicated by their support 
of abortion, support of passive euthanasia and prohibition of the death penalty. In 
any matter before the Constitutional Court where the court’s decision is not 
unanimous, the dissenting judgment would be in favour of the losing party, which 
means the judgment was partially in his favour. In the same breath, the dissenting 
judgment indicates that the winning litigant was wrong; the judgment would have 
been against him if the dissenting judges were in majority on the day in question.38 
  
The courts arrive at different conclusions because the law is indeterminate and the 
outcome is dependent on the understanding or interpretation of the law by the judge 
in question. Law varies in rhetorical forms; judges may misconceive the meaning of 
                                                 
32 Christian Lawyers Association supra n (10). 
33 Soobramoney supra n (3). 
34 Treatment Action Campaign supra n (3). 
35 Christian Lawyers Association supra n (10). 
36 Treatment Action Campaign supra n (3). 
37 Makwanyane supra n (19). 
38 Splits decisions: Glenister v President RSA 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC): four judges agreed with the 
President and five did not, see also Le Roux and Others v Dey [2011] ZACC4, S v Mhlungu and 
Others 1995(3) SA 867 (CC). 
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the constitutional text.39 This is because adjudication involves interpretation and it is 
with respect to interpretation that judges differ in their conclusions, even when they 
adjudicate the same disputes.40 The interpretation of statutes is essentially a 
creative and discretionary exercise.41 Van Zyl argues that justice, equity, good faith 
and boni mores contain subjective elements when they pertain to a particular person 
and the meaning thereof is dependent on and is inextricably linked to the personal 
circumstances of that particular individual.42  In the same vein, legal interpretation is 
in no way an exact science but rather a judicial art, in the end it is a matter of judicial 
instinct.43 In end, the judges of the Constitutional Court or the High Court, including 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, apply a science that is not determinate like other 
branches of science.44  
 
The inconsistency in the decision of the court is brought about by one factor, the 
human factor on the bench of both the Constitutional Court and the High Court with 
the power to decide someone’s fate.45 The inconsistency in this regard refers to the 
difference, in that there seems to be different understanding of the law by individual 
judges hearing the matter. The right to life, which is used here as the yardstick to 
                                                 
39 Woolaman S and Bishop M (ed) (2008)  Constitutional Conversations  at 1 and 5; see also Cockrell 
APH “Adjudication Styles in SA Private Law” (1993) 56 THRHR 590 at 606 where he suggests that 
different judges understand and justify their roles in profoundly divergent ways, Lord Denning Stevens 
(1997) Law and Politics 490; Cameron  E “Lawyers, Language and Politics-in Memory of JC De Wet 
and WA Joubert” (1993) 110 SALJ 51; Van Der Walt AJ “Striving for Better Interpretation - A Critical 
Reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harksen and FNB on the property clause (2004) 121 SALJ 
854 pp 854-878, Chetty D “The Perspective of a High Court Judge” (2004) 121 SALJ 493, see also 
Motala Z “The Constitution is not Anything the Court Wants It to be: The Mhlungu Decision on the 
Need for Disciplining Rules” (1998) 115 SALJ 141; Fiss OM “Objectivity and Interpretation” (1982) 34 
Stanford Law Review  739. 
40 Higher Courts can reach a different conclusion and set aside the decision of the lower Court, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals can overturn the decision of the High Court, and the Constitutional Court 
can overturn the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
41 Dlamini M “The Political Nature of the Judicial Function” (1992) 55 THRHR 411 at 416; see also 
Van der Walt J “The Relation between Law and Politics: A Communitarian Perspective” (1993) 110 
SALJ 757 at 768; see also Davis DM “Integrity and Ideology towards a Critical Theory of the Judicial 
Function” (1995) 112 SALJ 104 at 106; Motala supra n 20, wherein he argues that the constitutional 
interpretation of terms used therein invites widespread interpretation at 141. 
42 Van Zyl DH “The Significance of the Concepts ‘Justice’ and ‘Equity’ in Law and Legal Thought  
(1998) 105 SALJ 272 at 290. 
43 Brown LN & Kennedy T (2000) 5th ed    The Court of Justice of the European Communities at 323. 
44 In Chemistry one hydrogen molecule plus two oxygen make water (H2O), extraction of potassium 
irons from potassium permanganate result in the loss of purple colour by the chemical solutions, no 
matter who conducts  he experiment, but the same cannot be said about law, see Brown and 
Kennedy  supra n ( 43) at 323.   
45 The High Courts have inherent powers to decide anything except matters that can be heard by the 
Constitutional Court, see section 169 of the Constitution, and the Constitutional Court has the power 
to decide anything, see sections 172 and 173 of the Constitution. 
133 
 
indicate the inconsistency in judicial decisions, is enshrined in the Constitution in 
simple literal language without any qualification or limitation. This provision means 
that “life” must be protected, preserved and promoted. 
 
This is the perspective from which the court should understand and interpret the 
right to life: the right in section 11 relates to or has inevitable connections with “life”. 
One may argue that the adjudication process itself is not clear, it provides for 
different methods of interpretation which leaves the judges with wide discretion as to 
which method to apply. Then an individual judge chooses the method he or she 
prefers in a particular case. The different methods of interpretation utilised by 
different judges adjudicating the same case before them may results in them 
reaching different conclusions.  
 
The classical example of judges going astray was illustrated by Motala in which he 
asked: Does the Constitution mean what the court says it does?46 The question 
before the Court involved the transitional arrangement from the Interim Constitution 
about a matter pending before a court, section 241(8) of the Interim Constitution 
provided: 
 
 All proceedings which immediately before the commencement of this                 
            Constitution were pending before any court of law; including any tribunal or  
            reviewing authority established by or under law, exercising jurisdiction in  
            accordance with the law then in force, shall be dealt with as if this  
            constitution had not been passed. 
 
The decision of the court was split 5-4, the majority holding that the provision had to 
be interpreted to provide the most benefit in the widest possible way and the minority 
stated that there was no ambiguity in section 241(8).47 Motala correctly argues that 
there was no justification to depart from the express language of the Constitution 
and this is an example of a nihilistic assumption of the Constitution which ignores its 
text as being binding to judges.48 Motala argues further that the Constitution cannot 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
46 Motala Z supra n (39). 
47 S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC), 1995 (7) BCLR (CC) par 75. 
48 Motala Z supra n(39) at 154. 
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simply mean what the judges want it to mean and that judges must adhere to 
disciplining rules of interpretation.49 The text of the Constitution was very much clear 
in this case, but the majority decided to ignore it because they thought the result 
would be adverse to the applicant.50 It was not up the judges to correct the defect in 
law as they are not legislators but adjudicators.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
The decisions or judgments of both the Constitutional Court and the High Courts on 
the right to life indicate that adjudication is a complex process, but is all about 
interpreting the law.51 Adjudication involves interaction between the interpreter and 
the text itself.52 We cannot escape the reality that judges are human beings; they are 
also influenced by various factors in their dealings with the law.53 Language also 
complicates the understanding of law; law and language are inevitably linked.54 
 
The involvement of language in the life of law brings different context and 
understandings to adjudication and therefore different judgments.55 The language of 
law is sometimes ambiguous and complex. Legislatures do not have in mind the 
position of the interpreter and that of the person who seeks redress through law 
when making the law.  
 
As indicated above, the Constitutional Court and High Courts were called upon to 
adjudicate cases involving the right to life. I used euthanasia, death penalty, access 
to health care and abortion to illustrate the involvement of the judiciary in taking 
decisions on the right to life, or a matter in which the right to life may be implicated. 
Different courts ruled differently on the cases before them, but all cases involved the 
                                                 
49 Ibid at 155. 
50 Motala Z supra n (39) at 141-142. 
51 Fiss OM supra n (39) at 739; see also Brest P “Interpretation and Interests” (1984) 34 Stanford law 
Review 1325. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Chetty supra n (39) at 493; Dhlamini M “The Political Nature of the Judicial Function” 1992 (55) 
THRHR 411; Botha H “Freedom and Constraints in Constitutional Adjudication” (2004) 20 SAJHR 
249. 
54 Bix B (1993) Law, Language and Legal Determinacy Oxford University Press on pp 1-2 argues that 
language is the medium through which law acts. 
55 Hutchinson AC (2000) “It’s All in the Game” Duke University Press at 54-55; Carter LH (1998) 5th ed  
Reason in Law Addison Wesley Educational Publishers at 1. 
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right to life directly or indirectly. 
 
Some decisions of the court supported the right to life,56 and some did not support 
the right to life.57 The death penalty case in which the convicted murderer applied to 
have death sentence declared unconstitutional supported the right to life indirectly, 
while on the other hand a decision to confirm the validity of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act did not support the right to life. The denial of access to 
health care services in Soobramoney did not support the right to life; in contrast, the 
decision in Van Biljon to order government to provide lifesaving drugs to prisoners 
supported the right to life. 
 
It is therefore concluded that there is inconsistency in judicial decisions involving the 
right to life. The inconsistency is a result of the Constitution that was drafted as a 
political compromise between the National Party government and the African 
National Congress and other political parties at CODESA in 1993. The right to life for 
example, is enshrined in such way that a court can take any decision based on the 
provision,  it does not continue to qualify the right.58  
 
It is therefore recommended that section 11 of the Constitution be reviewed and 
amended to qualify the right to life so that the courts need not infer this right from 
other rights in the Bill of Rights. The provisions must be clear to indicate exactly 
what is allowed and what is not allowed in the context of the right to life. The 
Namibian Constitution’s right to life provision is clear, section 6 thereof provides that: 
 
The right to life shall be respected and protected. No law may prescribe death 
penalty as competent sentence. No Court or Tribunal shall have the power to 
impose sentence of death upon any person. No execution shall take place in 
Namibia. 
 
This Namibian constitutional provision on right to life is clear and to the point, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
56 Makwanayane supra n (19). 
57 Soobramoney supra n (2) (CC) and Christian Lawyers Association supra n (10). 
58 See section of the Namibian Constitution, it clearly indicate that death penalty is not allowed, see 
also article 8 of Lesotho Constitution, article 4 of Botswana Constitution, article 4 of Swaziland 
Constitution and section 12 of Zimbabwean Constitution. 
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especially on the issue of death penalty. The South African provision may therefore 
read as follows: 
 
11 (1) Every has the right to life; 
(2) The right to life is protected from conception until the person is certified death by 
medical practitioners; 
 (3) Death penalty may not be imposed as a sentence in the Republic; and 
  (4) Legislation regulating euthanasia and abortion must be enacted by    
                      Parliament within four years from the date of commencement of this  
           Constitution as proclaimed by the President in the National Gazette. 
 
The above provision would have dealt with the controversial death penalty matter in 
the constitution rather than leaving it to the Constitutional Court and High Courts to 
decide. It would also clarify the issue of constitutional protection of unborn child’s life 
and allowed the legislature to regulate abortion and euthanasia in national legislation 
with ease. The interests to be protected and promoted here would be life itself, life 
would be protected from conception and would also be protected from State 
execution through implementation of death penalty. Life would also be protected on 
the other end, euthanasia, when the quality of life is no longer worth enjoying, the 
law would regulate how to materialise the will of the person to die in dignity. On the 
same footing, the Constitution would allow pregnant woman a freedom to choose 
whether or not to have a baby through legislative provisions. These are the 
measures that would emanate from the proposed section 11 above. 
  
The second problem is that the Constitutional Court is given too much power to the 
extent that the law becomes what the Court believes it to be. Sometimes the court 
takes a policy decision on behalf of the electorate. The Court has become the Might 
who is always right. The decision of the Constitutional Court stands and there is no 
appeal or review or recourse against the decision of this Court. 
 
Because the decisions of the court are taken by majority votes, sometimes 5-4 split 
decisions, it is recommended that the decision of the Court be subjected to 
compulsory review after ten years or whenever two-thirds of the judges who 
participated in the votes on the decision are no longer serving. The review must be 
initiated by the Chief Justice on his or her own initiative or whenever the case before 
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Court deals with similar subject matter. The review applies to the Constitutional 
Court’s decisions only as is the apex court of the land. This would assist in speedy 
development of constitutional jurisprudence, as we have seen that consensus is not 
part of daily life at the Constitutional Court.  
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